

No. 110

Maps: GSGS 2541, 4249, 4338, 4-9-R1-R2-S1-S2 1/100,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines.

(K880580)-(K870570)-(K860570)-(K850573)-(K840570)-(K840550)-(K840520)

b. Defensive Organization.

SIEGFRIED LINE is still main enemy defensive position. Within this position, the enemy uses both field fortifications and fortified positions for defense. The German barracks (K878582) was used today as a strongpoint, from which he employed a variety of weapons to good effect.

c. Units in Contact.

330th Infantry Regiment, 183rd Infantry Division is manning the fortified positions in the Division zone. There is some indications that 1st Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment, has been replaced in line by 2nd Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment, 49th Infantry Division. Elements of 2nd Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, 49th Infantry Division; 1st Battalion, 352nd Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division; and 219th Engineer Battalion, 183rd Infantry Division identified yesterday in counterattack roles may still be in contact.

d. Artillery.

Estimate 3 light battalions, 1 or 2 medium battalions, and possibly 1 battery of heavy artillery capable of intervention in Division zone. Part of both the light and medium artillery is employed as roving guns and is believed to be self-propelled. The heavy volume of artillery fire received is believed to have been the result of increased activity of artillery already in position, as there has been no indication of movement of additional artillery into the Division zone.

e. Reserves.

Uncommitted elements of 49th, and 246th Infantry Divisions may appear as Kampfgruppen in the Division zone. 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions are reported regrouping in the COLOGNE (F4560) area. 26th Infantry Division is reported reforming in the area of MULHEIM (F4864). The arrival of a Panzer Brigade in this area is expected, according to PW statements.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.

Enemy operations during the period consisted of the heaviest volume of artillery fire which the Division has ever received, and the stubborn defense of fortified positions and strongpoints. In the northern sector, stiff enemy resistance was encountered from the German barracks (K878582). The enemy concentrated fire of small arms, mortars, and AT guns from this area, with good effect, and supported it by a large volume of artillery fire. In the central sector, the enemy opposed our advance from field fortifications and pillboxes. Our troops in this area systematically reduced pillboxes in the face of strong resistance. In the southern sector, the enemy had withdrawn from KERKRADE (K8253) during the night of 4-5 October, under cover of artillery fire. Enemy opposition to our advance in this sector was light. A large number of S mines were encountered which slowed our advance.

b. Operations of Component Elements.

(1) Anti Tank

Enemy employed AT guns from the German barracks (K878582).

(2) Artillery.

Artillery fire showed a marked increase in volume over the preceding period, and was reported the heaviest yet encountered by this Division. 37 SHELLREPS received, 5 counterbattery missions fired by Division Artillery, about 20 by Corps Artillery. 90% of the artillery fire reported fell in the area (K8157) - (K8160) - (K8760) - (8757). Most of the fire received came from the East and Southeast. One concentration of 100 rounds was reported, with many reports of concentrations of between 20 and 50 rounds. Some units reported that the fire of heavy mortars was mixed in with concentrations of artillery.

(3) Aviation.

Enemy aviation was active during the period. A flight of 20 to 30 ME 109s was over the Division area at 1440. 4 of these planes strafed the Division Artillery airfield (K756554), knocking out 1 of the planes on the ground and slightly damaging another. A number of enemy planes were over the Division area again at dusk. No incidents were reported. 5 enemy planes were reported shot down by AA fire.

(4) Engineers.

Enemy has employed mines extensively in KERKRADE (K8253) and

scellaneous.

A study of the amount of artillery fire received during the period was made by the Division Artillery S-2 and the Counterbattery Officer. In some instances, the amount of artillery falling in the time reported exceeded the capabilities of German artillery weapons. In one case, the amount of fire reported would have necessitated the employment of a battalion of artillery firing at its maximum rate of fire for two minutes. German artillery has never been known to operate in this manner. On the other hand, the presence of 120mm mortars has been reported. One observed counterbattery mission was fired on a battery of those mortars. While the effect of the mortar fire closely approximates that of the artillery, it is believed that technically, some of the fire is mortar fire. This may be indicated by 2 other facts. First, if the crater made by the shell lacks depth of ordinary light artillery, it is probably mortar fire. Secondly, there has been a report that some of the shells cannot be heard coming in. This would also tend to indicate mortar fire. It should be understood that this theory does not imply that all the fire received is mortar fire, but that only some is mortar fire.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties, including Prisoners.

PWs taken today - 88. Total for operation - 574. Total PWs taken to date - 10,625. Enemy dead buried today - 0. Total for operation - 13. Total to date - 384. Enemy tanks destroyed today - 0. Total for operation - 0. Total to date - 153.

b. Weather and Visibility.

Light fog in early morning, with haze persisting throughout the day. Visibility poor. Forecast for 6 October - overcast in early morning, with intermittent light rain or drizzle in morning. Improving in afternoon. Visibility fair. Unfavorable for air activity and ground operations.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) 7th Armored Division reports that it repulsed a number of counterattacks 4 October. CCA was counterattacked at 1600 by an estimated 2 companies of infantry from woods (K747307). Counterattack was preceded by a 30 minute artillery preparation. Enemy infantry attacked in waves. After vicious hand to hand fighting with bayonets and hand grenades, the enemy was repulsed.

(2) 2nd Armored Division reports that 57mm AT guns are used in some of the pillboxes in its zone.

(3) PWs continue to state that SS troops are forcing them to fight under the threat of concentration camps for their families if they surrender or retreat.

(4) Past experience has indicated that a large amount of enemy artillery fire and the use of the Luftwaffe in daylight raids have usually accompanied the movement of enemy armor into an area.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can

(1) Delay, with frequent small counterattacks in battalion strength or less, and ultimately withdraw to the East bank of the RHINE RIVER.

(2) Halt our progress as much as possible by limited counterattacks until his situation is relieved elsewhere providing him with the forces to mount a successful counterattack. By a limited counterattack is meant the employment of a battle group or reinforced Panzer brigade.

(3) Launch a major counterattack to restore the SIEGFRIED LINE. This would entail a force of from 7 to 10 battalions of infantry, 5 to 7 battalions of artillery, 20-30 SP guns and 50-75 tanks.

b. Discussion.

Capability 4 a (1) is improbable as a plan of enemy actions, since it is contrary to his theory of SIEGFRIED LINE defense. Capability 4 a (3) is improbable as a course of enemy action because of pressure on other parts of the front. Capability 4 a (2) is consistent with his practices and theory, and is currently indicated.

Authority: CG, 30th Infantry Division

Initials: 1. E. S.

Date: 5 October 1944.

The following PWs were processed by the division cage today:

183	Inf Div, 330 Inf Regt	
	I Bn	7
	II Bn	5
	III Bn	6
		<hr/> 18
49	Inf Div, 148 Inf Regt	3
	219 Engr Bn	20
	47 MG Bn	6
	149 Inf Regt	7
	OT WIEMERS	14
	OT JAEGEREL	3
246	Inf Div, 352 Inf Regt	19 (1,2 and 3 Cos)
33	Fortress MG Bn	7
		<hr/> 100

2. New identification: 33 Fortress MG Bn. Unit was formed in FRANKFURT AM MAIN early in September. Arrived in URBACH on 2 October. Bn consists of three MG Cos and a Mortar Co. MG Cos are equipped with 12 MGs and 18 bazookas. 4 Co has 12-31 mm Mortars.

Personalities and PFNs: Bn: PFN-27500. 2 Co: CO- Lt UMLAUF.

According to PWs two more Fortress MG Bns (45 and 62) were formed in FRANKFURT. Their present location is unknown.

3. II Bn, 148 Regt (49 Inf Div) has relieved I Bn, 330 Regt (183 Inf Div) and has taken its sector vic 915620.

4. A Pz Gren Brig is in the general area of the advance of XIX Corps. This may either be 103 Pz Gren Brig which had previously been reported in the REICHSWALD area or any of the Pz Gren Brigs which were forming in the COLOGNE area. It could carry one of the following numbers: 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 109. As pointed out previously, the organization of a Pz Gren Brig would probably be:

HQ
Sign Plat
Tank Plat
Mtl Plat

TANK BN
HQ (incl Tanks)
Three Tank Cos (each 11 Panthers)
Assault Gun Co (11 x L/70 guns)

PZ GREN BN (ARMORED)
Four light Cos.
One heavy Co.
(7 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2-8cm Mort,
6-7,5 cm KWks)

ENGR CO.

SUPPLY CO

Ivo E. Sciarra
IVO E. SCIARRA (PW)
2nd Lt, Armd Force
O.B. Team # 15

S E C R E T

Following extracts have been translated from a Journal kept by Dr. Carl Von Telser Berensberg, Regierungsrat Official, HORBACH (K810498). The original of the document was seized by the Division CIC Detachment.

* * * *

"The streets were filled with retreating columns ... for a real German it was a disgusting sight, to watch the troops pass by ... All of the road from MAASTRICHT to AACHEN was jammed during the first few days with long columns of men and all types of vehicles. At first there were many small groups of stragglers who had banded together and were travelling in every sort of vehicle ... This was very unpleasant to see ... There is much horse traffic and very few Army vehicles ... 480 Russians have passed, also some Belgians. They were supposed to build defensive positions in the NETHERLANDS ... Here in HOLLAND the men stay away from church on Sunday so that they will not be conscripted for labor.

HIMMLER himself has visited AACHEN and MAASTRICHT and his opinion was that an evacuation of MAASTRICHT was unnecessary. However, an evacuation of AACHEN was finally ordered by Hitler himself. The railroad is supposed to have one train a day to shuttle people from AACHEN to COLOGNE. Everyone is surprised to hear of the evacuation which is in the hands of the party.

The Americans have come. This morning I passed by an American tank with it's 10 man crew. Americans do not bother us civilians. All the village is talking about 10 Americans who went to church to receive communion. The villagers say "These seem to be different kin of people from the Germans who persecuted the Catholics."

I have been reading an American propaganda paper. Of course it contains many lies but we are so starved for news that we read it and try to tell what is true. People have said that the trains carrying the refugees went only part way to COLOGNE and let the people out in the country to shift for themselves. Those that did get in to COLOGNE found no place to go and no one to care for them. We don't know what is happening ... the talk is so confused ... the stories are very discouraging."

SECRET

Authority: CG 30th Inf Div

Initials: slb

Date: 5 October 1944

HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Office of AC of S, G-2

APC 30

G-2 ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION.

a. General

We have penetrated the SIEGFRIED LINE on a narrow front. The enemy knows we intend to complete the reduction of this strong defense barrier. Knowing that a breakthrough from here to the RHINE would be disastrous for him, he will use his total available strength to contain or drive us back.

b. Siegfried Line

This line was constructed by the Germans to defend their country from invasion. The theory of the defensive system is that of flexible defense. The pill-boxes and obstacles were designed to slow up penetration of large forces. As an attacking force pushed through the defenses by sheer power, it was to be counter-attacked by mobile forces in the rear of the permanent fortifications before the total enemy forces could exploit the penetration. The German's theory has been one of dependence on counterattacks to restore a situation which he might not be able to prevent because of the invader's strength at any given point. He has applied this plan by repeated and persistent counterattacks against spearheads that have pushed through sectors of this line in other areas.

c. Reserves

2 groups -- those which are now in the immediate vicinity and those in the general area but removed from the scene for another day or two.

Two battalions, 183 Infantry Division, and two battalions, 246 Infantry Division, now in reserve, could be committed at any time. Further, 2 battalions of infantry could be placed in action on this front that are now held in the area just SOUTHEAST of ROERMOND (K7890). A total of 15-25 tanks are in the vicinity.

The appearance of another division of the 183 type at any time is quite possible. Such a unit would not be a mobile counterattacking force, but rather a strong defensive reinforcement.

Elements of the I SS, 2 SS, 12 SS, 2 Panzer, 130 Panzer Lehr, and several full strength separate infantry regiments are now in reserve--some of these units in the COLOGNE area. Battle groups from one or two of these could be committed as a counterattacking threat at any time. Such a group would probably consist of 2 battalions of infantry, 20-30 tanks, and 3 to 5 batteries of artillery. Such elements may appear in the form of the new Panzer Brigade--1 battalion of infantry, 25-40 tanks or SP guns, and 3 to 5 batteries of artillery. 2 of these brigades or 2 battle groups are definitely within the capability of the enemy to rush to this front.

d. Terrain

With the exception of 2 streams which flow across our direction of advance and which afford the enemy limited delaying positions, the terrain in our zone of advance is as favorable for counterattack as it is for the attack.

e. Weather

Season of the year is definitely of advantage to the Germans, with frequent rains and limited visibility aiding his movement of troops unobserved in the daytime.

SECRET

SECRET

II. CONCLUSIONS

a. Capabilities

1. Delay, with frequent small counterattacks in battalion strength or less and ultimately to withdraw to the EAST bank of the RHINE.

2. Halt our progress as much as possible by limited counterattacks until his situation is relieved elsewhere providing him with the forces to mount a successful general counterattack. By a limited counterattack is meant the employment of a battle group or reinforced Panzer Brigade.

3. Launch a major counterattack to restore the SIEGFRIED LINE. This would entail a force of from 7 to 10 battalions of infantry, 5 to 7 ~~battalions~~ of artillery 20-30 SP guns and 50-75 tanks.

BATTALIONS

b. Discussion

Capability 1--delaying action--is improbable as a plan of enemy action. It would be contrary to his theory of SIEGFRIED LINE defenses. His commitment of all of his available forces along this line indicates his intention of defending here in an all out effort to avert total defeat. Delaying action is contrary to intentions. His behavior in other examples has not been one of withdrawal but stubbornly clinging to positions with repeated counterattacks.

Capability 3--major counterattacks--is improbable in the next day or two. Pressure on other parts of the front, unavailability of units, and his long enforced policy of immediate commitment of units as they arrive indicates a coordinated effort improbable at this time.

The most probable capability consistent with his practices and theory is a series of limited counterattacks hoping to stop or slow down our advance, hoping that weather and successes on other sectors will make available to him sufficient forces to later beat back our penetration. Counterattacks of this type, in strength of from 3 to 5 battalions of infantry, 5 battalions of artillery, and 20-40 tanks, is a probability at any time, with the principle direction of threat from the Southeast.

Hall

HALL

G-2

SECRET

TELEPHONE -- RADIO -- VERBAL ☒ LIASON OFFICER MSGR

TO FROM Col Purdue

Capt'd German map shows Regt CP at K86175630. Bn CP at K85175535. Bn CP at K85175535 and Goose eggs at K846558 K851560, and K848555 also at position overrun by 117.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

G-2 MESSAGE FILE AND JOURNAL

TELEPHONE --x RADIO -- VERBAL -- LIASON OFFICER MSGR

TO FROM 117 IPW Team

27 PWs from 7 Co, 148 Regt. The Regt, 330, CP was in Beggendorf near brewery last night. 1st Bn CP, 330 Regt in Zu Uebach (876573). The 7 Co, 148 Regt is almost completely wiped out, other Co's of the 2nd Bn, 148 had only light casualties. 2 Bn of the 148 Regt had replaced the 1st Bn of the 330.

G-2 MESSAGE FILE AND JOURNAL

TELEPHONE -- RADIO -- VERBAL -- LIASON OFFICER MSGR ☒

TO *G-2* FROM *117 th Inf*

13th Bn meeting stiff resistance from the vic of German Barracks, consisting of direct fire weapons, small arms, mortar and arty fire. Town and southern edge of Ubach under constant arty shelling, 105 & 150 caliber. Estimated at least 3 Bns. Most if it coming from SE. No new identifications

INITIALS	DISTRIBUTION		CLASSIFICATION
AP	30 Rec Tr	Div Sig O	Armed Forces
<i>W</i>	117 Inf	Div QM O	AT Units
	119 Inf	Chem O	AAA
	120 Inf	Ord O	Artillery
<i>117 th Inf</i>	Hq Div Arty	Prov M	Aviation

TELEPHONE — RADIO — VERRAL LIASON OFFICER MSGR

10. 6.2 FROM 117 4 71

13th Bn meeting stiff resist. great
of German. Have been cause of all to fire
weapons, small arms, mortar and arty. fire
Town and southern edge of town under
constant arty shelling, 100 + 150 shells.
Estimated at least 2 Bns. Most of it
coming from SE. No real ident. for

INITIALS	DISTRIBUTION	CLASSIFICATION	
AP	30 Rec Tr	Div Sig O	Armed Forces
	117 Inf	Div QM O	MT Units
	119 Inf	Chem O	AAA
	120 Inf	Ord O	Artillery
	Hq Div Arty	Prov M	Aviation
	113 FA Bn	Engr	Cas & PW
	118 FA Bn	Surgeon	Cavalry
	197 FA Bn	Army	Chem War
C.G.	230 FA Bn	Corps	CP's
A.D.C.	105 Engr Bn	Adjacent U	Def Org
C/S	105 Med Bn	Air S.P.	Engineers
G-1	Div Hq Co	CIC	Infantry
G-4	Atchd Troops	MII	Misc (Enemy)
Ln Off	743 Tk Bn	OB	Pat & Ren
TE	823 TD Bn	PI	Periodic Reports
ME IN	531 AAA	At Off	Reserves
			Supply & Evac
			Terrain & Wea
			Units in Contact
			Misc (Journal)

Maps: GSGS 2541, 4249, 4338, 4-9-R1-R2-S1-S2 1/100,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines.

(K880568)-(K858568)-(K835565)-(K845540)-(K835510).

b. Defensive Organization.

SIEGFRIED LINE is still main enemy defensive position. Within this position enemy uses both field fortifications and fortified positions for defense. The German barracks (K878582) was used as a strongpoint until reduced.

c. Units in Contact.

PWs were taken today from 1st Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment, 183rd Infantry Division; 33rd Fortress MG Battalion; 1st and 2nd Battalions, 352nd Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division; 1st and 2nd Battalions of both the 148th and 149th Infantry Regiments, 49th Infantry Division.

d. Artillery.

Estimate 3 light battalions, 1 or 2 medium battalions, and possibly 1 battery of heavy artillery capable of intervention in Division zone. Part of both the light and medium artillery is employed as roving guns and is believed to be self-propelled.

e. Reserves.

Uncommitted elements of 49th, 246th, and 232nd Infantry Divisions may appear as Kampfgruppen in the Division zone. PWs were taken today from 1st Battalion, 1043rd Infantry Regiment, 232nd Infantry Division in the STEINBROOK (K8340) area and indicate that a relief of 2nd Battalion, 404th Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division, was effected in the AACHEN (K8343) area. 2nd Battalion, 404th Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division was today identified in the IMMENDORF (K8962) area. The extent of a relief of 246th Infantry Division and the strength of 232nd Infantry Division present in the area are undetermined. 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions are reported regrouping in the COLOGNE (F4560) area. 26th Infantry Division is reported reforming in the area of MULHEIM (F4864). The arrival of a Panzer Brigade in the area is still expected.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.

In the eastern part of the Division zone, the enemy offered stubborn resistance from the German barracks (K878582). Artillery and mortar fire continued to fall in large volume, although some decrease was noted from yesterday's shelling. In the central sector, the enemy launched a counterattack at 0645 from the vicinity of (K865565). After an artillery preparation, the enemy made a frontal assault on our positions in an estimated strength of 2 battalions of infantry, supported by 6 assault guns, and 2 tanks. The counterattack drove our troops back, and the enemy regained 6 pillboxes in that area. The counterattack was broken up by air, artillery, and infantry action, and at the end of the period our troops had recovered the lost pillboxes. Considerable sniper fire was encountered in the MERKSTEIN HOFSTADT (K8456) area. Artillery fire was also somewhat lighter in this sector than yesterday.

b. Operation of Component Elements.

(1) Artillery.

Artillery fire decreased from the preceding period, but was still in large volume. 12 SHELLREPS received, 4 counterbattery missions fired. Fire was generally from the Southeast. One concentration of 200 rounds was reported, the majority of which is believed to have been heavy mortars. Enemy artillery was generally employed as 4-gun batteries, and in a few instances, 2 batteries were employed jointly.

(2) Aviation

Enemy aviation was active during the period. Estimated 4 planes were over the Division area at 1855, dropped flares, 2 large bombs and a number of anti-personnel bombs. At 2130, an enemy plane dropped 2 strings of anti-personnel bombs in the Division area. 2 planes were over the Division area at 2315, dropped several large bombs, and 6 sticks of anti-personnel bombs.

(3) Tanks

2 Mark VI Tanks were firing on UBACH (K8659) from the vicinity of (K872586) at 1220. Civilian reports 8 tanks in KERZOGENRATH (K843533) early in the morning.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties, including prisoners.

PWs taken today - 114. Total for Operation - 688. Total to date - 10,739.

Enemy dead buried today - 8. Total for Operation - 21. Total to date - 342.

the rest of the day. Moderately favorable for air activity in morning afternoon. Favorable for ground operations. Forecast for 7 October - broken middle clouds in morning, middle overcast in afternoon. Light haze but generally good visibility. Moderately favorable for air activity. Favorable for ground operations.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) 1st Infantry Division reports that the major amount of enemy artillery opposing it is believed located in the WURSELEN (K8649) HAAREN (K8645) area.

(2) Propaganda leaflets were dropped in the Division area today in enemy territory by our planes.

(3) A civilian report (believed reliable) states that there is a deep subterranean passage at BARDENBERG (K860502) with entrance in front of hospital. Passages extend to FELDGEM (K861524). The passage is large enough for small cars to travel in. At (K85355360) there are former searchlight positions, 7 yards in diameter and 5 yards deep. Civilian believes these holes are full of high explosives and dangerous to enter. In the same area, there are pillboxes with 47mm and 57mm AT guns. In the back of the pillboxes there is a wire strip 8 yards wide and over 1 mile long. Civilian does not know its use. In the back of the station at HAINRADE (K844545) on the slope of the hill, there are 4 pillboxes. 2 of these pillboxes have heavy guns - 75mm or 105mm.

(4) Extract from SECRET Division Order, 183rd Infantry Division, effective as of 2 October 1944 - SUBJECT: Flare Signals.

1.) The following flare signals are to be observed in the sector of the High Command of the West:

"Here we are"	Single white star, later yellowish. At night, also flashlight swung repeatedly in circles.
"Lay down fire"	Single green star.
"Enemy is attacking"	Single red star.
"Tanks!"	Smoke Shell, Violet or Blue.

2.) Until further notice from Higher HQ, the following signals will prevail in the Div area:

Barrage of 24 rds from two pcs of light Bn	Red star cluster with a white fore-signal (sent only once)
Barrage of 72 rds from pcs of entire light Bn during one minute.	Red star cluster with a white fore-signal, repeated quickly three times.

Cessation of barrage to be indicated by flare signals by platoon leaders or higher officer only when telephonic control of the barrage is not possible at the time.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can

(1) Delay, with frequent small counterattacks in battalion strength or less, and ultimately withdraw to the East bank of the RHINE RIVER.

(2) Halt our progress as much as possible by limited counterattacks until his situation is relieved elsewhere providing him with the forces to mount a successful counterattack. By a limited counterattack is meant the employment of a battle group or reinforced Panzer Brigade.

(3) Launch a major counterattack to restore the SIEGFRIED LINE. This would entail a force of from 7 to 10 battalions of infantry, 5 to 7 battalions of artillery, 20-30 SP guns and 50-75 tanks.

b. Discussion.

Capability 4 a (1) is improbable as a plan of enemy action, since it is contrary to his theory of SIEGFRIED LINE defense. Capability 4 a (3) is improbable as a course of enemy action because of pressure on other parts of the front. Capability 4 a (2) is consistent with his practices and theory, and is currently indicated.

Hall
HALL
G-2

...miners found that the enemy has used RIEGEL mines. The RIEGEL mine and the word RIEGEL stands for bar. The mine is 80cm long, 10cm wide and contains 9 lbs of explosives. The mine is set to explode on the pressure of 500-600 lbs on any part of the mine.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) At 071300 October, 1st Company, 689th Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division, received a Battalion order to withdraw to MERKSTEIN and surrender. It is not known whether this was a genuine order issued by 1st Battalion Headquarters or whether it was a ruse by which the surrender was induced. The Company obeyed the order as if it were authentic.

(2) Two 88mm guns reported in the woods at 861516 at 1215.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties, including prisoners.

Total PWs taken today - 843. Total for operation - 1531. Total to date - 11, 582. Enemy dead buried today - 16. Total for operation 37. Total to date - 358. Enemy tanks destroyed (6 October - 3) (today - 0). Total for operation - 3. Total to date - 156.

b. Weather and visibility.

Broken middle clouds all day. Light haze, but good visibility. Favorable for air and ground operations. Forecast for 8 October - occasional overcast in morning, light fog persisting until mid morning. Unfavorable for air activity in morning, moderately favorable in afternoon. Favorable for ground operations. Forecast for 9 October - deteriorating trend - low clouds and some rain. Moderately favorable for air and ground operations.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) PWs state they they were impressed by the operation of our tanks. The Commanding Officer of 7th Company, 149th Infantry Regiment, stated that both his flanks were pushed in by our tanks, causing him to lose contact with the adjacent unit. Asked why he did not withdraw in the tactically logical easterly direction, he replied that pressure was strongest from the North and West, thus forcing them to the South. PW claimed that their defensive strategy was "sabotaged" by our surprise attack from the North.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can

(1) Delay, with frequent small counterattacks in battalion strength or less and ultimately withdraw to the East bank of the RHINE RIVER.

(2) Halt our progress as much as possible by limited counterattacks until his situation is relieved elsewhere providing him with the forces to mount a successful counterattack. By a limited counterattack is meant the employment of a battle group or reinforced Panzer Brigade.

(3) Launch a major counterattack to restore the SIEGFRIED LINE. This would entail a force of from 7 to 10 battalions of infantry, 5 to 8 battalions of artillery, 20-30 SP guns and 50-75 tanks.

b. Discussion.

Capability 4 a (1) is improbable as a plan of enemy action, since it is contrary to his theory of SIEGFRIED LINE defense. Capability 4 a (3) is improbable as a course of enemy action because of pressure on other parts of the front. Capability 4 a (2) is consistent with his practices and theory, and is currently indicated.

Hall
HALL et al
G-2

1. PWs from the following units were processed by the division cage today:

183 Inf Div,	330 Inf Regt, I Bn	8
	219 Arty Regt	7
49 Inf Div	143 Inf Regt I Bn	32
	" " III Bn	7
	149 Inf Regt I Bn	14
	" " II Bn	2
	" " III Bn	1
246 Inf Div	352 Inf Regt I Bn	15
-----	33 Fortress MG Bn	4
Straggler	305 Security Bn	1
Straggler		1
		<u>92</u>

2. PWs modified the composition of 219 Arty Regt (183 Inf Div):

One Bn of 3 Btries 75 mm AT Guns.
Two Bn of 3 Btries 105 mm Hows.
One Bn of 3 Btries 150 mm Hows.

Personalities: CO Regt- Col MEYER. II Bn : Maj BESSAUER.

3. Four Fortress MG Bns have been identified by this division within the past few days, more have been reported in other sectors. These were newly formed units and the name sounded somewhat puzzling for this reason. PWs explained that Bns were mainly composed of disabled personnel who had been assured that they wouldn't have to do any walking and fighting at close quarters, but only man guns in fortified positions. This, of course, did not stop the Germans from making them part of their infantry regiments (42 and 57 Bns.). This, it appears, will be the fate of the remaining Bns.

4. 232 Inf Div seems to take the place of 246 Inf Div which had left the AACHEN area and arrived in our sector. Identification has been made of 1043 Gren Regt. The other Gren Regts belonging to that unit are: 1044 and 1045. This is another one of the Volksgrenadier Divs.

5. For locations of identified units see attached overlay.

6. 2nd Armored Division captured the following document:

I Bn, Gren Regt 330. BN ORDER OF THE DAY

Comrades: During the past few days you have occupied the West Wall in the area of GEILENKIRCHEN. Our mission is as follows: to defend this line of bunkers to the last man and the last cartridge. The enemy will try to concentrate the West Wall at any one point. We shall try to prevent this with all means at our disposal. We can only accomplish this, however, if every one of you is prepared to expect a grand attack, with the strongest artillery and tank support. It is highly important that everyone is mentally and spiritually prepared to stay wherever he has been ordered to hold. Every attack shall be repelled unless a surprise is in the offing. However, a surprise is out of the question if we are clear about the strength, the tactics and the habits of the enemy.

This knowledge about the enemy can only be obtained through our reconnaissance troops, who must be tireless in maintaining contact with the enemy and bringing in prisoners. I would like to express my gratitude to all soldiers of this battalion who have participated in these reconnaissance missions. You have fought bravely. Soldiers! This offensive spirit in defense shall not be relaxed. You must show the enemy that we are the masters of no man's land. Only he is the strongest who can fulfill this requirement. First of all, however, prisoners must be brought in who can tell us what is going on on the other side. I know that this desire inspires many soldiers. Whoever is successful will reap the reward. Go to it, soldiers: Bring me an American!

S E C R E T

Order of Battle notes, 6 October 1944 (cont.)

In case of tank attack, do not become excited. If you are successful in separating the infantry from the tanks, then the tank becomes the most helpless thing existing. Only tanks with infantry can become dangerous. In case of heavy artillery fire, immediately disappear into your pillboxes and as soon as the fire lifts, the field positions must be immediately occupied and prepared to repel the enemy as rapidly as possible. The enemy attack must stop in front of the MLR. Whenever the Americans meet strong resistance they stay put. Comrades, act according to these principles because now we defend our holy, beloved Fatherland against an opponent who does not belong here and whose greed started this war.

We have many obligations toward our foreign comrades who, in their belief in our future, have given the most that a human being can sacrifice. That should spur us on to pay our debt to them; to hate our enemy; to stop him, and stop him wherever we can. Some day we again shall take the offensive; we again will be the hammer and the enemy will be the anvil..

IVO E. SOLARRA
2nd Lt, Arm'd Force
O.B. Team # 15

G-2 MESSAGE FILE AND JOURNAL

TELEPHONE X RADIO VERBAL LIASON OFFICER MSGR

TO FROM XIX CORPS

Time over target - - 1205. Tac/R
 K8960--4 gun positions in concrete emplacements--fired one.
 K8657--20 MET with Red Cross, parked. - - - K9857-Big fire in Aldenhoven.
 FO351 to K8746. NMS on roads. FO351 - 8 MET going SW. K8759-6 fires,
 buildings burning. K8650 - 4 P47s seen with white markings on both top and
 bottom of wings top. Did not make hostile move. Over Statlberg to
 Erchweiler to Kerkrade to Uldenhoven, 25plus, ~~about~~ black objects about 1 ft
 in diameter with 10 to 12 ~~hairs~~ hairy looking streamers, to about 3 feet long,
 met at 6000 feet.

Flak at 9648, intense, accurate, heavy. Flak at K9857, moderate, accurate,
 heavy. Flak at K9063, meager, accurate and heavy.
 Tac/R 1215. K9064--6 tanks going South. K9765, 10 MET going S. K9467,
 5 cars and 2 vehicles going North. K8763 to K9060, approx 100 Allied armd
 vehicles going NE. K9768, 6 SP arty pieces going W. K9465-3 MET moving N.
 K9666, 10 personnel carriers drawing possibly small arty pieces. K8868-
 4 ~~trucks~~ trucks and 2 other vehicles. K9066- 2 vans parked facing S. 1 vehicle
 going N. K 9765.- Road bridge intact. K9565-trenches and possible gun
 positions. K9364-square of camouflaged buildings.

Tac/R - 1300

K9459 - 4 gun positions, fired on with no direct hits, one near hit. K934572,
 12 gun positions, possibly AA. Pilot did not adjust. (Hows) Flak 9166, intense,
 accurate, light. 9162, intense, accurate, light. 9664, meager, accurate, heavy.

Tac/R1405- F1985 - occupied flak and search light positions (over)

INITIALS	DISTRIBUTION		CLASSIFICATION
AP	30 Ron Tr	Div Sig O	Arm'd Forces
	117 Inf	Div QM O	AT Units
	119 Inf	Chem C	AAA
-3	120 Inf	Ord O	Artillery
	Hq Div Arty	Prov M	Aviation
	113 FA Bn	Engr	Cas & PW
	118 FA Bn	Surgeon	Cavalry
	197 FA Bn	Army	Chem War
C.G.	230 FA Bn	Corps	CP's
A.D.C.	105 Engr Bn	Adjacent U	Def Org
C/S	105 Med Bn	Air S.P.	Engineers
G-1	Div Hq Co	CIC	Infantry
G-2	Atchd Troops	MIT	Misc (Enemy)
Ln Off	743 Tk Bn	OB	Pat & Ron
TE	823 TD Bn	PI	Periodic Reports
6 Oct	531 AAA	At Off	Reserves
ME IN			Supply & Evac
1540			Terrain & Wea
ONE OUT			Units in Contact
			Misc (Journal)

TO: _____ FROM: GRAVES REGISTRATION

8 GERMANS LAID TO REST. AMEN.

17 PWS THRU CLEARING STATION TODAY

INITIALS	DISTRIBUTION	CLASSIFICATION
AP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	30 Rec Tr	Div Sig C
	117 Inf	Div QM O
	119 Inf	Chem O
	120 Inf	Ord O
-3	Hq Div Arty	Prov M
	113 FA Bn	Engr
	118 FA Bn	Surgeon
ISTRIBUTION	197 FA Bn	Army
C.G.	230 FA Bn	Corps
A.D.C.	105 Engr Bn	Adjacent U
C/S	105 Med Bn	Air S.P.
G-1	Div Hq Co	CIC
G-2	Atchd Troops	MII
Ln Off	743 Tk Bn	OB
TE	823 TD Bn	PI
6 OCT	531 AAA	Lt Off
ME IN		
1940		
ONE OUT		

Units in Contact: See I.F.W.

Summary of En. Activity: The enemy was generally quiet thru out the night. However at approx. 0645 the enemy was observed collecting forces in the vic. of 865.5-65 and after an arty concentration these forces began a direct frontal assault on our second Battalion. The counterattack was successful in driving us from about 6 pill boxes but was broken up by our arty and air. The attack was made by approx. 250 men of the 1st + 2nd Bns of the 148th Inf Regt. supported by assault guns (7.5's) and possibly 2 tanks. These 6 pillboxes were all retaken during the period - most of them not being occupied. 1st Bn cleaned out the large woods in the Rythl sector and occupied town of MERKSTEIN Hotst St. A great deal of sniper fire was encountered in this area.


Artillery. Arty fire in the rear area i.e. RIMBORG has been considerably lighter throughout the period but was fairly heavy on the

^{M M}
 gun. line troops. The type was
 mostly light however ~~some~~ medium arty
 was reported.


Aviation: Enemy planes dropped several
 strings of Anti-personnel bombs in
 our sector at approx 2100.

S. Messrs.
 S-2.

additional Note: Mission of this morning's
 counter attack was to ~~break~~ regain
 pill boxes previously lost.



⑦ 10/5/44



Defense of CROYD. CP
5 OCT, 1944
O = 4 MAN OP
O = 4 MAN OP with BAROCKA