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MALMEDY, BELGIUM MISTAKEN BOMBING, 23 AND 25 DECEMBER 1944.

Prepared B:
Royce L. Thompson,
European Section, OCMH.
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## CONTENTS.

CRITIQUE.		1-8.
Summery.		1.
23 December.		2-4.
Orders. The Flight and Reports.		
Photographs Identified MALMEDY. Mistake Explanations.		
24 December.		5.
25 Fecember.		6-7.
Flight and Reports.		0-7.
Mis-identification Reasons.		
fillied Air Commanders' Conference.		8.
DOCUMENTATION.		
23 December.		
I. IXth BD Mission Summary, 23 Dec	. 1.1	
II. IXth BD Photo Interpretation.		
III. 322d BG OPFLASH Report.		
IV. Pilot Interrogation Reports.		
V. 322d BG A-2 Log of Mission, 23 I	)ec. 44.	
VI. Orders.		
VII. Maps.		
VIII. Weather Office of IXth BD.		
IX. 322d BG History.		
X. MALMEDY-ZULPICH Distance and Ter	rain.	
XI. Route.		
Bibliography.		
25 December.		
I. Formation for 25 Dec. 44, 387th	BG.	
II. Interrogation Form of 387th BG,	25 Dec.	
III. IXth BD Photo Interpretation.	20.00	
IV. Unsatisfactory Bombing Report.		
V. Group's OPFLASH, 252020 Dec.		
VI. Overlay of Mission, by 387th BG.		
VII. IXth BD Mission Summary, 25 Dec.		
VIII. IXth BD Mission Report.		
IX. Eighth Air Force.		
Bibliography.		

#### SUMMARY.

MALMEDY was erroneously bombed on 23 and 25 December, not the 24th, by the IXth Bombardment Division(M), according to Ninth and Eighth Air Ferces' records. Photographs revealed the location, not pilot observation. Personnel mis-identification was responsible. Acknowledgement was made by the IXth BD in its daily report, but not by the Ninth AF. During the Allied Air Commanders' Conference on 4 January 1945, General Carl Spaces referred to an Alleged MALMEDY mis-bombing by the Eighth AF in December. That reference was the source for the only allusion to the MALMEDY accidents by the Air Force's official history.

ZULPICH was the assigned primary of the 322d Bombardment Group for the 23d, but of the 28 dispatched B-26's, six dropped 86 x 250 General Puppose bombs upon MALMEDY about 1526. Their personnel realized ZULPICH was not bombed, but believed LAMMERSUM six miles beyond had been attacked. Photographs disclosed MALMEDY as the victim. The flight was off course, bombed some 33 miles short, a town in hilly, forested country, whereas ZULPICH was in the open. Visibility was unlimited.

Enemy aircraft did not oppose, nor did flak prevent full load drops.

Four B-26's from the 387th BG dropped 64 x 250 GP's upon MALMEDY about 1600 on the 25th, instead of the nearby ST. VITH, the Group's objective. Pilot interrogation indicated a mistake, and BORN was believed to have been the locality. Photographic interpretation by the IXth BD again pointed to MALMEDY as the location. Personnel error was the apparent cause. Flight officers believed ST. VITH to be their position, inasmuch as instruments and visual observation agreed. Plane-to-ground visibility was three to four miles.

#### 23 DEC EMBER.

#### Orders.

ZULPICH(F-230327) was the primary target---no secondary, for the afternoon mission of the 322d BG.(VI,Bibl. #5, V) It was a necessary railhead for the German Seventh Army, according to the IXth BD, which named the town as the 322d BG's target. Bombing could be visual, if conditions permitted. In turn, the 99th Bombardment Wing added that the route was to be from the base to K-7746, to the target, and bombing was to be blind from approximately 12,000 feet at 1500. At 1145, the 322d's Operations notified A-2, and pilots were bracefed at 1230-1330.

#### The Flight and Reports.

Six B-26's attacked MALMEDY at 1526, while 22 others also dispatched to ZULPICH were aborted or bombed elsewhere.(I,IV,XI)

Maj. C. J. Watson's flight took off at 1328-1408. According to the course map, the briefed route was flown, which was from the base to ROTGEN(Initial Point), to target, left to SIERVENICH, and return.

Pilots named LAMMERSUM(F-3445), some six miles northeast of ZULPICE, as the target of their 86 x 250 GP bomb.(IV,V) Their A-2 statements immediately after the 1655-1730 landing were descriptive.

Flight Leader, Maj. C. J. "atson. --- "Fit town-not target-might be Lammersum. Excellent results on town."

2d Lt. D. R. Bustafson. --- "Center of town and walked out. Not target. Ex."

lst It. S. E. Eyberg. --- "Hit town of Lammersum - not target. Excellent on town."

lst Lt. R. T. Pike. --- "Bombs throug! certer of town - not target. Excellent results."

lst It. H. S. Isaacs. --- "Fit center of town - "as not target. Excellent results on town."

Conley. --- "Bombs blanketed small town. Did not bomb primary. --- 3 or 4 runs on T/O."

Based upon pilot reports, the Group telephoned the IXth BD about 1845 that ZULPICH had not been bombed, and believed LAMMERSUM had been attacked.(III,V) A 2210 amendment to the official OPFLASH #228 of 1915, repeated that data.

## Photographs Identified MALMEDY.

Flight cameras operated #100%, # and Capt. Bernhard O. Hougen,
IXth BD Photo Interpreter reported:

"6 A/C. P.N.B. Bombs hit through the center of the town of Malmedy, on buildings and streets in the town."

His "center of town" description was identical with pilots'. (II, IV)

Although the IXth BD acknoledged the mistake, the Ninth AF did not.(I, Bibl. #5) The IXth's daily Mission Summary as to the 322d BG reported "... 6 a/c bomted the town of Malmedy, 1/2 mile w of bombline, due to mis-identification of target..." by bombardier. In turn, the Ninth AF's Summary of Operations for the 23d, dated the 26th, referred only to EUSKIRCHEN and GLADBACH attacks by the 322d BG.

Pilot statements besed upon impressions were the original 322d BG information, then when later photographic interpretation provided accurate details, the Group's December history related this version.(IX)

"The Group's bombers headed for the defended area of Tulpich in the afternoon but weather conditions interferred with the operation and the majority of the aircraft brought t eir bombs back to base. Six aircraft misidentified the target and bombed the village of Malmedy in Belgium while four others bombed east of the village. ... Because of the fluid situation of the troop lines during the German Counter-offensive no serious damage to our troops was reported in the bombing of Malmedy."

## Mistake Explanations.

Pilots were lost and committed a personnel error, yet several mission factors seemed to favor the flight.

Location. --- MALMEDY was 33 air miles from ZULPICH, a substantial distance, even for aircraft, and LAMMERSUM was yet another six miles beyond ZULPICH.(X) Actually, the flight was off course and did not approach ZULPICH.(XI) MALMEDY was en route to both base-to-target and base-to-IP of ROTGEN where the formation was to take positions.

Terrain Could Be a Guide. ---- MALMEDY was in hilly, forested country, ZULPICH in the open.(X) LAMMERSUM and MALMEDY were bot! on rivers, however, possibly a perplexity. The former was on the ERFT, MALMEDY at the junction of 1A WARCHE and LA WARCHENNE RAU.(X)

Weather Was Favorable. ---- Pilots reported CEILING AND VISIBILITY UNLIMITED.(IV) Their descriptions of results and photographs were both detailed, sugg sting sharp observation.(IV,II) "eather did not affect bombing, the IXTh BD Weather Office reported.(VIII)

Enemy Was Not Distracting. ---- Aircraft opposition was lacking, and flak did not prevent dropping of 86 of the 87 carried bombs.(IV)

Attention is celled to possible tactical significance in the IXth BD's flak analysis of the 322d BG ZULPICH mission.(1) The location's identity was uncertain, however, inasmuch as ZULPICH was the target,

MALMEDY was bombed, but pilots believed LAMMERSUM had been attacked.

#### 24 DECEMBER.

No MALMEDY bombing evidence was found among air force records.

Such an incident was not mentioned in the IXth BD's Mission

Summary, as on the 23d and 25th.(I) Descriptions of missions to the

nearby ZULPICH and NIDEGEN did not refer to formations striking

MALMEDY by mistake. Records were not examined of the 387th, 397th,

410th, 416th BG's, which also attacked those two communication centers,
inasmuch as they were unsuspected.

Some Eighth AF heavy bomber attacks were made within the tactical area, but MALMEDY was not among them, according to the day's mission report No. 760. (2)

## Bibliography.

- 1. Inth Sombardment Division, Mission Summery, 24 Dec. 44. In Maxwell Field, Alabama. Air University. Air Historical Archives. 534.333, Dec. 44. Mission Summeries, Dec. 44.
- 2. Eighth Air Force, Mission No. 760. German A/F's & Communication Center, 24 Pec. 44. In Ibid. 520.332(or AF-8-SU-OP-S, 24 Pec. 44)

#### 25 DECEMBER.

## Flight and Reports.

Erroneous MAI MEDI bombing by four 387th BG sircraft occur ed during the executed afternoon mission of the JXth PD against ST.

VITH.(VII, VI) The 387th and 323d BG's dropped approximately
362-533 of 250 GP bombs, plus some 100's, enveloping the town in smoke. Briefing by the 387th BG was at 1300, and 36 B-26's were dispatched at 1430, to fly a course southeastward from an undesignated point, below SPA and STAVELOT to ST. VITH. Actually the flight passed between STAVELOT and MALMEET, bombed about 1600, then turned right at ST. VITH for the return.

Green Flight flew farther north, dropping 64 x 250 GP's upon
MALMEDY.(1) This was Flight A, Box I, 100 y Pilot Anderson and
Bombardier Shannon, followed by Pilots Missimer, Patterson, and Mueller.

The 387th BG realized at once that a mis-bombing had an place, but believed BORN(P-850940) to be the locality, a view repeated by the IXth BD in its first report.(II,V,VIII) This town was mentioned in the Group's interrogation report, which was likely made within two hours of the landing. The more official OPFLATE to the IXth BD carried the same information. In turn, the IXth BD's 15 Minute Mission Report noted in the 'deviation from route' column that "...850940 bombed by I flight" of the 387th BG. Thus, based upon pilot observation, early reports pointed to BORN as the victim.

Photographs rewested it to be MALMEDY, which was acknowledged immediatel; by the IXth BD.(III) Camer's of the 387th BG operated "100%," and 1st Lt. Ben "ann, IXth BD Photo Interpretation Officer

reported:

Box I, Flight A did not bomb the primary. "Apparent misidentification of target as primary completely enveloped by smoke. Eits in town of Malmedy approx. 10-3/4 mi. N.W. of primary."

Official confirmation was made by the IXth BD's Mission Summary for the 25th, dated the 26th.(VII) Referring to the 387th BG:

"The leader of one flight misidentified primary. This b/c plus 3 others dropped 64 x 250 GP at Malmedy - friendly territory. Bombardier and navigator believed they were synchronized on primary. 'Gee' operator obtained fix 3 minutes from BRP which corresponded with visual observation. Snow cover and haze made pinpoint navigation difficult."

The section 'Failures to Bomb' classifed personnel as responsible, the reason: "Leader misidentified pimary, dropping at Malmedy -friendly territory."

The only other details were provided in 'Unsatisfactory Bombing Report', an issuance probably by the IXth BD.(IV)

"Bombard or misidentified target. Bombed town of Malmedy, 12 miles NN" of St. Vith. Bombardier and Navigator were both positive they were on briefed target. 'Gee' box was not working well but operator obtained supposedly accurate fix on course 3 minuets from BRP. This fix corresponded exactly with bombardier's visual observation and no doubt existed as to his correct position. Snow cover and haze made pin point navigation difficult. All details concerning error not yet coordinated."

# Mis-identification Reasons.

Personnel error was the apparent cause. Flight officers believed ST. VITH to be their position, inasmuch as navigation and visual observation agreed.

weather seemed to favor the latter. Plane to ground visibility was three to four miles.(VII) Detailed photography was obtained, sufficient to identify the victim.(III)

#### ALLIED AIR COMMANDERS CONFERENCE.

This was held at SPARF in Versailles, Thursday, 4 January 1945. (IGeneral Carl Speats, U.S. STRATegic Air Forces in Europe, reported:

"Eighth Air Free had operated... Towns in the battle area had also been attacked, including(so it was said) MALMEDY which was on our side of the line..."

General Speats was reporting presumably about the period since the last conference on 28 December.

#### cited

That conference report was they sou ce of information for the following statement in the Air Force history: (2)

One such town, Malmedy, was the scene of a tragic error, for it was held by Allied troops at the time it was bombed." The reference was that the heavy bombers of the Eighth /ir Force, but no date was mentioned, on an allusion to December operations of Ardennes.

#### Bibliography.

- 1. Notes on the Allied Air Commanders' Confencee, 4 January 1945. In Files of the Air Historical rehives, /ir University, Maxwell Field, Alabama.
- 2. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. Three, Surope: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945. Chap. 18, Autumn Assault on Germany, by John E. Fagg. p. 670. <u>In Army Library; General Reference Section</u>, OCM; fir Force Fistorical Office.

#### MALMEDY BOMBING ON 23 DECEMBER 1944.

By 322d Bombardment Group(M), 99th Combat Bombardment Wing, 9th Bombardment Division(M).

(Sourcer Massell Field, Ala. Air University, Air Historical Archives. GP-322-SU-OP-S 33 Boo. 44. surping Defended Area. File obtained through the Air Historical Liaison Office in "ashington.)

> 1. #th BD(M) Mission Summary( fternoon) 23 Dec. 44. Dated 24 Dec. 44.

#### "Zulpich (Communications Center)

322 BG: 28 a/c dispatched (including 2 PFF a/c). 5 a/c bombed other targets, dropping 64 x 250 GP. 3 window a/c.

> 18 a/c failed to bomb: 6 a/c flight leader could not locate target due to weather. 2 PFF a/c returned to base after navigators determined that formation would be 12 minutes late at target due to lade takeoff. 6 a/c bombed the town of Malmedy, 1/2 mile W of bombline, due to misidentification of target. xxx 4 a/c ogher reasons: 2 a/c jettisoned bombs when a/c were hit by flak. 1 a/c could not catch formation. 1 s/c did not drop as leader jettisoned. Bombs of 1 a/c which landed at Couvron unaccounted for.

4 a/c attacked casual target, the location and type unknown at this time. No photo coverage or visual observation.

1 a/c attacked the town of Goldbach (F-230410). No photo coverage or visual observations of results.

No losses, 18 s/c flak battle damaged, no casualties."

# Failures to Bomb.

Group No. A/C Classification 1) 322

Personnel

5) Other Reason.

Bombardier misidentifed target; bombs hit town of Malmedy in friendly territory.

Observations.

WEATHER: Zulpich 322 BG: Clear, Snow on ground, Visibility 4-6 miles in haze

# S/a Photo Reports.

322d's cemmeras photograhing 100%

## Flak Analysis Anneg.

Zulpich Rail Communications Center. 322 BG.

No A/C were lost to flak, but 18 were demaged.

"Flak in the target area started out to be moderate and inaccurate. However, as the /c reached the inner defense zone of 18 kmmx heavy guns, the fire became intense and accurate. This target represents one of the moreheavily defended areas of the enemy's communication system. Moderate to interse fire could be expected from the 18 heavy guns plotted."

II. Ath BD Photo Interpretation.

S-2 Report(First Phase Interpretation), signed(typed name) by Capt. Bernhard O. (Hougen), Photo Interpreter.

Photos of 322d Group.

Target hit: Walmedy.

A. Trget Briefed: Zulpich---Privry.
None ---Secondary.

M.P.I .: Center of Town.

A.P. : Same.

- C. No. & Type of A/C dispatched: 26 B-26s. 11 attacking.
- D. Bombing by 3's 6's, ...: 6's.
- E. No. and sime of bombs dropped: 4 x 1000 GP 150x 250 GP
- F. Heading A/W when bombs dropped: Approx. 30'
- G. Time bombs dropped: 1526.
- E. Activity at target: None.
- J. Results of bombing:

"Due to operational difficulties, weather, and mnemy activity the //C could not fly their designated positions in their respective boxes and flights; it is impossible to determine the bombing by either boxes or flight due to this.

#6 A/C. P.N.B. Bombs hit through the center of the town

of Malmedy, on buildings and streets in the town.

#1 A/C. P.N.B. Location of strikes undetermined due to

poor quality of photos, hits in fields, A/C hit by Flak, one engine out, jettisoned bombs.

No photos of other bombings."

N.B. --- PNB was probably Primary Not Bombed, according to postwar AF sources.

III. 322d BB's OPFLASE REPORT-

To be teletyped to the IX BD within two hours after last plane landed.

- B. Briefed Primary: Sulpich.
- D. No. A/A attacking: Primary.

6 Secondary. "Baleived Lammersum F3435 -- hit center of town -- Excellent."

F. Bombs.

86 Secondary.

G. Results of Bombing on:

Primar, . \_\_\_

Secondary. "Believed Lammersum - Fit center of town and malked through. Excellent."

- H. No. A/C: (As to cusualties)
  5 damaged.
- J. Flak:

Target: Mod & Inacc.

Elsewhere: IP Intense and Acc.

- L. Altitudes of Attacks: 12,000 Coondary.
- M. Time over Targets 1526-1530, Secondary.

The more official OPFIASH from the 222 322 Group was the teletyped OPFIASH No. 228 for 23 Dec. at 231915A Dec., to the IX Bomber Command(ASt: A-2) and CG, 95 th Combat Ming.

It contained none of the above information of the preliminary report, but, was amended at 2210A, to indicated some of the above data. The most important was Par. D to read: 11 A/C - Secondary-Lammersum(F34.35).

IV. Pilot Interrogation Reports.

Tatson(Haj. G.J.); Eft Ldr; Box 1, Flt. 1, Pos. 1; took off, 1408, landed, 1655.

Altitude, 12,300; hour, 1526.

"Fit town - not target - might be Lammarsum. Excellent results on town."

Bombs: Dropped load of 13 x 250 GPs.

Westher: Ground haze. CAVU.

Flak: Intense and accurate.

Opposition: None.

Gustafson(2d Lt. D.R.); 451 Sq.; Box 2, Flt. 2, Pos. 4; took off, 1340, landed 1700.

Alt., 12,000: 1529.

"Center of town and walked out. Not target. Ex."

Bombs: Dropped load of 16 x 250 GPs.

Weakker: 0/10 in haze.

Flak: Intense, accuarate. Opposition: None.

Eyborg(Lst. It. S.E.); (506 \_\_\_Sq.; Box 1, Flt. 1, Pos. 1; took off, 1408, Tanded 1655.

"Hit town - not target - might be Lammersum. Excellent results on town."

Bombs: Dropped all of 13 x 250 GPs.

was ther

Eyberg(1st Lt. S.E.); 452 Sq.; Box 1, Flt. 3, Pos. 1; took off, 1404, landed 1705. All: 12,300; 1526 hrs.

"Hit town of lammersum - not target. Excellent on town.

Bombs: Dropped load of 16 x 250 GPs.

Frather: Ground haze. CAVU.

Flak: Intense, accurate at IP.

Opposition: None:

Pike(lst Lt. R.W.); 451 Sq.; Box 2, Flt.2, Pos. 1; took off 1328, landed 1700.

Alt. 12,000; 1530 hrs.

"Bombs through center of town - not target. Excellent results."

Bombs: Dropped load of 13 x 250 GPs.

Weather: Haze on ground. CAVU.

Flak: I tense and accurate.

Op: osition: None.

Isaacs(1st Lt. I. S.); 450 Sq.; Box 1, Flt. 2, Pos. 4; took off, 1408, landed 1720.

All: 12,000; 1526 hrs.

"Fit center of town - "as not target. Excellent results on town." Bomia: Dropped 12 of 13 x 250 GPs.

Fouthers CAVE.

Flak: I terse, 'ccurate.

Opposition: None.

CONTRACT

Conley(?); 451 Sq.; Box 2, Flt 2, Pos. 2; took off, 1335, landed 1730. Alt. 12,000; 1530 hrs.

"Bonbs blanketed small town, did not bomb primary. -- 3 or 4 runs on T/O"

Bombs: Dropped load of 16 x 250 GPs; "Salvoed bombs around." "eather: Over secondary, grd-haze 2/10 strato.

Flak: Primary target, interse, accurate.

Opposition: 2 ME 109s SE Zulpich.

V. 322 B@'s A-2 Log of Mission, 23 Dec. 44. (Bibl. #1)

Zulpich Denfended Area.

1145 - Notified of target by operations.

1239-1300 - Prebriefing.

1520- F/O #399 and Intelligence as nex rec'd.

1640 - Interrogation started.

1730 - " ended.

1845 - OPFLAST and 2-hour pone report.

#### VI. Orders.

# A. Ath Bembardment Division(") (Bibl. #4)

1. Typed summary of FO #680.
The 322d BG of the 99th B\* was to bomb, blind, the Zulpich Ræilhead, F-230327, st 1530.

2. A chart(typed) of the wing's missions and detailed
The %th B Wing's target was the Zulpich Railread,
WF 230327. The notation "Spec. Photos" was entered in the target
column, probably indicating the requirement to take them or the
target had been set up as the result of such photos. Specifically,
the target was a small railhead 7 miles from the bomb line, and
in general, Pulpich was to be bombed as a small village with important
road net. Attack's objective was to deshroy sumplies in the railhead
and to cut communications in the area. A TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
column applied to railheads of MUNSTEREIFEL, ZULPICH, NEDEGGEN, as
follows: "The German 7th / rmy which jumped off in an attack about 6
days ago are depending on these 3 feeder line railheas for all types of
supplies and reinformement, as the Germans expected to capture a great
deal of supplies and as they did not, they are rather in bad need
of supplies." Bombing Visual and Blind.

N.B.---Bombline mentioned was that of the Medium Bomber interdiction line which curved westward from the REINE near BONK to pass midway between ZULPICH and DUREN.

(Bibl. #5, p. 691.

B. 99th B Wang's FO #399, 231430 Dec. 44, and Intelligence Annew at 231441 Dec.

(Bibl. #1)

ZULPICH (F-230237) was specified as the target, with zero hour to be 231500 for Plan B(Blind.), and bombing at 12,500 and 12,000 feet. The route was to be from base to K-7746 to Target, thus was well north of MALMEDY.

#### VII. Maps.

B.S.G.C. 4042: North West Europe, 1:250,000. Sheet 3, Brussels-Liege.

4346; Central Europe, 1:250,000. Sheet K 51, Koln.

4416; 1:100,000. Sheet S 1, Bonn.

# VIII. WeatherOffice of Ath BD. (Bibl. #4.)

Its Flash Report, dated 23 December, for the 322d BG was the following:

#22ND Bomb Group Target: F-23027 (1530) ZULPICH
Target: Clear, Snow on Ground. VSBY 4-6 Miles in Haze.
Did "sather Effect Bombing: No.

IX. 322d BG's Fistory, December 1944. Undated. (Bibl. #2)

"The Group's bombers headed for the defended area of Tulpich in the afternoon but weather conditions interfered with the operation and the majority of the aircraft brought their bombs back to base. Six aircraft misidentified the target and bombed the village of Malmedy in Belgium while four others bombed east of the village. Several others bombed casual targets. Because of the fuid situation of the troop lines during the German counter-offensive no serious damage to our troops was reported in the bombing of Malmedy. Eighteen aircraft were flak damaged but there were no losses or casualties.

# X. Malmedy-Zulpich Distanceand Terrain.

Examination of a 1:100,000 map(see VII above) indicates the air distance to have been approximately 33 miles. MALMEDY was minute situated at the junction of the La W LA "ARCHE RIVER and LA "ARCHE RE RAU, the terrain being hilly and forested. ZULPICH and LAW TRX The nearby(northeastward) LAMMERSUM were in open country, the latter also on a river, the ERFT.

322nd Bomb Group(M). 23rd Dec 1944 --- Route Target: Zulpick Defended Area. TOT: 1530-1532. \*\*\* Alt: 12,200-11,500. "eather: CAVU. Briefed Route -lst Box's Route \_\_2nd Box's Route Sievenich Maybach 1-Terget Zulpich F-2333 Formation: IST BOX O Cat A. Batthe Dene X eat. Ac. " Scale 1:500,000 Intense, accurate, FFF in Zulpich area. Source: GP-322-SU-OP-S, 23 Dec.44. Zulpich Defned 'rea. 534.332A. 23 Dec. 44. 9th BD. F.O's 680. 23 D c. 44 (Bibl. #1, 4.)

## Bibliography.

Maxwell. --- Documents were obtained through the Air Historical Liaison Office in "ashington, from Maxwell Field, Alabama. Air University. Air Fistorical Archives.

- 322d Bombardment Group, Supporting Documents. GP-322-SU-OP-S,
   Dec 44. Zulpich Defended Free. <u>In Maxwell</u>.
  - 2. 322d BG, History. GP-322-Hi. Dec. 1944. (Bomb.) In Maxwell.
- 3. IXth Bombardment Division(M), Deily Mission Summeries, December 1944. 534.333. <u>In</u> Maxwell.
- 4. IXth BD, Field Order #680. 23 Dec. 44. 534.332A, 23 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.
  - 5. Ninth Air Force, Mission Fills, 23 Dec. 44. 533.334. In Maxwell.

#### 25 DECEMBER 1944.

By 387th Bombardment Group, 98th sambart Bemberdment Wing, IXth Bombardment Division(M), Ninth Air Force.

 Formation for 25 Dec. 44, 387th BG. (Bibl. #2)

Green Flight: Records did not identify the following as to rank and given names:

Lead A/C---Pilot Inderson, Bombardier Shannon, in A/C #684. Other A/C--- Pilots Mueller, Missimer in #880,#700; and probably Patterson in #717, instead of Moffett of #899.

Briefing at 1300; Takeeff at 1432.

II. Interrogation Form of 387th BG, 25 Dec. (Bibl. #2)

The flight lead by Anderson appeared to have been composed of Anderson, Mueller, Missimer, Patterson. Tookoff at 1432; Target was St. Vith; Date 25 Dec. Flight dropped 16 x 250 on the target. BORN was noted as a locality.

III. IXth BD, Photo Interpretation(First Phase Inter.) (Bibl. #2)

Report by 1st Lt. Ben Mann, Photo Interestion Officer, of 398th BG(98th BWg) operations of 25 Dec.

Target briefed and hit---St. With. A/C attacking--30. Drop at 1605. Activity at target: "Target area completely enveloped by smoke, making identification of target on their he ding extremely difficult.

Results of bombing: Box I, Elight A. Anderson-Shannon.

PNB(Primary Not Bombed). "Apparent misidentification of target as primary was completely enveloped by smoke. Hits in town of Malmedy approx. 10-3/4 mi. N.". of primary."

Blights B and C of Box I attacked St. Vith. Box II, not involved in Malmedy. Flight

A, Morse-Britton bombed Rocherat by mistake, instake of St. Vith, and that incident was that referred to in the history(December) of the 387th BG.(Bibl.#1)

IV. "Unsatisfectory Bombing Report."
(Bibl. #2)

For 387th BG, Mission of 25 Dec. 44 to ST. VITh. Issuing organization was not identified, but it was likely the Group. Unsigned; undated.

Box I, Flight A, Pilot /nderson, Bombardier Sharnon. Visual Bombing. Results: PNB.

"Remeons for 1 Bombing or Pailure to Attack Primary:

"Bombardier misidentified target. Bombed town of
Malmedy, 12 miles NAT of St. Vith. Bombarder and Navigator were
both positive they were on briefed target. 'Gee' box was not working
well but operator obtained supposedly accurate fix on course 3 minutes
from BRP. This fix corresponded exactly with bombardier's visual
observation and no dought existed as to his correct position. Enow
cover and haze made pin point navigation difficult. All details
concerning error not yet coordinated."


Nim

V. Group's OPFLAT, 25 Dec. (Bibl.#2)

No mention of Melmedy mistake. Report would give impression the primary had been bombed as briefed, with certain exceptions. One flight of 4 s/c may have bombed Born P-850940. VI. Overlay of Mission, by 387th BG.

I. Overlay of Mission, by 387th BG. (Bibl.#3)

TOT, 1600; Altitude 12,500; "eather Nil clouds, 419. 5 mi.



VII. IXth BD, Mission Summary(Afternoon), 25Dec. 44.
Dated 26 Dec. 44, as to Field Order #683
(Bibl.#3.#4)

# "St. Vith (Defended Village)

387 BG: 36 w/c dispatched, 26 dropping 426 x 250 GP on and in vicinity of primary. ...

199

The leader of one flight misidentified primary. This a/c plus 3 other dropped 64 x 250 GP at Malmedy - friendly territory. Bombardier and navigator believed they wer synchronized on primary. 'Gee' operator obtained fix 3 minutes from BRP which corresponded with visual observation. Snow cover and haze made pinpoint navigation difficult.

Box I - Bligh . A. P.N.B. Apparent misidentification of target as primary was completely enveloped by smoke. Hits in town of Malmedy approximately 10 3/4 miles NW of primary.

Other 5 . Vith Attacks.

323d BG dropped from 40 a/c; 5 33 x 2502,168 x 100 2 P2

394th BG dispatched 39 a/c, but none bombed.

. . . #

Failures to Bomb.

GP A/C Classification 387 18/C Personnel

Reason.

"Leader misidentified primary, dropping at Malmady - friendly territory."

# S/A Photo R ports.

387th cameras operating 100%.

MEATHER: Nil Glouds. Visibility 3-4 miles plane to ground.

VIII. IXth BD. Mission Report(15 Minute Report' (B bl. #3)

387th BG: 36 A/C; TOT 1500; Bombed primery; Deviation from route, etc. --- "-850940 bombed by 1 flight."

IX. Eighth Air Force.
(Bibl. #5)

No indication found among records.

## Bibliography.

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- 2. 387th BG, Supporting Documents. GP-387-SU-OP-S(b), 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.
- 3. IXth Bombardment Division(M), Field Order #683, 25 Dec. 44. 534.3324 FO #683, 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.
- 4. Ninth Air Force, Mission Summary, 25 Dec. 44. 533.334. Mission File, 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.
- 5. Eighth Air Force, Mission #761, 25 Dec. 44. 520.332.8 th AF Might FO 1451A and Mission No. #761. 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.