

Like the New Year's Eve that preceded it, New Year's Day, 1945, was no more noisy or festive for the 120th Infantry Regiment than the previous week had been. In foxhole strong points which formed a semi-circle, starting at a location about 1500 yards southwest and extending approximately 4000 yards southeast of Malmédy, Belgium, troops thought the snow was colder than usual. The turkey dinner served at noon tasted good, but otherwise there was still watch to be stood, weapons to be cleaned, and gloves to be thawed out, before 1730 when the sun set.---- On our left were elements of the 1st Division, on our right the 119th Infantry Regiment. The Regimental Command Post was still at Beverce.


Raids and Patrols

The enemy to our front was quiet; he did not make himself obvious to view, nor did he throw any but harassing fire into our area. Though he seemed eager to keep us worried, he remained ever cautious and made no show of power.

The Regiment wanted more information regarding the unit opposing us. It also wanted to test the defensive power set up against it. With the double mission, then, of worrying "Jerry", and of capturing prisoners of war, a series of combat patrols pricked enemy lines during the first two weeks of the month. Information these patrols gathered was to be used as a basis for an offensive to reduce the German salient, already being hacked in its western extremities.

Three hours into the new year two platoons of Company "B" set out across the snow to capture German prisoners, and to investigate a strong point in a house 200 yards southwest of the road junction at Baugnez, in front of Company "A". When the main body of the raiding party had reached the road junction which came to be called 'Five Points' for the number of roads which converged there, the ten-man point had turned south toward the house. The point came to within 35 yards of it, when the men were fired upon. The patrol leader recognized two machine guns, one firing from the house, the other from a point 200 yards west of it. He despatched one platoon to flank the house from the left, and held the remainder of the men to keep the attention of the enemy by fire. Noting more movement, the enemy poured automatic fire and rifle grenades on them; the patrol leader was killed. While the platoon flanking the enemy on his right was passing through the fields southwest of Baugnez, some of the men stumbled over uneven humps in the ground.

The "uneven" humps were investigated, and by the light of the bright moon, were discovered to be the bodies of approximately 50 American soldiers. They lay in groups, on top of one another and in disorder. Some were shot in the head. A few of the patrollers remembered stories of men in a Field Artillery



Observation Battalion who were captured and murdered in a field near Malmédy. This, then, was the site of the famous massacre, details of which were later written up in Yank magazine. At a later date, the information was confirmed; when the field came into American hands, picture recordings were made of the horrifying evidence of German cruelty there.

The platoon continued on its mission. Moving to the woods next to the house, they surprised and captured a German prisoner, a slim 120-lb. superman who looked about 13 years old. (A Battalion Commander later wondered if he wasn't so small that he should be "thrown back"!) Word was sent to the acting patrol leader, who deemed that the patrol's mission had been accomplished, and withdrew the party back to our lines.

One man in the patrol chose to stay behind. Within 50 yards of enemy gunners he lay in the deep snow all night; he made slight movements of his hands and feet to keep from freezing, but knowing the enemy would be alert to movement for some time after the patrol had been stirring, he waited till daylight before starting to creep. He made his way, almost numb, to the man who had stayed behind to save, a man who had been hit seriously by machine gun fire, and had fallen in a ditch. He tore his snow suit to make bandages and applied them hastily to the man's back. Snipers noted the movement by then, and started to fire occasionally in his direction. He dragged the man over the snow to Five Corners, where he found a wheelbarrow. He placed the wounded man inside and wheeled toward his own lines by a covered route. He tried to solicit help from civilians; one gave him cognac, but all feared German reprisals and turned him away. He reached at last a Company "A" outpost, and procured aid there. The wounded man was saved. The man who brought him to safety was his assistant squad leader, Sergeant Herman A. Fischer.

Otaimont and "Huyer"

On the 2 January, two raiding parties were planned: Company "I" was briefed on attacking strategic ground 500 yards southeast of Otaimont from the North through our lines; it was to take prisoners and withdraw on order to our regular positions. Meanwhile Company "B", 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, was to drive through Hedomont and Baugnez for "Huyer", the high ground 1500 yards southwest of Baugnez. It was to be supported by fire from the 1st Battalion, and was also to be prepared to withdraw on order.

At 0830 on the 3 January, both Companies moved out on schedule. The day was foggy, and observation for supporting fire almost impossible. Company "I" met a force of only about 30 men, who offered little resistance. The Company was on its objective and had taken three prisoners, when according to plan it was ordered at 1930 to withdraw. Resistance proved stiffer against Company "B", of the 526th Armored Infantry; however, they reached Hedomont, but just beyond the town they met withering machine gun fire which made clear that the Germans intended to hold "Huyer" at any cost. Artillery was light until about 1630; when Company "B" withdrew at that time, it increased considerably; the

Attack plans had meanwhile been drawn up, and D-day was to be Saturday, 13 January 1945. H-hour was 0800. The strategy of the operation was a double strike, one from both flanks of the Regimental zone aimed at the enemy's probable strong-points. From the right flank near Malmédy the 3rd Battalion was to move forward to take "Huyer", the high ground southwest of Baugnez, while the 2nd Battalion from Weismes planned to take the settlement of Thirimont and the high ground south of it, "Haussart". Accordingly on the night of the 12 January the 2nd Battalion moved to Weismes. The 1st Battalion was to attack through the other Battalions after they had secured their objectives; it was prepared to seize Ligneuville.

"Huyer"

On schedule at 0800 both Battalions struck. Deep snow slowed the advancing units, and tanks and tank destroyers were useless. As a result the 3rd Battalion took heavy casualties, but at 1000 had reached its objective, and in three hours had consolidated its defense.

The 2nd Battalion found its assignment tougher. Thirimont and the hill behind it were considered by the enemy to be the key to the area and he clung to them tenaciously. Artillery, mortar, and small arms were deluged upon the attackers. Company "G" struggled into the outskirts of Thirimont and finally reached some of the farmhouses in the center of the village. Just before noon a hundred enemy infantry counterattacked, but were unable to dislodge Company "G".

Companies "E" and "F" were unable to come to the support of Company "G", however, since some pockets of resistance which Company "G" had by-passed were taking a toll in casualties from well dug in and ideally located points. At 1600 after taking a hard pounding, Company "G" was ordered by the Regimental Commander to withdraw. Before the troops could organize for the withdrawal, however, a company of infantry supported by a company of tanks counterattacked through the intricate road-system of the hamlet, and cut off some of Company "G". Approximately 100 men were lost, whom later developments indicated were taken prisoner.

Meanwhile, after supporting the initial attack by fire, the 1st Battalion was in readiness for an attack on Ligneuville and had moved forward toward Baugnez. Because of the heavy resistance encountered by the others, the 1st Battalion did not continue onward; instead Company "A" outposted the "Five Points", while Company "B" was positioned in defense of Gero-mont. At noon, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, was ordered to prepare plans for a night attack on Thirimont.

The Regimental Command Post had moved from Beverce to Monbijou in the morning and as evening came on, plans were completed for the seizure of Thirimont and "Haussart" the next day. Because it had ample time to work over the details of the operation, the 1st Battalion made sure that each man was thoroughly oriented and knew his exact duties.

Thirimont

At the dark hour of half after midnight on the 14th, an advance party from Company "B" moved out from "Five Points", to establish a block on the Ligneuville road 1000 yards east of the high ground "Huyer". The remainder of the Battalion followed when the roadblock was set up, moved 1000 yards south almost to the block, then swung east into the Pange stream valley and up the steep banks and the winding road into Thirimont. At 0445 the enemy began to snipe and drop mortar shells, and his opposition increased steadily until in the early dawn, the Battalion was forced to halt. Snow canalized any armored support, and tanks bogged down in the soft stream-bottom. Patrols sent to flank enemy strong points were unable to advance. At 1500 came a light counterattack, in which 30 infantrymen with one tank were repelled.

Inside the town elements of the 9th German Parachute Regiment, 3rd Parachute Division, had set up an iron-clad defense; and they fought with a fanaticism of which Hitler must be proud. As dark was closing in, about 1730, they counterattacked with one battalion of infantry advancing in waves and supported by one company of tanks. Company "C" in the lead rallied its fire power, and called for artillery. The enemy pushed madly forward to within 50 yards of our hastily dug in lines along the hedgerows and roadways which make Thirimont a complicated network. There two tanks were knocked out by artillery, and the infantry backed off. Pressing our advantage we forced the enemy to withdraw to the east, and pounded him with artillery as he fled.

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The 3rd Battalion positions on "Huyer" were taken over by the 117th Infantry at 1030 on the 14 January (S). Pine-covered and even higher than "Huyer", "Haussart" (Hill 551) was known to be full of snipers who had caused numerous casualties among the troops in Thirimont. It presented a formidable problem, but it was the principle key to the entire Ligneuville sector. At 1150 the 3rd Battalion crossed the Line of Departure, and moved generally parallel to the Ligneuville road, striking "Haussart" from the northwest. Along the road where destroyed American vehicles were still lying in testimony of the German breakthrough, men met constant harassment by artillery and rocket shells, aimed at the obvious route of advance.

(S) Company "L" was attached to the 117th Infantry until 1600, when it reverted to Battalion control.

Into the draw of the Pange stream the troops ran across the open ground and up the hill toward the heights ahead. The enemy was prepared. He had chosen positions for his automatic fire and artillery observation which were impossible to detect.

In and around one house "Jerry" had set up a "pillbox", and as Company "K" advanced over the snow in the open, the enemy let go with their maximum. A squad leader who had distinguished himself a month before at a paper mill near Malmédy observed where the strong point was, and with two of his pals ran 200 yards toward the house. The three men ducked into a barn next door for cover. The "buddies" all came from upper New York, and they fought with an ardent and unbeatable teamwork. With rifles and hand grenades they tortured the enemy on the ground floor of the house, forcing them at last to go upstairs. Pfc Raymond W. Gould had distinguished himself by leading a squad to knock out a strong point on "Huyer"; now he ran to a back window to catch the Germans by surprise. As he climbed in, however, an enemy observation post nearby perceived him and cut him down. Sergeant Francis Curry and his other comrade, Pfc Adam Lucero, did not hesitate a moment; they fired a BAR and threw handgrenades into the upstairs from outside until they were fired on from another enemy position. They went inside and fired through the floor; the enemy howled. Then they ran outside to fire through the windows; soon they had to force the enemy upstairs again. The remainder of the squad had come to the barn, meanwhile, and was firing persistently through the walls and windows of the house. For three and a half hours the scrap continued. At 1700 Sergeant Curry had his men put hay in the house from the barn, and ignite it. Soon the house was aflame, and the enemy was forced to withdraw, with losses, into the night. The "pillbox" was reduced, and the two pals responsible were unscathed.

There were many more well installed strong points, however, and darkness found the 3rd Battalion digging in 500 yards short of their objective. Patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the areas to the flanks.

The 15 January saw the battalions resume the attack with a superhuman effort. Just before dawn the enemy directed a two-company attack against the 1st Battalion clinging to the outskirts of Thirimont. Two hours later, Colonel Ellis W. Williamson, 1st Battalion Commander, sent Company "A" on the left and Company "B" on the right to strike for the remainder of the town (0815). The enemy called his utmost support and threw all his strength against the attackers. The Germans used the sturdy farmhouses and stables, which served as mutually supporting pillboxes and provided thick-walled basement shelters for machine gunners and snipers; they used Mark IV tanks which poured 75 mm fire on the doughboys. At this point, had it not been for the attached platoon from the 742nd Tank Battalion and a platoon from the 823rd TDs, the town might never have been taken. These mobile powerhouses were able to blast at the cellars and engage the tanks so effectively that the town of Thirimont had fallen to the 1st Battalion by 1330.

"Hill 522"

On the 18 January the 120th Infantry struck again. The objective: "Hill 522"; the Line of Departure: 2nd Battalion front on "Wolfsbusch". The 1st Battalion attacked south. It moved through the thick pine forest to the high ground and encountered little opposition. They captured two enemy patrols, without disclosing its formation or committing a large number of men. By 1330 the men had dug in, and though they received intermittent tank fire which caused tree-bursts, no casualties were suffered.

The enemy is known to counterattack with persistence and regularity. This occasion was particularly humiliating to the enemy, and he made his counterassaults especially frequent and vicious. In the following days he tried desperately with this strategy to eject our Armies.

Three and a half hours after the 1st Battalion had moved onto its objective, it was struck with a force of five tanks and 100 infantry. The tanks were canalized, however, by snow and woods, and two were speedily put out of action by bazookas. The infantry withdrew.

They returned, however, later in the evening. A block established by the 1st Battalion on the road running north into Kaiserbaracke damaged two more tanks and an assault gun. Again the infantry withdrew. But this time they left behind forty prisoners.

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The 3rd Battalion meanwhile moved to "Hill 522" to reinforce the defense of the 1st Battalion.

Key to success in this area at this season was the maintenance of communication, supply, and evacuation routes. Particularly with flanks and rear exposed the S-4 assignment was doubly difficult. No vehicles could go without convoy. Wet weather and shell fire constantly hampered telephone wires, and the wooded, hilly terrain made radio a troublesome method of keeping contact.

To keep supply lines open, the 2nd Battalion still holding "Wolfsousch" sent elements to protect the vulnerable main road leading to the forward battalions. The 30th Reconnaissance Troop kept contact, meanwhile, with the 23rd Infantry Regiment on our left.

The Germans, too, had realized the importance of roads in preserving a strong defense. Three of their blocks had to be bypassed in the initial stages of the attack on "Hill 522". One was at the railroad crossing north of the hill, one at Kaiserbaracke, and another at a dirt crossroad 500 yards due north of Kaiserbaracke.

On the 19 January Company "K" was given the mission of contacting the 117th Infantry on our right (west), and with help from

that Regiment to attempt to wipe out the road blocks on the road between them which was close to the regimental boundary. At the railroad crossing, Company "K" was able to break up the enemy block and destroy a Mark IV and an assault gun. At Kaiserbaracke, the block could be removed; pressure there, however, forced four assault guns and a staff car to attempt to make a getaway to the south. Elements of Company "C" and of the Antitank Platoon, 1st Battalion, deployed on both sides of the escape route, destroyed all five vehicles.

German tracked vehicles were scattered useless up and down the St. Vith road. Five Mark IV tanks mounting 75 mm guns, and two 105 assault guns, and one military car lay wrecked between Kaiserbaracke and "Hill 522". In the wooded terrain and foggy weather long fields of fire did not exist; the tanks had to be attacked from close quarters. Rifle grenades and particularly bazookas proved invaluable, and alone accounted for most of the destroyed enemy vehicles.

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Patrols had ascertained that enemy infantry were well entrenched around Feckselborn, a tiny settlement on the Recht road west of the St. Vith highway. Relieved by the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, our 2nd Battalion moved into the attack from the area of the 1st Battalion on "Hill 522" along a ridge extending southwest into the hamlet. Brilliantly led by Lt. Col. James W. Canteay, who kept the troops organized in face of an initial artillery barrage falling on it, the advancing Battalion met only light resistance, and had consolidated the gain by 1705. Of the 18 prisoners captured, some indicated that they had expected an attack from the west, and had been taken by surprise on their right flank.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions remained in position, while Company "K" with elements of the 117th Infantry at last reduced the roadblock at Kaiserbaracke at 1115 on the 19 January.

Nieder Emmitzer Heide

Assigned to the 120th Infantry was Objective "T", the village of Nieder Emmitzer Heide, and especially the high ground immediately north of it. A patrol from the 1st Battalion set out at 0830 on 20 January and, halfway to the objective, drew fire. At 1000 using the main St. Vith road as a left boundary, the remainder of the Battalion maneuvered through the wooded area west of the town, and so was able to hit the enemy from the rear, destroy his positions, and take 13 prisoners.

The 3rd Battalion attacked on the east side of the road towards Nieder Emmitzer Heide one hour and forty minutes after the 1st Battalion. It encountered assault guns and infantry, but was able to push on to Objective "T" and consolidate a defense by 1645.

Supply routes again had to be cleared. Company "C", which had remained on a roadblock on "Hill 522", was sent to open the road to Nieder Emmitzer Heide. Company "K" assisted until, when the road was finally cleared, Company "C" rejoined its Battalion. Company "G" relieved Company "C" on the roadblock.

The 30th Reconnaissance Troop relieved the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, on "Wolfsbusch" at 0900, and established contact with the 117th Infantry on our right(west).

Counterattack on "Wald"

The night of 20-21 January was long and cold, and the men were tired. At 0400 a German patrol was noted and three of its number shot before it could escape. At the first glimmering of dawn, enemy artillery increased slightly. B-rations were served for breakfast, nevertheless, and feeling secure, some of the troops were trying to keep warm in their blankets, when at 0915 the enemy made a spectacular appearance.

From the East around Born came ^ttwo assault guns with 150 infantry; they hit our lines in the vicinity of where a firebreak crosses the main road just north of Nieder Emmitzer Heide. The enemy drove hard for the main road; whether to turn right to tear asunder our lines, or to turn left to escape to his own, no one knows. The attack was preceded by artillery and ^ahalf hour was raging at a furious pace; the lead assault gun hit two 57mm antitank guns at the road bend, mashing their breechblocks; it fired on a machine gun nest of Company "K" and killed all four men therein. And it raced back and forth in the firebreak while the infantry around the tanks scattered and fired small arms into our lines. Tanks of the 743rd Armored Battalion on the main road kept the self-propelled gun from leaving the firebreak.

Meanwhile Companies "K" and "L" were able to pin enemy infantry to the ground. One tank was able to direct frontal fire at the assault guns, while three other tanks with some infantry of the 1st Battalion maneuvered to the right flank of the enemy force, where they knocked out one of the guns; the other escaped. Small arms accounted for most of the German infantry, who lost 24 captured and 70 killed.

Three prisoners were led in by Lt. James J. Butler, leader of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon. He appeared even more ill at ease than the prisoners, and told the amazing story of the capture. Lt. Butler had gone to the front lines shortly before the counterattack to choose an OP for his platoon. He left his jeep close to the fateful firebreak-road crossing, and took a path toward the opposite flank from which the strike came. When the assault guns charged up almost to the bumper of the jeep, the driver took a running leap for the nearest foxhole. Shortly afterwards, when the guns had withdrawn, but the infantry was still battling, Lt. Butler returned from his reconnaissance, and went nonchalantly about loading his maps, and equipment into the back of the vehicle. Suddenly a rush of bullets near him caused him to hit the ground. Every now and then he raised up and threw another item on the jeep.

Although he noticed some soldiers standing near he continued to load and hoped to drive away at earliest opportunity. All at once he looked up, and saw standing over him three of the enemy, one brandishing a white flag over his head. He recovered his breath soon enough to turn the prisoners over to the IPW.

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Two Emmels

One last objective south of Nieder Emmitzer Heide remained to be taken. The 2nd Battalion moved forward on 22 January from Feckelsborn. Company "F" attacked Ober Emmels, a village which dominated the western half of the objective. Company "E" moved through Company "F" to take Nieder Emmels, the eastern, northern portion.

Resistance was light, since elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were putting pressure on the southern tip of Nieder Emmels, which they had moved into by nightfall. Five enemy tanks were knocked out or captured, however; in one the motor was still running long after the town had been taken. One hundred eighty-one prisoners were captured.

Prisoners of war stated that they were overwhelmed with the speed with which our forces surrounded them. By keeping our routes open we were able at all times to keep supplies and ammunition going where they were needed. It is more than likely, however, that the enemy felt a constantly growing pressure, too, and sensing our relentless progress, did not care to try to stop it.

At 2230 the 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd in Nieder and Ober Emmels; the latter moved back to its former area at Feckelsborn. The following morning the 1st Battalion replaced the 3rd Battalion, which moved back to Malmédy.

The 30th Reconnaissance Troop had been relieved of attachment to the 120th Infantry at 1730 on the 22 January, and was attached to the 117th Infantry.

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The next three days gave the Regiment the chance to rest and reorganize following the bitter campaign. Men warmed up in the shelter of a Belgian home for the first time in a week. Reinforcements joined the outfit. Light training included: battle orientation discussion, combat tips from veteran soldiers; first aid instruction; and winter combat hygiene.

Care and cleaning of equipment naturally took first attention in training. All weapons were brought to A-1 shape.

Training Days

On the 27 January, the Command Post of the 120th Infantry moved from Ligneuville to Sart, Belgium, and was in operation at 1115. From Nieder Emmels the 1st Battalion moved to Verleumont; from Fekkelsborn the 2nd Battalion moved to Sart, and the 3rd Battalion moved from Malmédy to Halt. Antitank Company assembled in an area at Provedroux. And on the following day Cannon Company with the 230th Field Artillery moved into Salmchateau.

On the 28th of the month training began. Billets were cleaned, and church services were held. Weapons were cleaned and checked.

The last three days of January were given to training, firing of weapons, and recreation. One noncom from each platoon attended Regimental Gas School on the 29th. The 1st and 2nd Battalions saw a film on "Germany--Non-Fraternization". Part of the 1st and 3rd Battalions had baths in Stavelot. All Battalions were familiarized with the new M-24 light tank. Improvised snow suits, woolen "booties", and Quartermaster arctic clothing were fitted and distributed.

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At the end of January the German salient in Belgium, which had ended hopes for peace in 1944, and had startled complacent optimists in non-combat zones, had been reduced to a "bubble". Von Rundstedt's counterattack was already mentioned in papers as a "fizzle", and compared to the dying convulsions of Ludendorff in the last war.

The 120th Infantry will long remember the "bulge" in Belgium. The doughboys may not remember the spectacular success they had in overcoming some of Hitler's few remaining crack paratroopers, nor the brilliant strategy of their commanders, particularly that of Colonel Purdue, commanding officer of the Regiment, nor the superhuman effort they expended in the worst of circumstances. But they will remember Thirimont, and "Haussart", and "Hill 522", and the counterattack on "Wald". Even more will they remember the dull, cold hours of watch, the long, dark days of plodding through snow, and the foxholes they dug in the pine-woods, and camouflaged over and over again. They will remember the cry of incoming tree-bursts, and sleeplessly bitter nights, and cold K-rations.

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Later, at a presentation of awards, General Leland L. Hoobs, commander of the 30th Division, was to say, "In every hot spot, in every heavy encounter since D-day--excluding only D-day itself--you men have been there, and come through on top."

And so, along with St. Lo and Mortain, the campaign of the Belgian salient took its place among the most difficult assignments of the Regiment. The doughboys had fought doggedly and yard by yard against a stubborn enemy, a cruel climate, and unfavorable terrain. Another tough spot-- another victory for the 120th Infantry.

STATISTICS

Total number of prisoners taken during the month of January was 448. Prisoners belonged to following units:

246 Volks Grenadier Division
 18 Volks Grenadier Division
 3 Parachute Division
 244 Assault Gun Brigade
 905 Assault Gun Brigade
 883 Marsch Battalion
 884 Marsch Battalion
 460 Artillery Battalion
 298 Construction Battalion
 434 Construction Battalion
 9 SS Panzer Division (stragglers)

CASUALTIES FROM 1 JANUARY 1945 TO 31 JANUARY 1945 INCLUSIVE

	Officers	EM	Total
Killed in Action	3	117	120
Wounded & Injured	17	481	498
Missing in Action	7	160	167
Captured	0	0	0
Total -	27	758	785
From Wounded and Evacuated to Returned	6	216	222
From MIA to other Battle Casualty status	1	71	72
or returned	0	11	11
Died of Wounds			

CASUALTY SUMMARY TO DATE

Killed in Action	52	889	941
Wounded & Injured	175	3915	4090
Missing in Action	23	431	454
Captured	3	101	104
Total -	253	5336	5589
Died of Wounds	9	115	124

Unit Report S.2

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Enemy Situation

The Enemy has strongly organized a ~~a strong~~ defense in the Town of Thirimont and along the high ground South of the town. The enemy has offered stubborn resistance and has counter-attacked twice during the afternoon. The enemy attacked at 1300 with (1) Tank and approximately 20 infantry and again at 1720 with 5 Tanks and approximately 100 infantry.

2. (A) This Bn moved out of its defensive positions at 0100 fan 13th with the mission to take the Town of Thirimont. The Bn crossed the I.P. at 0200 hrs at Baugnez. After the Bn had advanced South approx 1000 yds, it swung East into the Town of Thirimont where the first contact was made with the E

The enemy opened ^{II} fire with Two (2) M.T.'s
(Heavy) one firing across at a very
high angle and another firing grazing
fire. Charlie Co neutralize these two
M.T.'s and moved further into the town
to where the enemy had M.T.'s in the
houses, and two others firing from the
high ground to the South. Baker Co
attempted to clear the hill-top to the
South of the town, but the patrols
were ambushed in the forest there, two
men from our patrol killed, 1 wounded,
as the Bn. moved on towards the center
of the town from the West it met
two strong points in houses, and one
other two the night, while snipers
fired from the left. Enemy observation
was too good to allow the Bn
to advance with the aid of support
weapons. The infantry could not advance
close enough to the houses to use
Rifle grenades.

III

The enemy has fired heavy Mortars
our position (81 mm.), Four assault guns
have been firing into our positions
all day but the location of the guns
could not be determined. The guns were
firing from a ~~S.E.~~ S.E. direction, apparently
from the high ground south of the River.
Two howitzers have been firing into
the Bn's position from the south, location
of the guns unknown.

(B) The enemy moved tanks at 0600 hrs
in the South East in of Thiermont, the
appeared to be moving south across the
river and around the high ground
toward Montenas. and at about 0700
two tanks were heard starting their
motors in the same general vicinity.
It is estimated the enemy has 10 to
15 tanks in the vicinity of Montenas.

(C) The Bn has captured approx. 40 men
from the 3rd Para Div. 9th Regt. ~~of~~
(D) Seven of which said they were officers

D) The Boi has suffered considerable high casualty rate. Many of which were serious. Evac. of Wounded has been successful, although, which would not have been so, without the aid of prisoners. Prisoners were organized into litter carrying teams to hand carry the wound to a point where Veh's could pick them up.

E) Enemy Capabilities

at this present moment reports are coming in stating, the enemy is withdrawing, but under heavy friendly Art. fire. It is evident that the enemy is capable of waging heavy and strong counter attacks in this sector both with Tanks and Infantry or offering strong resistance from the high ground South of the River, (Thurmont),

Shange
Cupward "2"