

+70  
88

III  
X 351

LINDERN

XX 183

LINNICH

XX 275

II  
X T GRON

GEILENKIRCHEN

CT 72

III  
X 984 (273)

AT 29 2 II 148

II  
X 330

II  
X FT. STRAND

DUFFENDORF

2 II 330

II  
X 74

SEITTERICH

2 II 148

XX 49

MG II 67 II 149

MG II 47

ALDENHOVEN

ALSDORF

2 II 148

II  
X 148

3 II 245

II  
X 15005

FL II CT SCHWAB

503 MOBILE

II  
X CT GLASS

506 BAS

II  
X 302 WEST

II  
X 689

II  
X 404

WURSELEN

III  
X 352

II  
X 689

WURSELEN  
VON FRITZCHEN

ESCHWEILER

XX 246

MG II 34

II  
X 489

III  
X 27

II  
X 17 GAF  
FORT

II  
X 475 REFL

III  
X 48

II  
X 173  
RACHEN

Enemy Order of Battle  
304 O/B Team #15

1:100,000

SECRET

00  
+ 42

BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE

(The following is a transcript of notes taken by Captain Ferriss while present at the CP of the 119th Inf on 2 Oct 44.)

The CP of the 119th Inf on 2 Oct was located in a small room on the first floor of a private dwelling in Groenstraat. In addition to myself, there were present in this room virtually the entire time I was there the following officers: Col Edwin M. Sutherland, CO of the 119th Inf (referred to as "CO" in my notes); Major H. D. McCown, S-3 (referred to in the notes as "S-3"); Major Vodra Phillips, S-3 of 743d Tk Bn; and Lt Col Seeright, CO of 197th FA Bn. Intermittently, other officers visited the operations room, as indicated in the transcribed notes.

The 119th Inf had the 197th FA Bn (code name "Crunch") in direct support. The 65th FA Bn, ("Castle") reinforced fires of the 197th FA, while the 92d Chemical Bn ("Meteor") was in general support. Finally, the 258th FA Bn ("Mallory Red") had nine of its SP 155's on the special mission of supporting the 117th Inf and the 119th Inf in the reduction of pillboxes.

1300 -- E Co in Rimborg, meeting heavy s. a. fire.

1315 -- CO told Wayne he wanted to get B Co across as soon as possible, so that he could start Brown rolling.

1330 -- CO of 2d Bn rpts committing F on R of E Co.

1400 -- Cox reported plan to commit G Co behind E and move his CP into Rimborg. McCown thinks this indicates things are going well.

1350 -- 2d Bn, having cleared out Rimborg proper, is getting a lot of s. a. fire from upper stories of castle immediately behind town.

1410 -- Herlong reports using "little bridges" successfully to cross creek.

- 1420 -- Effort being made to get Mallory Red to fire direct fire on castle.
- 1430 -- 2d Bn, says its view of castle is obstructed; hence, hasn't been able to use attached tanks against it.
- 1440 -- CO says none of 1st Bn has crossed RR track. Receiving fire from down RR tracks -- an MG right on RR tracks.
- 1442 -- S-3 checked with 1st Bn - found that one platoon of A was across RR, but none of C. Bridging held up by mechanical failure of dozer; hence, no vehicles across stream. Tanks and TD's ready to go across.
- 1450 -- CO says 2d Bn has 3 foot bridges -- they haven't gotten them in yet -- it's too deep to cross without them.
- 1500 -- CO urged Herlong to get platoon around to L and work on MG firing down RR tracks; told him time of essence.
- 1535 -- An engineer Lt Col says both "expedient" bridge and treadway (northern) bridge are almost in. Latter has been put in under MG fire. Approaches are apparently OK.
- 1537 -- "Smitty" (1st Bn) reports he expects tanks to roll across culvert in a few minutes. CO believes that things will begin to crack when the "cans" get across.
- 1535 -- Mallory Red reports unable to get guns into position to fire on castle -- wants air OP to adjust fire. Lt Col Seeright previously said there were 3 OP's up and he had requested that one adjust arty fire on castle.
- 1545 -- Crunch 6 learns that arty is putting smoke on RR to protect those putting in bridge.
- 1550 -- 1st Bn reports it is all set to cross, using smoke to protect crossing of tanks.
- 1557.- S-3 learns that Croydon has run into trouble with bridge.
- 1558 -- 2d Bn has 1 squad of F Co across stream -- they're wading.
- 1559 -- 3d Bn alerted *by* CO that he'll be ordered to move soon -- as soon as tanks move over stream.



1600 -- Lt Col \_\_\_\_\_ (Engrs) says treadway has been in since 1530. Tanks didn't go before due (1) communication trouble; (2) waited for smoke protection. "Expedient" bridge not in.

1557 -- Capt \_\_\_\_\_ (105 Engrs) arrived to get dope on how to handle maintenance of bridges, which they are to take over.

1605 -- Maj Phillips (S-3, 743d Tk Bn) learns that 1 platoon of tanks is now across; others waiting till the one platoon fans out. TD's will follow when all 3 platoons of tanks get across.

1618 -- CO tells Herlong to use bridge that's in (treadway), not wait for other one -- put things across it as fast as possible -- Herlong must make room for 3d Bn, which CO is going to start at once. Speed essential, as troops must begin digging in at 1800.

1621 -- Lt Col Brown arrives at CP. CO tells Brown situation -- that Herlong is ready for him so long as Brown keeps to R -- temporary bridge (about 200 yds S of treadway) will be in momentarily.

1624 -- 2d Bn has only 2 squads of F across, none of E. Resistance: S. A. Co E's L in contact with 117th.

1629 -- Lt Col Quinn (S-5, 119) tells CO it will be ok to feed Cox' tanks (B Co., 743d) across on Herlong's bridge -- these tanks can then help reduce resistance facing F Co. Quinn to tell Cox to do this.

1631 -- Maj Phillips learns that 2 platoons of tanks now across stream.

1634 -- Maj Hill says Lt Col Johnson - on PL 5 - offers to put mortar fire on castle blocking 119th's progress (which is on Johnson's right rear). CO's answer: Use mortars on castle if observer can actually see Jerries.

1638 -- Lt Col Cox told that 2 platoons of Co B (CO, Lt Howell) of \_\_\_\_\_ TD Bn is attached to 2d Bn immediately -- have tanks pick TD platoon up at treadway bridge.

1645 -- "Smitty" (1st Bn) told to clear bridge as fast as possible -- CO wants entire outfit on position by 1800. A & C are not to wait for tanks to join them, though they'll be there soon.

1650 — Only spasmodic arty fire (McCown to Div).

1700 — Crunch 6 says one FA Bn has put 1100 rounds into woods E of RR; another (Castle) has fired 600 rounds -- presumably at same target. He thinks woods should be well flattened out.

1700 — Herlong going across stream to join C Co.

1708 — 1st Bn S-3 reports that C Co pinned down between stream and RR and is waiting for tanks. He is told to get story straight as Herlong had previously reported that C Co was up to RR.

1715 — Maj Phillips learns that tanks (3, to be exact) are bogging down on E side of stream -- an effort being made to pull 'em out with help of TD's. "Too damn much rain, for too many days."

1723 — Maj Hill says 117th is getting fire from its R flank.

1728 — CO tells Gen Hobbs that he's going to have to send Brown ahead without tanks, due bogging down, with mission of getting to "U" tonight.

1730 — CO to Herlong: Necessary to get to "U" tonight -- due soft footing, we don't know when tanks can join inf -- so inf must go ahead -- 3d Bn being sent across. Herlong says 3d Bn can help most by swinging onto R of 1st Bn. Co said this would be done. This confirmed to Brown, who was present at 119th CP.

1732 — CO to Cox: Situation explained -- Cox to concentrate on getting bridge in at Rimburg and on tying up E and F for night with 117th at N edge of woods. Idea is to hold a secure bridgehead for night.

1740 — S-3 tells 117th that bulk of our F Co is across , and E Co now crossing at Rimburg.

1747 — Maj Phillips says two platoons of 743d are stuck in mid. No use trying to put tanks across on treadway bridge now in -- advises that if 2d Bn's tanks and TD's have not started across, they should be pulled back -- must wait for bridge to be put in at Rimburg. CO adopts advice.

1748 — 2d Bn told that its tanks and TD's are to be pulled out (if not already mired).

1751 -- Phillips learns that Cox' platoon of tanks think they've found a route through soft ground that will work. CO says for them to go ahead and try it.

1755 -- 3d Bn reports it's 200 yds from stream, carrying its 3 inf bridges.

1810 -- L. O. from TD Bn told that remaining two platoons of TD Bn will bivouac in general vic with Brown's two tank platoons in defiladed positions W of stream -- prepared to counter any infiltration from S and SW.

1819 -- CO tells Cox that success of entire operation depends on Cox' securing bridgehead and successful completion of bridge at Rimburg tonight. Engrs must work all night. Cox must get bridging material to site very soon before it's dark. CO just learned and informs Cox that Cox' platoon of tanks have gotten through boggy ground and are 600 yds S of moat. CO says Cox must get inf protection to these tanks.

1822 -- 3d Bn reports 1 platoon of Co L across stream.

1825 -- S-3 learns that Cox' platoon of tanks has received bazooka fire about 250 yds SW of moat -- fire bounced off. This word phoned to 2d Bn.

1830 -- Herlong tells CO that fire is still coming down and across RR track and he can't get across RR. CO told him that the one platoon of tanks already across are his to use if they can find any route up to RR that's dry enough -- if no advance possible, dig in W of RR, but be sure to link up with 3d Bn.

1835 -- CO tells Brown to get in good position and also help Herlong on L -- the two bns must be tied in.

1839 -- Scotty (2d Bn S-3) told he must contact and protect the platoon of tanks that got through boggy ground.



Authority: CG 30th Inf Div

Initials: SLH

Date: 01 October 1944

## HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION

No. 106

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 01 0001 Oct

Maps: GSGS 2541, 4249, 4338, 4-9-R1-R2-S1-S2 1/100,000

To: 01 2400 Oct

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

## a. Enemy Front Lines.

(K843600) - (K843585) - (K830570) - (K820540) - (K820510)

## b. Defensive Organization.

SIEGFRIED LINE is the main defensive position in Division zone.

The enemy has constructed additional tank ditches and foxholes in rear of the SIEGFRIED LINE, between GEILENKIRCHEN (K8664) and the ROER RIVER. Construction has continued on ditches and entrenchments in the SIEGFRIED LINE area, and in at least two bolts further to the East on this side of the RHINE.

## c. Units in Contact.

2 battalions of 330th Infantry Regiment, 183rd Infantry Division, occupy sectors between GEILENKIRCHEN and RIMBURG (K8458). 5 battalions of about 450 men each, operating under 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions, occupy sector from RIMBURG to Division's southern boundary.

## d. Artillery.

Estimate 3 light battalions, 3 medium batteries, and probably 1 battery of 210mm capable of intervention in Division zone. Much of the enemy artillery is believed to have displaced to the rear for defense in depth.

## e. Reserves.

1 battalion of each of the 3 infantry regiments of 183rd Infantry Division are possible enemy reserves in the Corps zone. 698th Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division, has been identified in the vicinity of AACHEN (K8343). Of 246th Infantry Division, 3rd Battalion, 404th Infantry Regiment, and 1st and 3rd Battalions, 352nd Infantry Regiment, are still unlocated but are presumably in the vicinity or en route to this area. 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions are considered to be in layback roles for possible counterattacks against Allied breakthroughs of the SIEGFRIED LINE. According to PW statements, elements of 12 SS Panzer Division are in the vicinity of (K4704) in unknown strength. COLOGNE (F4560) is known as a straggler collecting point, capable of dispatching limited reserves to our front.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

## a. General Summary.

Contact with the enemy was limited to patrols and artillery fire. Enemy patrols operated in the WINDHAUSEN (K8461) area during the hours of darkness. Observation of enemy movements was poor because of the weather.

## b. Operation of Component Elements.

## (1) Artillery.

Enemy artillery was fairly active during the period. 15 SHELLREPS received, no counterbattery missions fired. Fire was received from Northeast, East, and Southeast. No pattern could be noted in the fire, and no definite locations were obtained. Several concentrations of 20 rounds were reported.

## (2) Engineers.

Enemy continues to lay extensive minefields.

### 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

#### a. Enemy Casualties, including Prisoners.

PWs taken today - 3. Total for operation - 2546. Total to date 10,051. Enemy dead buried - (Sept. 29 - 3) (Sept. 30 - 2) (Oct. 1 - 2). Total to date - 321. Enemy tanks destroyed - (Sept. 21 - 1) (Oct. 1 - 0) Total to date - 153.

#### b. Weather and Visibility.

Low overcast with rain all morning. Low clouds the rest of the day. Visibility poor. Forecast for Oct. 2 - Haze in early morning with only fair visibility. Broken clouds throughout the rest of the day with good visibility. Favorable for air activity and ground operations.

#### c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Civilian report on German secret weapons referred to V-2 sites in the woods East and Northeast of DUSSELDORF (F3492). This was previously reported incorrectly as V-1.

(2) German civilians are reported to be using a modern car with license number 063315, equipped with a radio transmitter, in the Division area. Germans are also reported to be using stolen civilian car with license number 63604.

(3) Civilians report that while they were examined at a German headquarters at (K833525) a civilian came in and reported that he had just returned from MAASTRICHT (K5652) with valuable information. If this statement is true, it means that at least one civilian (German agent) passed through our lines and returned to the enemy lines. All units must prevent passage to and from our lines by civilians. The description of this particular agent was: 45 years old, thin build, thin face with high cheek bones, slightly bald, wearing overalls and a black suitcoat, no hat.

(4) Belgian Secret Army reported to First U.S. Army that the following civilians are believed attached to American combat units: Marcell MOREAU, of BRUSSELS, a former member of German Gestapo. Last seen in American uniform. Edmond ETIENNE, of BIEVERES, suspected enemy agent and German sympathizer. If either of these persons are found present in units, they should be turned over to CIC.

(5) Cut telephone wires behind the lines of 29th Infantry Division were found to have been booby trapped. A wire attached to the cut wire was attached to a Tellermine and fixed with igniter so that when the wire was picked up by wire crews, the mine was detonated. The Battalion of the 29th Infantry Division attached to this Division reported its wire cut in four places during the day. These are only two instances of tampering with our communications, but they give us fair warning of what to expect in the future. Wire-tapping as well as wire cutting is also a distinct probability inside Germany.

### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

#### a. The enemy can

(1) Delay our advance with the forces now in contact.

(2) Make an all-out defense of the SIEGFRIED LINE, using all available reserves.

#### b. Discussion.

Capability 4 a (2) is definitely indicated.

Hall  
HALL CMB  
G-2



Maps: GSGS 2541, 4249, 4338, 4-9-R1-R2-S1-S2 1/100,000

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

## a. Enemy Front Lines.

(K851598)-(K860598)-(UBACH (K865592)-(K857585)-RIMBURG (K846586) - (K837570)-(K830560)-(K820550)-(K820510).

## b. Defensive Organization.

SIEGFRIED LINE is still main enemy defensive position. Only in the northern half of the Division zone are our troops through the first line of fortifications where they destroyed 11 pillboxes. Between GEILENKIRCHEN (K8664) and the ROER RIVER, the enemy has constructed additional tank ditches and foxholes. Construction has also continued in the 2 defensive belts of the SIEGFRIED LINE further to the East, this side of the RHINE RIVER.

## c. Units in Contact.

PWs taken today confirm the presence of 1st Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment, 183rd Infantry Division in the sector between GEILENKIRCHEN and RIMBURG (K8458). PWs were also taken in the same area from 4th Company, 1150th Infantry Regiment, attached to 183rd Infantry Division. PW was taken from the 4th Battery, 219th Artillery Regiment, in the MARIENBERG (K8459) area. Now identifications of the period were: 1st Company, 42nd Fortress MG Battalion in the PALENBERG (K850598) area, and 3rd and 4th Companies, 47th Fortress MG Battalion in the RIMBURG (K8458) area. The sector from RIMBURG to the Division's southern boundary is believed occupied by 5 battalions of about 450 men each, operating under 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions. PWs were taken today in the vicinity of (K818528) from 4th Company, CT VALTA, attached 49th Infantry Division.

## d. Artillery.

Estimate 3 light battalions, 3 medium batteries, and possibly 1 battery 210mm capable of intervention in Division zone. Much of the enemy artillery is believed to have displaced to the rear for defense in depth.

## e. Reserves.

1 battalion of each of the 3 infantry regiments of 183rd Infantry Division are possible enemy reserves in the Corps zone. 3rd Battalion, 404th Infantry Regiment, and 1st and 3rd Battalions, 352nd Infantry Regiment, 246th Infantry Division, are still unlocated, but are believed in the vicinity of AACHEN (K8343) or en route to this area. Uncommitted elements of 42nd and 47th Fortress MG Battalions are also likely enemy reserves. 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, of 116th Panzer Division was identified today on the British front in the ARNHEM sector. 9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade were also identified in the same area. 10th SS Panzer Division was identified today in the area of 7th Armored Division. 12th SS Panzer Division has been reported in widely separated areas, but is most probably in VII Corps sector. COLOGNE is a straggler collecting point from which the enemy can dispatch various types of reserves.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

## a. General Summary.

In the northern half of the Division zone, resistance to our attack was met initially along the line of the WURM RIVER where the enemy concentrated small arms, mortar and artillery fire to oppose our crossing. In spite of this heavy fire, a crossing was secured, and the advance continued to the East. The enemy's defense in this area was made both from within the pillboxes and from field fortifications protecting them. The enemy stubbornly defended PALENBERG (K850598) where houses were reported being used as pillboxes. By 1900, our troops had occupied most of the town, but some small arms fire was still being received. Mortar fire was particularly heavy in this northern sector, from positions believed to be located in the UBACH (K8659) area. Artillery fire was also heavy in volume in this sector. However, there was no report of the use of direct fire weapons by the enemy. In the center of the Division zone, the enemy met our attack with a large volume of small arms and mortar fire in the vicinity of RIMBURG (K842589). A particularly intense amount of small arms fire was received from the castle (K843585), and our advance elements were held up West of the railroad in that sector. South of RIMBURG, small arms fire came initially from the railroad, and artillery fire was also received. Opposition in the woods to the East consisted of intense fire from small arms and automatic weapons located in field fortifications there. Several pillboxes were uncovered in the vicinity of (K841575). At 1900, our troops were in position along the railroad. On the extreme southern flank, several points made by our troops in that area drew small arms and artillery reaction. Considerable artillery fire fell on BOCHOLTZ (K7848) and EIJGELSHOVEN (K8256) during the period.



Anti Aircraft.

Enemy flak opposing the aerial bombardment preceding our attack was light, in contrast to the intense accurate flak previously noted in this area.

(2) Artillery.

Enemy artillery fire was heavy throughout the period. Fire was received from the Northeast, East and Southeast. The preponderance of fire was from the Southeast, in the general vicinity of ALSDORF (K8954). 30 SHELLREPS received, 22 counterbattery missions fired. One report of a battalion concentration of 75 rounds. Most of the artillery fire received was from a single piece or a 4 gun battery.

(3) Engineers.

Enemy minefields were encountered throughout the Division zone.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties, including prisoners.

Total PWs taken today - 28. Total for operation - 28. Total to date - 10,079. Enemy dead buried today - 0. Total for operation - 0. Total to date - 321. Enemy tanks destroyed today - 0. Total for operation - 0. Total to date - 153.

b. Weather and Visibility.

Ground haze in early morning, lifting by mid morning. Generally clear throughout the day. Visibility good. Forecast for October 3 - scattered clouds in early morning, increasing in late morning. Broken clouds in the afternoon with scattered showers. Good visibility. Favorable for air activity. Favorable for ground operations. Forecast for October 4 - considerable cloudiness, little rain. Favorable for ground operations.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) On VII Corps front on September 30, an estimated 300 enemy infantry launched a counterattack at 1915 against 9th Infantry Division Northeast of LAMMERSDORF (K9626) after an intense preparation by an estimated light artillery battalion. The penetration was scaled off and the situation restored at 2000, but intense artillery fire was received for 2 hours thereafter.

(2) 7th Armored Division reported that on their front the enemy has several times raised white flags to stop the fire. When the firing has ceased, the enemy has resumed his fire.

(3) The large number of unexplained holes observed in the Division zone are reported by PW to be nothing more than foxholes for troops to fall back to in case of necessity. PW states that they were dug by civilians who did not know how to dig them properly.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can

(1) Delay our advance with the forces now in contact.

(2) Make an all-out defense of the SIEGFRIED LINE using all available reserves.

b. Discussion.

Capability 4 a (2) is indicated.

Hall  
HALL EMB.  
G-2

Order of Battle Notes for period ending 22200 October 1944.

1. The following is an extract of a captured document giving the codenames of 42 Fortress MG Bn, dated 28 September 1944:

MG Bn 42	KÖHLER
" Staff	STREICHHOLZ
" 1 Co	ZIGARETTE
" 2 Co	ZWIEBEL
" 3 Co	TISCHTUCH
" 4 Co	ASCHENBECHER
" CO	FERDINAND
183 Gren Div	ZAMPA
Gren Regt 330	VEILOHEN
I Bn, "	ROSE
II Bn, "	NARZISSE

42 Fortress MG Bn was formed in DUSSELDORF on 13 September and moved from there to GEILENKIRCHEN. Some of its units were attached to 330 Regt (183 Gren Div), while the rest remained in GEILENKIRCHEN. The Bn consists of 3 MG Cos with 16 HMGs each and a 4th bazooka Co.

2. Organization of 14 (AT) Co, 330 Regt (183 Inf Div):  
Three Plats with each 18 bazookas and 1 LMG. 10 bazookas were held in reserve for the whole Co. CO: Lt KÄRTNER.

3. Organization of 219 Arty Regt (183 Inf Div):  
One Bn with 3 AT Btries  
One Bn with 3 Btries 105 mm Hows.  
One Bn 155 Hows.

According to FW the daily allotment of ammo is 20 rounds per 105 mm How and 10 rounds per 155 mm How.

Personalities: 4 Btry: CO- Lt MOTZGAU.

4. 47 Fortress MG Bn, connected with 49 Inf Div, was identified by PWs taken on 119th Inf front. According to them the Bn also consists of 4 Cos, but otherwise its organization is different from 42 Fortress MG Bn. 3 Co (probably also 1 and 2 Cos) has three Plats, each with two HMG squads and one AT squad (bazookas). 4 Co has two Mortar Plats, one Bicycle Plat and one Engr Plat.

Personalities: 3 Co: CO-Lt WIESE. 4 Co: CO-Lt WIENINGER.

5. Another one of the OTs connected with 49 Inf Div is OT VALTA. It was formed (or possibly reformed) at ESCHWEILER <sup>at</sup> approximately 15 Sept and moved from there to HERZOGENRATH. CO- Capt VALTA, FPN- 24526. 4 Co: CO-Lt WIEMERS.

6. According reports from higher HQ 156 Pz Gren Regt of 116 Pz Div has been identified on the British front near ARNHEIM. 9 Pz Div and 105 Pz Brig are in the same area. 10 SS Pz Div was identified in 7th Armd Div area.

7. PWs from 47 Fortress Engr Bn state that yellow flares at present mean "We are here" and green flares "Light Artillery fire". It has been confirmed, however, that colors are being changed frequently.

IVE E. SOLARRA (PWS)  
and Lt, Armd Force  
O/B Team # 15




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
Hq 119th

Overlay showing route  
advance of units at  
119th Ltr. 021400 021444  
Maps: Central E  
1/2

022255  
1137



022255  
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55

### Attack on the Siegfried Line.

The 2nd Battalion occupied a defense line in the vicinity of Wrotenrath, Germany, with the 1st Battalion on the right. For the attack, this Battalion was ordered to follow the 1st Battalion at 1000 yards on an order and seize an area north of the two slag dumps at Palenberg. Company "E", under Regimental control was ordered to seize a bridge site on the left of the 1st Battalion and secure it from small arms fire, this site being on the main road from Marienberg to Palenberg.

A study of maps and photos indicated that the area west of the slag dump was very steep ground, the area south and southwest of the slag dumps consisting of extensive factory or mine buildings plus a large residential area in Palenberg and Ubach. The Battalion zone of advance to its objective was blocked by the slag dumps.

Plans for the attack was as follows--The Battalion Line Of Departure to be just east of Scherpenseel, the Battalion (less Company "E") to move to this line in order, to pass through Scherpenseel on two roads in the zone of advance and attack in the zone of the 1st Battalion until across the Wurm River, thereafter northeast to the Battalion objective. Formation Companies abreast, Company "F" on the left, Company "G" on the right, one Machine Gun platoon direct support of Company "F", one section direct support Company "G", one section direct support Company "E". 81 mm. mortar platoon from positions northwest of Marienberg in general support of the Battalion. The Battalion to be prepared to change formation to column of companies at Battalion Line of Departure, to initially seize a line (see overlay) near the slag dumps, reorganize and continue the attack on order.

### The Attack--October 2, 1944, Company "E".

Company "E" coordinated their attack with the 1st Battalion advancing on the left of the 1st Battalion. Initially "E" Company was to clear out the town of "Marienberg" and then cross the Wurm River and secure the bridge site on the main road to Palenberg. This bridge site was located approximately 400 yards north of the Battalion (1st Bn.) crossing. (see overlay).

On the advance, E Company ran into extremely heavy mortar and artillery fire 400 to 500 yards from Marienberg. They continued their advance, ran into Machine gun fire and sniper fire in Marienberg, finally clearing out the town. "E" Company suffered heavy casualties during this operation mainly from artillery and mortar fire. The 1st platoon with one section of Heavy Machine Gun and the weapons platoon attached, secured the bridge site from positions on the west side of the river. The 2nd and 3rd platoons crossed the river North of the 1st Battalion (see overlay) and cleaned out two large pillboxes, numerous machine guns positions and secured the bridge site from the East of small arms fire. The bridge site was secured by 1600 when the 275th Engineer group started work and completed the bridge for heavy traffic by 2000.

"E" Company continued with the mission of securing the bridge site until relieved by units of the 2nd Armored on October 4th. "E" Company then linked up with the 2nd Battalion in defense of Palenberg.

### "F" Company.

"F" Company, in the attack, crossed the Line of Departure at 1430 and advanced in the same sector as "E" Company of the 1st Battalion. They continued their advance through the west portion of Palenberg, cleaning out this portion of town as they advanced. They encountered machine gun and rifle fire from



the houses and dug in positions. There advance continued along the west of Palenberg and they were able to assist "E" Company in cleaning out the two large pillboxes and numerous machine gun positions. There assistance helped considerably in securing the Bridge site. "F" Company advanced on North of Palenberg and took up defensive position North of town (see overlay) at the bottom of a high ridge that was occupied by the enemy. "F" Company secured this portion of town on the night of October 2.

On October 3, 1944, "F" Company continued the attack with the mission of securing the high ground north of the town. The only approach was a large draw west and north of the large slag piles and factory district. The enemy held this draw with a strong force and covered by pillboxes. "F" Company was stopped on this attack without advancing.

On October 4, at 0700, "F" Company was counterattacked by 240 Germans. The counterattack came through the draw that "F" Company attacked through. This was held by the 2nd platoon of "F" Company. This platoon, with the support of artillery and mortar fire, had the counterattack repulsed by 1500. It was necessary, during the operation, for the platoon leader to call for mortar and artillery fire on his own position. Hand to hand fighting was encountered with the enemy. "F" Company suffered moderate losses. The following days (three days), "E" Company sent out numerous patrols and had several small skirmishes with the enemy. They kept contact with the enemy at all times.

#### Company "G".

"G" Company ~~the attack~~ followed "F" Company, and crossed the Line of Departure at 1630. "G" Company also had to cross the Wurm River under extremely heavy mortar and artillery fire. "G" Company cleaned out the balance of Palenberg and advanced to the factory district East of the town. They linked up with "F" Company and took positions along the factory. This factory is located on built up ground and is surrounded by a wall from 15 to 25 feet high. The enemy had perfect observation of everything from the factory buildings on our positions. "G" Company secured this portion of town on the night of October 2. On October 3, they cleaned out the factory area and kept this area secure by constant patrolling.

"G" Company, in cleaning out the balance of Palenberg, captured a large number of positions and a large amount of German equipment and guns.

#### Company "H".

"H" Company initially supported the attack of the Regiment with mortars in battery Northwest of Marienberg. On October 3, the mortars displaced to Palenberg and supported our positions. The fire of the mortars was largely responsible for breaking up the counterattack.

"F" Company was supported by one section (platoon) of Heavy Machine gun, "G" Company and "E" Company were supported by one section of Heavy Machine gun each.

## SUMMARY OF BATTALION OPERATIONS.

The 2nd Battalion, mission originally was to secure ~~the~~ the high ground North of Palenberg. This high ground was heavily defended by dug in enemy and covered by pillboxes. The only approach available to this high ground was the draw that "F" Company was to attack through. The ridge securing this high ground was very steep and in some places vertical. The 2nd Battalion was released of the mission of taking this high ground on October 3 and given the mission of securing the Regiment left flank which was accomplished.

"F" & "G" Companies, both had to pass through units of the 1st Battalion that were held up, making control a difficult problem. "E" Company reverted back to Battalion control on October 4th.

On October 6th, the 2nd Battalion moved to Ubach and took up positions to the NorthWest (see overlay) and secured the left flank of the 3rd Battalion. This move was made during the late hours of lightness and during dark. Heavy mortar and artillery fire was received during the entire period.