

SECTION I - PERSONNEL

A. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES.

1. Casualties.

a. The following tabulation presents the total daily battle casualty rate for this command during the month of October. The first column is based on the estimates of unit commanders as submitted in the Daily Estimated Loss Report. The second column is based on machine records battle casualty reports showing the number of casualties sustained each day by this command. While unit commanders still generally appear to underestimate their losses it is noted that in comparison with the same tabulation for the month of September this month's daily estimates show a steadier correlation with the machine records figures and the total for the month of October is only 7% under machine records totals in contrast with 18% lower during September. The ability of unit commanders to estimate closely their losses continues to form a sound basis for tactical decisions, current replacement requisitions and, in addition, justifies the acceptance of unit commanders' estimates of losses forty-eight hours in advance for the purpose of furnishing advance replacements.

DAILY FIRST US ARMY BATTLE CASUALTIES

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED LOSS REPORT</u>	<u>MACHINE RECORDS UNIT REPORT</u>
1 October	212	334
2 October	455	624
3 October	494	496
4 October	769	841
5 October	467	462
6 October	795	812
7 October	570	724
8 October	708	787
9 October	699	515
10 October	375	507
11 October	525	570
12 October	502	574
13 October	525	598
14 October	407	580
15 October	419	410
16 October	437	540
17 October	369	348
18 October	327	303
19 October	384	227
20 October	228	173
21 October	304	108
22 October	40	70
23 October	65	98
24 October	86	87
25 October	76	107
26 October	104	98
27 October	82	75
28 October	82	80
29 October	138	150
30 October	52	51
31 October	66	104
TOTAL OCTOBER	10,762	11,453



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b. Table 1, page 3 indicates the breakdown by major units of the First US Army casualties for the month of October based on the adjusted cumulative battle casualty columns of the Daily Estimated Loss Report. While the adjusted totals are 7% higher than the machine records totals the variation is still within a tolerance limit which will permit the use of the estimated loss reports in lieu of machine records data during the 60 day time lag before machine records reports can be considered complete.

c. Table 2, page 4 and Table 3, page 4 are percentage analyses by type and category of unit based on cumulative figures of Table 1, as discussed in paragraph 1, b., above.

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TABLE 1

CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY UNIT, FIRST US ARMY, PERIOD 1 OCTOBER TO 31 OCTOBER 1944

(Compiled from Daily Estimated Loss Report)

UNIT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	CAPTURED	TOTAL BATTLE	NON BATTLE	REMARKS
Army & Corps Troops	133	727	35	8	903	3507	
1 Infantry Division	191	1266	161	0	1618	1202	
2 Infantry Division	9	123	1	0	133	242	From 22 to 31 October
4 Infantry Division	290	352	23	16	681	595	
8 Infantry Division	1	17	13	0	31	135	From 22 to 31 October
9 Infantry Division	273	1898	221	0	2392	1724	
28 Infantry Division	46	258	30	0	334	753	
29 Infantry Division	185	781	250	0	1216	738	From 1 to 22 October
30 Infantry Division	240	1790	354	86	2470	493	From 1 to 22 October
83 Infantry Division	9	11	7	0	27	193	From 22 to 31 October
2 Armored Division	87	523	33	3	646	546	From 1 to 22 October
3 Armored Division	286	576	8	9	879	1012	
5 Armored Division	90	369	4	0	463	330	
7 Armored Division	44	367	54	0	465	179	From 1 to 8 October
9 Armored Division	3	23	0	0	26	29	From 22 to 31 October
TOTALS	1887	9081	1194	122	12284	11678	
Total Cumulative from 6 June to 31 October 1944	22664	103177	7122	2489	135448	45715	

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TABLE 1

TABLE 2

CASUALTY ANALYSIS BY TYPE, FIRST US ARMY, PERIOD 1 OCTOBER 1944 TO 31 OCTOBER 1944
 (Computed from Daily Estimated Loss Report)

<u>BATTLE CASUALTIES ONLY</u>	
Killed - - - - -	15.4 %
Wounded - - - - -	73.9 %
Missing - - - - -	9.7 %
Captured - - - - -	1.0 %

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF CASUALTIES BY TYPE UNIT, FIRST US ARMY, PERIOD 1 OCTOBER 1944 TO 31 OCTOBER 1944
 (Computed from Daily Estimated Loss Report)

<u>UNIT GROUP</u>	<u>BATTLE CASUALTIES</u>
Army & Corps Troops	7.4 %
Infantry Divisions	72.4 %
Armored Divisions	20.2 %

2. Replacements.

a. Operation of Replacement System within the Army Area.

(1) During the period of this report the Replacement System, operated within the Army Area under the control of the Ground Force Replacement System as indicated in previous reports.

(2) While the tactical situation (a static front) permitted this system to continue operating adequately, the following undesirable conditions developed as a result of the 3rd Replacement Depot being under control of an authority outside the Army:

(a) The Ground Force Replacement System continued to stock the 3rd Replacement Depot beyond the requirements of this command in numbers of men and in branches for which few requisitions were submitted.

(b) The Ground Force Replacement System withdrew trucks from the 3rd Replacement Depot without warning. This made it extremely difficult to move replacements forward from echelons of the 3rd Replacement Depot left behind during the rapid advance of the Army during the previous month. This command was forced to furnish trucks urgently needed for other purposes to bring up replacements.

b. Requisition Analysis.

(1) Breakdown of requisitions submitted during this period into specification serial numbers as tabulated in Table 4, page 6 indicated the following trends:

(a) Of the 18,421 replacements requisitioned during this period, 13,402 or 72.7% were infantry.

(b) Of the 13,402 infantry replacements requisitioned, 7,265, or 54.2% were riflemen. Riflemen, therefore constituted 39.4% of all replacements requisitioned during this period.

(2) Breakdown of replacements assigned during this period as tabulated in Table 5, page 11 indicates that of 17,741 replacements assigned 15,131 or 85.2% were supplied to divisions.

c. Advance Issue of Officer Replacement Personnel.

In accordance with ETOUSA directive and in order to insure the availability of combat trained replacement officers to lead experienced combat troops the following advance issue of officer replacement personnel as overstrength was authorized to units of this command 21 October:

One lieutenant	per	Combat Infantry Company
"	"	" Divisional Artillery Battery
"	"	" Non-divisional Artillery Battalion
"	"	" Combat Engineer Battalion
"	"	" Tank Company
"	"	" Mechanized Cavalry Troop



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TABLE 5

"REPLACEMENTS ASSIGNED TO UNITS"

Period: 1 October 1944 to 31 October 1944 Inclusive

		AF	AG	BI	CAC	CAV	CE	ChC	CWS	DC	FA	GSC	INF	MAC	MD	MP	ORD	QMC	SC	SnC	TD	TOTAL
1st Inf Div	Off					1					8		60					1	1			71
	EM					3	12				36		2310		28	3	2	5	1			2400
2nd Inf Div	Off						1	1			8		10									11
	EM					1	1						225		2							237
4th Inf Div	Off			1*				3			12		34							1		51
	EM							1			12		378		4							395
8th Inf Div	Off							2			6		55									63
	EM										1		55									56
9th Inf Div	Off					1	3				9		125									138
	EM					17	115				22		4396		128	1		3	4			4686
28th Inf Div	Off			1		1	1				12		35	1							1	52
	EM					7	31				22		1164		57		1					1282
**29th Inf Div	Off								1				99	4								104
	EM					1	13				2		1839		46			1	1			1903
**30th Inf Div	Off										10		67	2						1		80
	EM					7	63				36		2295		37		2		2			2442
83rd Inf Div	Off					1	1				5		2									9
	EM					2	15				12				12							41
**2nd Armd Div	Off	52		1*							2		23					1				79
	EM					15	44				45				15		1	2	2			124
3rd Armd Div	Off	6		1*		7	1				3		33									51
	EM	147				2					4		461									614

TABLE 5 (Part 1)



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		AF	AG	BI	CAC	CAV	CE	ChC	CWS	DC	FA	GSC	INF	MAC	MD	MP	ORD	OMC	SC	SnC	TD	TOTAL
5th Armd Div	Off	1								1	3								1			6
	EM	92				19	69				30		307		23	1	4		2			547
**7th Armd Div	Off	19				2		1			1		23				1					47
	EM	178				7	88				32				23		3		2			333
9th Armd Div	Off	1				4	1				5		12						3			26
	EM	1				6	8				6		49		1							71
TOTAL FOR DIVISIONS:	Off	79		4		17	13	2		1	76		578	7			1	2	6	2		788
	EM	418				87	460				268		13479		376	5	13	11	14			15131
Corps Units	Off								49		10		9		11	1			2			82
	EM																					
Army Troops	Off	14			11	33	9	5		1	23		13	8	13		15	2			13	160
	EM	606		43	33	324	235		3		340		174		79	1	79	335	18		258	2528
GRAND TOTAL:	Off	93		4	11	50	22	7		2	99		591	15	13		16	4	6	2	13	948
	EM	1024		43	33	411	695		52		618		13662		466	7	92	346	34		258	17741

*Warrant Officers.

**Units no longer under our command.

TABLE 5 (Part 2)

STATUS OF BATTLEFIELD APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
AS OF 2400 HOURS 31 OCTOBER 1944

TABLE 8

Unit	Total Rcvd	Appointed	Discharge Ordered Apmt Not Consumsted	Ret'nd Dispvd	Fwd Other Comds	Fwd ETO Apvd	Pending	Ret'nd Battle Casualty
Army Troops	68	55	3	3			7	
V Corps	26	22	1	1			1	1
4th Inf Div	55	44		3		6	2	
9th Inf Div	45	33	2	1		4	2	3
28th Inf Div	27	24		1		2		
5th Armd Div	7	4		1			2	
VII Corps	33	27	1	1		1	2	1
1st Inf Div	26	24	1				1	
3rd Armd Div	29	21	3	2		2	1	
VIII Corps	6	4					2	
2nd Inf Div	19	13			3		3	
8th Inf Div	3	2			1			
83rd Inf Div								
9th Armd Div								
Units No Longer Asgd to this Command								
XIX Corps	22	18		4				
2nd Armd Div	18	15		1		2		
7th Armd Div	8	8						
29th Inf Div	44	33		2		8		1
30th Inf Div	42	33		7		1		1
5 ESB	6				6			
6 ESB	2				2			
35th Inf Div	5	2		1	1	1		
79th Inf Div	6				6			
90th Inf Div	9	2			7			
82nd A/B Div	20					20		
101st A/B Div	6	2				4		
TOTAL	532	386	11	28	26	51	23	7

B. MORALE, WELFARE AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES:

1. Army Exchange Activities.

a. Gratuitous Issue.

The issue of semi-necessary items on a gratuitous basis was continued for all troops of this command during October. The supply of these items is still unsatisfactory as only 24 days' supply of the tobacco ration, and a smaller percentage of other goods, was received and issued during the month.

b. Unit Exchange Activities.

(1) Approximately 125 new accounts were opened during the month, raising the total number of accounts within First Army to 400. None of the items being distributed gratuitously were offered for sale. Approximately 15% of the items sold were captured German goods, a large portion of which was secured directly from the Communications Zone warehouse in Paris.

(2) Four large post exchanges were set up in towns where organized recreation centers have been established. These exchanges were substantially stocked, in order to afford men on pass every opportunity to make purchases.

(3) Arrangements were completed for the sale of beer to First Army troops. Ten thousand liters daily were obtained and dispensed to units through a Belgian brewery. The demand far exceeded the supply.

(4) The local procurement of approximately 1,000,000 francs worth of Belgian merchandise was arranged. This merchandise includes fine lace, stationery, crystal and brass gift items. Delivery will be effected throughout the month of November.

(5) Processing of exposed amateur film continued to be unsatisfactory.

2. Leaves, Furloughs and Passes.

During October the policy, which had been in effect since before D-Day, of granting no leaves, furloughs, or passes was relaxed to the following extent:

a. In certain towns the "off limits" policy was relaxed to allow corps to establish recreation centers to rehabilitate combat troops through 48 hour passes and to provide recreational facilities for corps troops while on short passes in town. Facilities made available include motion pictures, USO shows, showers, post exchange stores, church services, swimming pools, dances and beer bars. Since this program was developed late in the month further details which are not at present available will be included in the November report.

b. 48-hour passes to Paris were instituted on 22 October. The quota for First Army was 36 officers and 401 enlisted men for each 48 hour period. For the first five trips, these passes were limited to front line troops of combat divisions. It is anticipated that personnel from other units will be included as this program progresses.

3. Special Services Activities.

a. The military front during the month of October was relatively stabilized and demands for special service entertainment increased. Due to cold and inclement weather it was necessary to provide shelter for most performances and for the entertainers. Arrangements were made to provide each show with stage lights and heavy clothing for winter operations.

(1) The following are the attendance totals for the various Special Service Activities for October:

(a) Movies:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF SHOWS</u>	<u>TOTAL ATTENDANCE</u>
Army Troops	808	172,158
V Corps	871	177,270
VII Corps	857	217,360
VIII Corps (wk 22 Oct)	189	49,135
XIX Corps (1 Oct to 21 Oct)	<u>626</u>	<u>96,631</u>
Totals	3,351	712,554

(These totals represent only the attendance at shows put on by the Special Service companies. It is estimated that the totals to include shows given by units with their own projectors would approximately double these figures in each case.)

(b) USO Shows.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF SHOWS</u>	<u>TOTAL ATTENDANCE</u>
"AT EASE"	30	15,550
"MERRYMAKERS"	25	15,200
"AT YOUR SERVICE"	27	11,850
"BANDWAGON"	29	18,500
"BOOMS-A-DAISY"	24	11,600
"HEDGEROV CARAVAN"	<u>15</u>	<u>4,000</u>
Totals	150	76,700

(c) Special Service Live Shows.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF SHOWS</u>	<u>TOTAL ATTENDANCE</u>
16th SS Co (Army)	33	19,100
2nd SS Co (V Corps)	21	19,175
1st SS Co (VII Corps)	38	14,875
24th SS Co (XIX Corps 1 to 21 Oct)	23	9,793
35th SS Co (VIII Corps wk 21 Oct)	<u>16</u>	<u>5,850</u>
Totals	131	68,793

(d) Bands.

The nature of Band activity changed with the shifting of entertainment indoors and the relaxation of the fraternization-with-civilians policy in Belgium and Luxembourg. In place of the outdoor concert, the indoor dance became the prime source of request for the Army Bands. Concerts were continued with hospital units receiving the first priority. Toward the end of the month, the 86 piece US Army Band played several concerts for troops of First Army, including units near the front lines.

b. Supply.

On 16 October, the supply officer was able to distribute a shipment of captured German radios. It is believed that all companies have been supplied with at least one radio, with the exception of VIII Corps which rejoined First Army after distribution of radios had been completed and which had received only 25 sets from the Ninth Army allotment. Efforts are continuing with the objective of procuring sufficient radios to enable the exchange of radios with units as old radios become unserviceable.

c. Twenty motion picture projectors were obtained by plane from the UK, and distributed to corps and divisions. A shipment of French-manufactured projectors was obtained in Paris, but they proved inferior to American models. In addition, the serviceability of these French projectors was questionable because of the lack of spare parts. As of 30 October, projector spare parts were not available, although ceaseless efforts have been and are continuing to be made.

d. A special item of supply was a shipment of German captured candy, which was distributed to Corps and Divisions and Separate Army troops, to be used mainly in recreation centers. There was a great demand for large quantities of German captured writing paper, which was distributed as soon as received.

4. American Red Cross Activities.

a. Field Service.

Field directors attached to corps and divisions carried on their work during October as normally as possible in the face of supply problems caused by the difficulty of obtaining necessary transportation. Delays in cable communication with the United States continued during this month due to heavy traffic on military cables and low Red Cross priority on home service messages.

b. Hospital Department.

The amount of Red Cross hospital supplies received for this month was more adequate than for the two previous months. Newspapers, magazines, and chocolate candy were received for the first time since First Army's arrival on the continent and were distributed immediately. In addition to the regular Red Cross chocolate supply, a Belgian candy manufacturer donated 2000 lbs. of chocolate candy to the American Red Cross for distribution to the wounded.

c. Clubmobile Department.

(1) Clubmobile groups continued their normal operations throughout the corps and Army areas. In the reassignment of XIX Corps to Ninth Army and VIII Corps to this command, both Corps retained their attached clubmobile groups, thus avoiding any exchange of personnel.

(2) This Headquarters was charged by Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, with the safety of the clubmobile girls and their return to rear areas at such time as their normal operation placed them in undue jeopardy. This Headquarters, in turn, delegated to each corps the responsibility for the safety of their own group.

5. Religious Activities.

a. Report of Activities: See Table 9 which follows on page 23

b. During the period covered by this report one chaplain was killed in action, one wounded in action and one reclassified.

c. Chaplain supplies were received in small quantities.

C. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. AG Battle Casualty Reporting.

a. Procedure.

No major changes in casualty reporting procedure were effected during the month of October.

b. Transfer of Units.

(1) XIX Corps was relieved from assignment to this command and assigned to Ninth US Army. At the same time VIII Corps was relieved from assignment to Ninth US Army and assigned this headquarters. Continuous and accurate casualty reporting from the two Corps during and immediately after the time of transfer was made possible by liaison trips and the prompt transfer of casualty files between servicing machine records units. A similar trip was also made to the headquarters of each division scheduled for assignment to this command. Processing procedures, report control, and the transmission of casualty reports were discussed. Particular emphasis was placed on the necessity for prompt reporting. Arrangements were made with XIX Corps to complete action on all suspense correspondence through this headquarters. Ninth US Army turned their file of incomplete cases pertaining to VIII Corps over to the casualty section this headquarters. Machine records units servicing XIX Corps and Ninth US Army were notified well in advance of the proposed Corps transfer. When the time came duplicate casualty files were transferred at once, resulting in accurate and continuous casualty reporting from these units.

(2) The 9th Armored Division, without experience in casualty reporting, joined the command during the month. Upon arrival discussions were held with the officer who was to supervise casualty reporting in the division. These discussions took up reporting procedures, the proper use of burial, hospital and straggler reports, and stressed the absolute necessity for prompt and accurate reporting of casualties.

2. Postal.

a. Postal Division, Headquarters, ETOUSA, advised that authority has been requested from War Department to reorganize Corps APUs to a strength of 19 EM and 1 officer, and 3 other APUs attached to group headquarters of this command, to a strength of 15 EM and 1 officer. All APUs attached to this command are presently authorized only 11 EM and 1 officer.

b. Corps and divisions were informed by letter from this headquarters dated 29 October 1944 that War Department has authorized the grade of captain for postal officers of Infantry and Armored Divisions in theaters of operations.

c. No difficulty was encountered by APOs in the handling and transmission of ballot (voting) material as prescribed by Headquarters ETOUSA.

d. During the month of October 1944, mail volume decreased and transit time increased. It was reported that the above situation was due to insufficient allocation of air lift for air mail from U. S. to this theater. Although mail has been routed directly from U. S. to the continent, transit time was excessive. Parcel post which left New York by boat on 5 - 12 October had not arrived on 25 October. 2,000 pouches of letter mail received at Glasgow, Scotland, on 28 September was not received at 17 Base Post Office on the continent until 19 October.

e. In attempt to expedite delivery of official mail between APOs of this command, the following changes in instructions were among recommendations made to Postal Division, Hq European Theater of Operations, after an extensive study of incoming and outgoing mail at the 26th Postal Regulating Section:

(1) That all official mail should be "tied out" separately from personal mail,

- (2) That all PRSS be directed to scheme all official mail.

These recommendations were adopted and published by Hq European Theater of Operations after the close of period covered by this report.

f. Separate AFUs and command APOs of First US Army continued to be served by the 26 PRS located at Liege, Belgium, throughout the entire month. Letter mail was routed to the PRS by truck, and parcel post by rail. A train of 40 cars has been made available for transporting incoming mail to distribution points. Transit time by rail from 17 HPO (Cherbourg) to 26 PRS varied from 6 to 12 days.

g. Some difficulty was experienced in maintaining a sufficient supply of V-Mail forms, but a shipment of five million forms was dispatched from 17 HPO to 26 PRS on 20 October and supply was kept current after that date. Various APOs also reported difficulty in meeting demand for air mail envelopes and stamps. This situation was due to abnormal length of time required for filling of APOs' requisitions for such items.

3. Discipline.

The discipline of the command during the period 1 - 31 October 1944 is illustrated by Table 10 which follows on page 26.

4. Investigations of Self-inflicted Wound and Neuro-psychiatric Cases.

a. Self-Inflicted Wound Cases.

During the period, only two cases of suspected self-inflicted wounds were reported to the Army Inspector General. Upon investigation, it was found that neither of the men involved had wounded themselves intentionally.

b. Neuro-psychiatric Cases.

The Army Inspector General continued to investigate neuro-psychiatric cases of commissioned officers, reports being handled in the same manner as previously reported. Policies formulated to date were enunciated to the command in letter, this Headquarters, AGPERS 210.01/442, 29 October 1944, subject: "Policy and Procedure Governing Disposition of Neuro-psychiatric cases of Commissioned Officers", which follows on page 27. During the period a total of 58 cases were investigated, of which 32 (55%) were held to be medical cases only, and 23 (40%) were recommended for reclassification. Three cases (5%) were referred to the appropriate commanders for further investigation and determination as to whether or not disciplinary action was warranted. See Table 7, page 16 for breakdown by rank of cases recommended for reclassification.

5. Payment of Troops.

a. During the month of October 1944, all troops, except those actually engaged in combat and in the front lines on the last of the month, have been paid promptly. All necessary arrangements have been made for immediate payment to troops of the pay due as soon as they are disengaged from combat. The following local currency problems were met during the month's operations:

(1) Belgian Currency.

(a) Pursuant to a decree of the Government of Belgium which became effective 9 October 1944, all large, old type Belgian currency notes issued by the "Banque Nationale de Belgique" in denominations of 100, 500, and 1,000 francs were withdrawn from circulation and ceased to be legal tender. New type Belgian notes were substituted therefor. Old type notes in denominations of less than 100 francs (i.e. 20 francs, 50 francs, etc.) were not exchanged but continued in circulation as legal tender.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 230

AGPERS
210.01/442

29 October 1944

SUBJECT: Policy and Procedure Governing Disposition of Neuropsychiatric cases of Commissioned Officers.

TO : Corps and Division Commanders.



1. In order to insure a uniform procedure for disposition of officers of this command, who have been hospitalized with a diagnosis of psychoneurosis, anxiety state, the following policies are enunciated:

a. Determination as to whether or not such officers should be evacuated to the communications zone for further observation and treatment is a medical question to be finally determined by appropriate medical authority in the chain of evacuation.

b. Decision that an officer should be evacuated for further observation and treatment does not preclude action for his appropriate disposition with respect to his status as an officer; nor does a diagnosis of psychoneurosis, anxiety state preclude reclassification or court-martial if the attending facts and circumstances are such as to warrant this action.

c. As a corollary to b above, reclassification may be recommended whenever such an officer has demonstrated inefficiency, lack of leadership, or the lack of such necessary officer qualities. It is the view of this Headquarters that such cases fall within the exception cited in War Department Circular 82, 24 March 1943 - "(Other than those of mental indifference, inaptitude, or incompetence, to which AR 605-230 applies)" - and that in such cases the provisions of AR 605-230 are applicable.

d. As a further corollary to b above, court-martial charges should be preferred whenever there is sufficient evidence that the officer concerned is a deliberate malingerer or has misconducted himself in the presence of the enemy.

e. Incompetence or cowardice must not gain for an officer an assignment safe from danger and therefore no officer who has exhibited lack of leadership qualities and inefficiency will be permitted a less hazardous assignment by reason of his demonstrated deficiencies.

2. This Headquarters has no intention or desire to infringe upon the command responsibility or prerogatives of subordinate commanders in the disposition of neuropsychiatric cases. However, to assist commanders concerned, this Headquarters has established a procedure in which each officer patient at an Exhaustion Center is interviewed by the Army Inspector General who will make inquiry into the causes of his condition, utilizing for such purpose clinical and military records of the patient, conference with the attending psychiatrist and personal observation and interview.

a. In cases where the Army Inspector General is of the opinion that no action by way of reclassification or court-martial is indicated, he will so inform the Army Surgeon who will dispose of the case through normal medical channels.

b. In cases where there is reasonable evidence that the officer is a deliberate malingerer, seeking to avoid hazardous service or has misconducted himself in the presence of the enemy, the case will be reported to the commander concerned for further investigation and appropriate action. In such cases the officer concerned will be returned to the appropriate Headquarters having court-martial jurisdiction.

c. (1) In cases where there is evidence that reclassification proceedings should be instituted, the recommendation of the Army Inspector General to that effect, will be forwarded to the appropriate commander for consideration.

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- (2) In such cases the officer concerned will be reassigned to his former unit and placed on temporary duty with the appropriate Corps rear echelon.
- (3) Upon receipt of the report of investigation the Corps Commander will take necessary steps to determine whether reclassification proceedings should be initiated or other disposition made. If reclassification is recommended, action will be taken as prescribed in Circular 133, this Headquarters, 23 October 1944.
- (4) When, in the opinion of the Corps Commander, an officer's physical or mental condition makes necessary his retention at Corps rear echelon pending completion of reclassification proceedings, he may take appropriate action under paragraph 7d(3) and (5), Changes 3, 7 August 1944, to AR 605-230.

By command of Lieutenant General HODGES:

/s/ S. E. SENIOR
S. E. SENIOR,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Corps-----5
Each Division-----5

(b) In view of the foregoing decree, commanding officers were instructed to arrange for the collection of all old type Belgian notes, in the denominations of 100, 500, and 1000 francs, from all troops under their jurisdiction. Commanding officers were also instructed to effect the exchange through the finance officer normally paying the organization between 9 October and 13 October 1944, inclusive. The exchange was made on a note for note basis.

(c) Military personnel were instructed that they would not enter into any transaction with civilians for the purchase, sale or exchange of either the old type or the new type Belgian currency.

(2) Luxembourg Currency.

(a) The Luxembourg Government announced that German marks and old Belgian franc notes, stamped by that government, would be exchanged for new Belgian or Luxembourg francs during the period 18 October 1944 to 23 October 1944 inclusive. After 23 October 1944, reichsmarks, rentenmarks, old Belgian notes, and Allied Military Marks ceased to be legal tender in Luxembourg.

(b) Conversion was made on the following basis: 1 new Belgian or Luxembourg franc for 1 old, stamped, Belgian franc. 4.38 new Belgian or Luxembourg francs for 1 Allied Military Mark. 12.5 new Belgian or Luxembourg francs for 1 stamped Reichsmark. 12.5 new Belgian or Luxembourg francs for 1 stamped Rentenmark.

(c) In order to protect army personnel who may have accepted stamped German mark notes, in small denominations, as change in commercial transactions, exchange of such stamped mark currency was made by finance officers but was limited to approximately fifty marks per capita.

(d) Commanding officers were instructed to arrange for the collection of all stamped mark and stamped old Belgian franc notes from troops under their jurisdiction, and to effect the exchange through the finance officers normally paying their organizations.

(e) Military personnel were instructed that they would not enter into any transactions with civilians for the purchase, sale or exchange of any of the above-mentioned currencies.

(3) German Currency in Possession of U. S. Military Personnel.

(a) At the present time, U. S. military personnel operating in Germany are being paid in Allied Military Authority Mark Notes only. The largest denomination of these notes now in use is 100 Marks. The only manner in which German-issued "Reichsmarks" or "Rentenmarks" may lawfully be acquired by troops will be through change received from payments for commodities or services. Consequently, such military personnel should have in their possession German-issue notes of less than 100 mark denominations only and these in small numbers.

(b) In view of the foregoing, instructions were issued that until such time as German-issue "Reichsmarks" and "Rentenmarks" are put into general circulation by finance disbursing officers, the possession of such notes in denominations of 100 marks or more, will be considered sufficient cause for investigation as to their source, and as to the means by which they were acquired. Also, instructions were issued that such notes will not be accepted by disbursing officers for PTA, War Bonds or exchange, nor by postal officers for stamps, money orders, etc., except on the approval of a headquarters commanded by a general officer.

b. Disposition of Pay.

Payrolls and vouchers which cleared through disbursing officers' accounts during the month of October 1944, reflected the following:

(1) Total Pay Earned	\$26,977,189.28
(2) Total Allotments, PTA, Soldier's Deposits, War Bonds and other Collections	\$24,226,844.90
(3) Net Pay Retained	\$ 2,750,344.38
(4) Percentage of Pay Retained	10.20%

Details of the above-mentioned \$24,226,844.90 allotments and collections are as follows:

<u>Class of Allotment</u>	<u>Allotments</u>	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percentage of Total Pay Earned.</u>
"B"	\$ 1,272,199.91	4.7158
"E"	8,914,070.70	33.0429
"F"	2,970,117.52	11.0097
"X"	10,275.39	.0380
"D"	6,793.76	.0252
"N"	1,832,475.16	6.7926
Total Allotments	<u>\$ 15,005,932.44</u>	<u>55.6242</u>

<u>Type of Collection</u>	<u>Other Collections</u>	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percentage of Total Pay Earned</u>
Personal Transmission of Funds	\$ 7,101,325.91	26.3234
War Bonds	54,962.75	.2037
Soldiers' Deposits	967,460.40	3.5862
Other Collections	1,097,163.40	4.0670
	<u>\$ 9,220,912.46</u>	<u>34.1803</u>

6. GRAVES REGISTRATION:

a. Assignment of Graves Registration Companies:

603rd -- VII Corps
606th -- V Corps
3042nd -- VIII Corps
607th -- Army

b. Activities:

1 October 1944 - At the beginning of October, three cemeteries were in-operation in the First US Army: Henri Chapelle Cemeteries No. 1 and No. 2 were operated by the 603rd under the supervision of VII Corps and Overrepen (enemy) Cemetery was being operated by one platoon of the 608th. Since casualties were light, arrangements were made with VII Corps for Henri Chapelle Cemeteries to be used by all Corps and Divisions, thus eliminating the necessity of continuing to operate Overrepen Cemetery.

7 October 1944 - Overrepen Cemetery transferred to Advance Section, Communications Zone with a total of 169 enemy burials.

8 October 1944 - An Army collecting point was established for XIX Corps at Map Coordinates K-600570 and operated by one platoon of the 607th. This was necessary due to the fact that the evacuation lines from XIX Corps to Henri Chapelle Cemeteries were too great to be effectively operated by the one Graves Registration company attached to XIX Corps.

Permission was granted VIII Corps, under Ninth Army, to begin using Henri Chapelle Cemeteries this date.

18 October 1944 - Arrangements were made with XIX Corps for one platoon, 608th, to remain attached to the 7th Armored Division even though this division was relieved from duty under XIX Corps and began operating with the British Second Army.

22 October 1944 - 608th transferred with XIX Corps to Ninth U.S. Army and 3042nd transferred to First US Army with VIII Corps. No change in the Graves Registration system for VIII Corps was necessary at this time since it was agreed that the 3042nd would continue to evacuate to Henri Chapelle Cemeteries for VIII Corps as it had been doing since 8 October 1944. It was also agreed at this time for one platoon, 607th, to continue to operate the Army collecting point at K-600570 for XIX Corps.

c. Cemetery Burials During Month:

	<u>AMERICAN</u>	<u>ALLIED</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Identified	2296	29	873	3198
Unidentified	<u>57</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>178</u>
Total	2353	39	984	3376

d. Isolated Burials:

In compliance with Change No. 1, ETO SOP # 26, dated 31 August 1944, data on 225 isolated graves was obtained by this office and the information forwarded to the Chief, Graves Registration, Headquarters Communication Zone. Of the 225 burials, 75 were American, 100 were Allied, and 50 were enemy.

e. Labor:

Shown below is the average number of laborers used per day at all cemeteries for the period covered by this report.

Prisoners of War -- 59 per day
 Civilians -- 0
 Service Troops -- 131 per day

f. Status of cemeteries opened by First U. S. Army, as of 31 October 1944, is indicated in Table 11, which follows on page 32.

7. PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN DETAINEES:

a. Prisoners of War.

(1) The Army Prisoner of War Enclosure remained at Herbesthal (K-745335) in the vicinity of the Class I depot.

(2) The 553 MP Escort Guard Company moved its location in the XIX Corps sector to a new location at Bastogne (P-575580), and prepared to take up the duties of evacuating prisoners from the divisions of VIII Corps upon the transfer of that Corps to First U. S. Army at 1200 hours, 22 October 1944.

(3) The employment of MP escort guard companies at this time was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>OPERATING WITH TRUCKHEAD</u>
428 MP Escort Guard Co.	Servicing V Corps	Eupen	#55 Class I
482 MP Escort Guard Co.	Servicing VII Corps	Eupen	#700 and #701
553 MP Escort Guard Co.	Servicing VIII Corps	Bastogne(P-575580)	#80 and 81 Class I
552 MP Escort Guard Co.	Army PWE	Herbesthal(K-745335)	Army Class I Depot.

TABLE 10

NAME OF CEMETERY	UNIT SERVED	M/P COORDINATES	NUMBER OF BURIALS						TOTAL
			OWN TROOPS		ALLIED TROOPS		ENEMY TROOPS		
			Ident	Unident	Ident	Unident	Ident	Unident	
Honri Chapelle # 1	V, VII, XIX Corps & Army	K705352	2550	60	30	10	0	0	2650
Honri Chapelle # 2	V, VII, XIX Corps & Army	K705352	0	0	0	0	987	118	1105
CEMETERIES TAKEN OVER BY ADSEIC									
Poupeville	*Disinterred	446945	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hiesville	**Disinterred	387921	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St. Laurent #2	***Disinterred	669905	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St. Martin	Transferred	385975	251	9	3	0	135	54	452
St. Mere-Eglise #1	Transferred	350984	2169	31	10	3	747	253	3213
Blosville	Transferred	360935	4550	120	0	0	0	0	4670
Orglandes	Transferred	255985	0	0	0	0	4962	1112	6074
St. Mere-Eglise #2	Transferred	346960	4033	76	23	7	0	0	4139
St. Laurent #1	Transferred	687890	3613	147	67	16	1000	250	5133
La Cambe	Transferred	556877	4193	34	0	0	1285	331	5843
Marigny #1	Transferred	393633	2387	92	2	0	0	0	2481
Marigny #2	Transferred	393633	0	0	0	0	1255	298	1553
Le Chene-Guerin	Transferred	462408	1103	19	0	0	397	117	1636
Gorron #1	Transferred	Y710865	613	49	3	0	0	0	665
Gorron #2	Transferred	Y708858	0	0	0	0	412	242	654
St. Andre	Transferred	R270506	348	26	4	3	182	21	589
Solers #1	Transferred	S301187	264	20	4	2	0	0	290
Solers #2	Transferred	S301187	0	0	0	0	139	28	167
Fosse #1	Transferred	J839047	1237	64	17	5	0	0	1323
Fosse #2	Transferred	J839047	0	0	0	0	750	101	851
Overrepen	Transferred	K383482	0	0	0	0	141	28	169
TOTAL			27311	747	163	46	12397	2993	43657

* 271 US reinterred at St Mere-Eglise #2, 3 Allies at St Mere Eglise #2, 91 Enemy reinterred at Orglandes. Entire Poupeville cemetery was originally composed of hasty burials in an area just off the beach.

** 248 US reinterred at Blosville, 188 Enemy at Orglandes, Hiesville cemetery had to be moved to make room for an air-strip.

*** 457 US reinterred at St Laurent #1. Entire St Laurent #2 cemetery was originally composed of hasty burials in an area just off the beach. Disinterment in all cases mentioned above was accomplished by First US Army.

DDP DIR. 5200.10, June 29, 1968
NE by B.R. da Silva

DECLASSIFIED

TABLE 10

SECRET

(4) The following is the Prisoner of War report for the month of October 1944 (Weekly).

FIRST ARMY CAGES	RECEIVED		EVACUATED		ON HAND	
	MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES
(a) Week ending 30 Sept.					810	
(b) Week ending 7 Oct.	2,963		2,767		1,006	
(c) Week ending 14 Oct.	5,635		5,981		660	
(d) Week ending 21 Oct.	4,317		3,294		1,683	
(e) Week ending 28 Oct.	1,071		2,612		142	
(f) Week ending 31 Oct.	62		77		127	
	14,048		14,731		127	

(g) There were 2,547 prisoners of war admitted to hospitals during the month of October 1944.

(h) Total number of prisoners of war handled at First Army cages as of 2400 hours, 31 October 1944 ----- 183,335

(i) Total number of prisoners of war admitted to hospitals as of 2400 hours, 31 October 1944 ----- 13,954

197,289

(5) For analysis of prisoner of war statistics see charts 1, 2 and 3 which follow.

b. Civilian Detainees:

(1) The Master Interrogation Center and Civilian Enclosure moved from its location at the Master Stockade at Micheroux to an installation at Henri Chappelle (K-725335) on October 9, 1944. One section of the 482 MP Escort Guard Company is presently operating this enclosure.

(2) The first case in which a German national resident in Germany, was processed as a suspect through the Master Interrogation Center and found to be dangerous to our military security, was encountered on 10 October 1944. The provost Marshal received a request for internment of Nikomedes Glomski, German National and member of NSDAP. This request for internment contained the recommendation that the subject be interned for the duration of hostilities, and that his case be reviewed at that time.

(3) The following is the Civilian Suspects and Detainees report for the month of October 1944 (Weekly).

WEEK ENDING	RECEIVED		RELEASED		ON HAND	
	MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES
30 September					108	11
7 October	63	4	40	4	131	11
14 October	162	8	75	8	218	11
21 October	51	13	141	4	128	20
28 October	44	3	91	17	81	6
31 October	18	1	16	2	83	5
TOTALS	338	29	363	35	83	5

8. CONTROL, COLLECTION AND DISPOSITION OF STRAGGLERS.

a. The methods of control, collection and disposition of stragglers by the Army military police battalions remained essentially the same as previously reported during this period.


b. The return of stragglers through the use of replacement channels was used only in instances involving the return of British or Communications Zone personnel.

c. Whenever it is determined that the individual is a deserter or absent without leave from his organization, the replacement channels are not used because of the absence of guard personnel, and the possibility of the individual making his escape.

d. The procedure for handling stragglers by passing this personnel to flank units for return to their organizations as outlined in last month's report has proven highly successful.

e. The following is the straggler report for the month of October 1944 (Weekly).

(1) Week of 1 Oct to 7 Oct	76
(2) Week of 8 Oct to 14 Oct	70
(3) Week of 15 Oct to 21 Oct	54
(4) Week of 22 Oct to 28 Oct	54
(5) 29 Oct to 31 Oct	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	275



9. DISPOSITION OF ESCAPERS AND EVADERS:

a. The IS9 (WEA) personnel moved from the Army Prisoner of War Enclosure to the site of the Master Interrogation Center and Civilian Enclosure at Henri Chappelle (K-725335) on 7 October 1944. This enables the escapers and evaders coming back through prisoner of war channels to be afforded comfortable conditions during interrogation prior to being evacuated to the replacement depot.

b. There were three escapers and evaders interrogated by IS9 (WEA) personnel at the Army Prisoner of War Enclosure during the period. All were US ground forces personnel.

10. NON-FRATERNIZATION POLICY:

a. In Belgium and Germany: Immediately upon the conclusion of the rapid pursuit across France and Belgium, need was felt for a policy to keep troops segregated from civilians in both Belgium and Germany. This command pioneered in the development of non-fraternization with its directive published on 15 September 1944 covering the relations of troops with the civil populace. Introduced primarily in the interest of security and safety of the troops, this directive pointed out that while there were but few German sympathizers in Belgium breaches of security were of such serious consequences that it was necessary to enforce this policy throughout the Army area. Unofficial conversation with civilians, visits to civilian homes, dining with civilians and barter or trading with civilians except in an official capacity was forbidden. It was contemplated relaxing this policy with respect to Belgium as soon as CIC screening of suspicious persons was reasonably complete in a given area. The policy was rigidly enforced until 15 October when a policy on the use of towns and cities as recreation centers was published allowing personnel on pass in selected Belgian towns to mingle with the civilian population. Complete relaxation of the non-fraternization policy in all Belgian towns was contemplated upon completion of CIC investigations.

SECTION II -- INTELLIGENCE

A. INTRODUCTION.

One month after the arrival of elements of First U. S. Army on the German frontier, the enemy had achieved a fairly rigid stabilization of the front. Our advances during September, although hard-fought by the enemy, had not over-taxed his ability to defend from the bunkers and pillboxes of his fortified line. The enemy had been pressed back in the vicinity of AACHEN and had yielded ground in the defended belt of the West Wall at two or three places, but as yet major defenses of the Reich remained intact.

The opening days of October found the enemy reaping the benefits of his drastic manpower comb-out and total mobilization program which he had inaugurated during the two previous months. In the month of September, it was estimated that about 230,000 men were brought up to take over the defense of the West Wall, of whom 100,000 formed fresh divisions, between 10,000 and 20,000 were GHQ troops, 50,000 were products of the high-pressure replacement system and more than 50,000 were members of fortress battalions. The effect of this infusion of new blood into the defense of the border was particularly noticeable on the front of First U. S. Army where the deepest penetrations into the Reich had been made. After the haphazard, uninspired rearguard action which the German Army had put up across FRANCE and BELGIUM from the time of the ST LO breakthrough, there had been a very definite stiffening of resistance by the Wehrmacht, once the frontier of the Fatherland had been crossed. Despite the easy desertion of untrained and battle weary troops, it seemed that, for a change, the Fuehrer's oft-repeated exhortation to "Defend to the last man and the last round" was not falling upon barren ground.

A hidden reserve of the German Army had now made its appearance in the form of independent "fortress battalions" of which a total of almost seventy had existed. Their existence had been cleverly concealed. Of these seventy fortress battalions, approximately twenty were committed to the defense of the West Wall in the First U.S. Army zone of action. These battalions were allotted to the divisions which had suffered heavily during our campaign in the West. The battered elements of these divisions were sent further to the rear in order to reform and refit while the fortress battalions took over their sectors in the line. Later, many of these battalions were permanently incorporated into the divisions they served.

B. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

On 1 October, First U. S. Army faced the Seventh German Army. Both the North and South boundaries of the opposing Armies ran along the same general lines. Seventh German Army, under command of General der Panzer Truppen BRANDENBERGER, consisted of four Corps: On the North with its right boundary resting on the general line HASSELT - DUSSELDORF and its South boundary on a line EUPEN - BONN was LXXXI Corps which had under command the following divisions:-

- 183 Inf Div
- 275 Inf Div
- 49 Inf Div
- 246 Inf Div
- 12 Inf Div
- 353 Inf Div



South of LXXXI Corps, with 526 Reserve Division and 347 Infantry Division subordinated, was LXXIV Corps with its left flank resting generally on the line MALMEDY - SINZIG. South of this line was I SS Panzer Corps, commanding elements of 89 Infantry Division, 2 SS Panzer Division, and 5 Parachute Division. In turn, its south flank was bounded by the line WILTZ - WITTLICH. South of this line was LXXX Corps commanding but one unit, the 36th Infantry Division.

C. ENEMY OPERATIONS.

The scheme of maneuver of First U. S. Army at the beginning of October called for an attack by elements of XIX US Corps from north of AACHEN to the

Southeast, with the mission of cutting the AACHEN - COLOGNE super-highway and joining up with the right flank of VII US Corps to complete the encirclement of this key German city and anchor of the West Wall. The enemy appeared to be well-informed of our intentions. On 1 October, the AACHEN area was reinforced by the arrival of 246 Inf Div, a mere shadow of its former self. Prisoners of war reported that it contained 40% Naval Personnel and numerous Airforce elements with only ten days of infantry training. It was by committing divisions such as this, that the enemy had managed to extricate three or four shattered Panzer divisions from the line for use as a last-ditch counterattack reserve.

During the course of the first two days of October, local fighting around AACHEN was vigorous due to the arrival of 246 Infantry Division which fought well despite its condition. On 3 October, in the face of heavy resistance by the enemy, our forces advanced slowly on the XIX US Corps front. Each pillbox had to be reduced individually, but gradually LXXXI Corps was forced out of BIRGDEN (K-89), HATTERATH (K-86), TRIPSRATH (K-88) and UBACH (K-85). On the following day however, units of LXXXI Corps launched heavy counterattacks against our advance through the West Wall North of AACHEN. For this purpose, some troops were withdrawn from the static SIEGFRIED Line defenses on either side of the penetration. Further to the South along I SS Panzer Corps and LXXX Corps fronts, there was active patrolling and considerable artillery fire with particular aggressiveness in the MONSCHAU (K-91) area.

The battle North of AACHEN continued on the following days as LXXXI Corps fought desperately to contain a breakthrough near GEILENKIRCHEN (K-86). Numerous strong counterattacks with heavy artillery preparation succeeded in slowing the progress of our troops. The Luftwaffe was active in this area in greater strength than for many weeks past, bombing and strafing our units. Meanwhile, on the LXXIV Corps front, similar hard efforts to prevent our advances in the MONSCHAU area were not successful, although the enemy succeeded in slowing down our progress here, too.

On 7 October, more than 1200 prisoners were taken by XIX Corps, many of whom surrendered without fighting. Progress in the VII US Corps sector was steady, though slow against field fortifications and pillboxes to the Southeast of AACHEN.

The ground yielded by the enemy, during the first seven days of October, was principally in the sector Northwest of AACHEN. By this time, the enemy was aware that the main might of our attack was in the North and that, in fact, the focal point of the Allied effort was in the AACHEN area. He acted promptly to strengthen the line at this point with armor drawn from both the North and the South. During this period, I SS Panzer Corps moved north from its old sector between BUTGENBACH and KAUTENBACH in the SCHNEE-EIFEL and slipped into the line on the extreme North flank of Seventh German Army between LXXXI Corps and LXXXVI Corps. Control of its sector was assumed by LXXX Corps. The effect of this switch was felt on 8 October when two infantry divisions, and elements of two more, which were fighting hard to prevent the encirclement of AACHEN from the North and the East with little success, were reinforced by three mobile battalions from the LUXEMBOURG area and a Panzer brigade which had just arrived from NIDMEGEN. Infantry and tank counterattacks put in to relieve Allied pressure in the vicinity of ALSDORF (K-85) were hit hard by the close support of aircraft of the IX Tactical Airforce and our artillery. They were finally forced back to the Northeast.

At 1050A on 10 October, on order of the Commanding General of VII US Corps, an ultimatum was presented to the military and civil leaders and people of AACHEN. The enemy was given 24 hours to spare the city from useless destruction. The official document was delivered through the line by an American officer. In addition, loud speakers and pamphlets were used to broadcast the terms to both frontline soldiers and civilians in the center of the city. There was no reply to the ultimatum. Almost 2,000 civilians, however, made their way through the lines prior to the expiration of the time limit in order to escape the promised bombardment by air and artillery which was to follow the negative response to our appeal for a cessation of hostilities.

During the course of the next two days, further enemy reinforcements arrived and on 11 October reconnaissance elements of 116 Pz Division as well as 1 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 1 SS Pz Division were identified in counterattacks southeast of BARDENBERG. Prisoners of these units reported having left ARNHEM two days before. Further identifications of new arrivals in the AACHEN area included 506 Heavy Tank Battalion and 304 Pz Grenadier Regiment of 2 Pz Division. With the arrival of these units, the battle for the AACHEN corridor entered its most bitter phase. A number of counterattacks by these units were attempted in this sector, but all were broken up by air and artillery bombardment before they could gather momentum. Enemy traffic was still entering the gap throughout the day, but was subjected to heavy observed artillery fire. Despite the arrival of reinforcements, the enemy had been unable to prevent our forces from narrowing the gap, still further, to approximately a width of 2-1/2 miles. In the HUERTGEN Forest, the enemy continued to put up strong opposition. Fire from concealed tanks and assault guns as well as extensive mining and booby trapping greatly reduced our rate of advance. As a result of changes of boundaries and troop dispositions on our own front as well as on the front of the enemy opposing us, the enemy's strength was now estimated at 7 to 8 equivalent divisions of which one to two were the Panzer type.

The days preceding the closing of the gap were characterized by a series of piecemeal counterattacks which were repeatedly shattered by our artillery and air bombardment. Having failed to prevent the encirclement of AACHEN, the enemy was now making desperate efforts to break through with reinforcements and supplies to the beleaguered city. Enemy reinforcement of the battle area East of AACHEN continued. This was possible without undue strain on the slender resources of C-in-C WEST owing to the comparative quiet on the remainder of the Western front. With the exception of the penetration of AACHEN, the enemy held the West Wall virtually intact. He had manned it largely with infantry and fortress troops, thus releasing his more mobile formation for counterattack roles. One of these mechanized divisions, the newly arrived 3 Pz Grenadier Division, made a determined counterattack to keep the escape gap from the city open on 15 October. A diversionary attack was also made in the vicinity of GERMETER by the newly arrived Battle Group Trier. House to house fighting had begun in the factory district in the southern suburbs of AACHEN. By 16 October, one-third of the town was in the hands of the 1st US Inf Div, and on the same day patrols from the 1st US Inf Div advancing from the South joined up with patrols of the 30th US Inf Div, Northwest of HAAREN (K-86), thus completing the ring and isolating the city. Fierce counterattacks to the Northeast of AACHEN against XIX US Corps by 116 Pz Div with other supporting armor, made several unsuccessful attempts to break through and re-open communications. The enemy in pillboxes on either side of the encircled garrison continued to resist stubbornly.

Between the 16th and 21st of October, the enemy put up a bitter defense within the perimeter of AACHEN, moving in even the AACHEN City Police and Firemen as infantry. Further counterattacks by the enemy to re-open the corridor ended in dismal failure. In the HUERTGEN Forest, south of AACHEN, sharp enemy resistance prevented our troops from making further substantial gains. In the six days which elapsed between the sealing off of AACHEN and the surrender, more than 1,000 German prisoners were taken, and 5,000 civilians evacuated from this localized combat zone. German civilians who came over to our lines complained bitterly about the behavior of the Wehrmacht and the SS. Extensive looting, manhandling of civilians, and "un-German" acts had been committed, they said.

The efforts of LXXXI Corps, 1 SS Panzer and XII SS Corps to relieve the beleaguered garrison, were in vain. The ring proved too strong. Fighting within the fortress city was characterized as "from house-to-house and sewer-to-sewer", but the remaining 2,000 troops in the bunkers and cellars were fighting a hopeless battle and they knew it. At noon, 21 October, Colonel WILCK, Commandant of the AACHEN garrison, surrendered unconditionally with 600 of his men. A further 1,000 German troops were rounded up in the city later when the word trickled through to them that the battle for AACHEN formally had been declared lost by their Commander. It was interesting to note that only troops of the Wehrmacht remained in the city. All SS personnel had been withdrawn when encirclement had threatened.

As a result of the capture of AACHEN, new boundaries were assigned to First U. S. Army. Facing our troops after this tactical re-arrangement were the following units of Seventh German Army:

FROM NORTH TO SOUTH:

<u>LXXXI Corps</u>	<u>LXXIV Corps</u>	<u>LXVI Corps</u>	<u>LXXX Corps</u>
3 Pz Gr Div	89 Inf Div	91 Inf Div	36 Inf Div
12 Inf Div	347 Inf Div	353 Inf Div	
275 Inf Div			
Remn 246 Inf Div			
Remn. 2 Pz Div			

This alignment included all of the Seventh German Army with the exception of its northernmost Corps, XII SS Corps, which controlled 183 Infantry Division, Remnants of 47 Infantry Division, 116 Panzer Division, and 506 GHQ Tank Battalion. Elements of the latter two units were also in contact with First U. S. Army on our extreme left (north) flank.

Between the 22nd and 31st of October, the enemy failed to mount anything even resembling a counter-offensive to recapture his Rhineland capital. Although resistance to our further advance eastward along the AACHEN - COLOGNE corridor was stubborn, the enemy was unable to prevent the capture of other German towns such as ESCHWEILER, WEIDEN, EUCHEN, GERMETER, and VOSSENACK. Further to the South, however, from his pillboxes, bunkers, and fortifications of the Siegfried line, the enemy was able to halt the advance of our troops.

At the close of the period, the enemy had withdrawn 116 Panzer Division from our front and dispatched it to the North to assist in an attack against the southern flank of 21 Army Group. The elements of 2 Panzer Division which had been committed in the AACHEN front were withdrawn from the line to refit in the MUENCHEN-GLADBACH area. 353 Infantry Division handed over its sector and most of its troops to the 275 Infantry Division, and the Headquarters and staff of the division moved South to control fortress units in the area north of TRIER. Despite the arrival of reinforcements prior to the fall of AACHEN, at the close of the period the heavy losses suffered by the enemy in AACHEN and in the counter-attacks to relieve the city offset any gains in strength which the enemy had obtained during the period. At the end of the month, all armor had been withdrawn from the line and reliable information indicated that at least two Corps, i.e., I and II SS Panzer Corps controlling 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS and 130 Panzer Lehr Divisions, had retired East of the RHINE to WESTPHALIA where they would be reformed under Sixth SS Panzer Army.

D. SUMMARY.

The month of October had seen a remarkable comeback by the German Army. Only a matter of a few weeks before, a defeated and disorganized force had retreated several hundred miles across FRANCE and BELGIUM to the borders of the Reich. Yet, in the short space of time they had reorganized sufficiently to prevent a major breakthrough to the RHINE. This military feat could be attributed to two things: The existence of a considerable number of fortress battalions which were available during the crisis period, flexible divisional organization and an even more flexible replacement system which though unable to produce quality, produced in quantity.

SECTION III - OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL ADJUSTMENTS.

Allocations of major combat units of the First US Army as the month opened may be summarized as indicated in the Order of Battle dated 27 September 1944, as follows:

<u>XIX Corps</u>	<u>VII Corps</u>	<u>V Corps</u>
29th Inf Div	1st Inf Div	4th Inf Div
30th Inf Div	9th Inf Div	28th Inf Div
2nd Armd Div	3rd Armd Div	5th Armd Div
7th Armd Div		



As the month of October commenced there was a tendency to concentrate First US Army effort on the northern part of our front. The northern Anglo-American boundary effective up to 27 September had run from just north of SITTARD almost due east above COLOGNE and the southern First-Third boundary had run northeast from south of TRIER to a point slightly south of KOBLENZ. This arrangement had placed COLOGNE directly in front of the advance of the XIX Corps, BONN in front of the advance of VII Corps and a long stretch of the RHINE in front of the narrowing zone of V Corps.

The shift of boundary lines farther toward the north was such as to include DUSSELDORF in the zone of the XIX Corps, COLOGNE barely within the zone of the VII Corps, and BONN and REMAGEN in the zone of the V Corps. The right boundary of the Army which had run through LUXEMBOURG - TRIER - KOBLENZ, was shifted on 27 September to run from LONGUYON to ANDERNACH, closing V Corps up against the VII Corps boundary. V Corps was to drive into and take over the southern portion of VII Corps zone, largely covered only by cavalry reconnaissance and a new boundary between VII and V Corps would reach the RHINE between COLOGNE and BONN. BONN would become the objective of V Corps, just as COLOGNE and DUSSELDORF would become the objective of VII and XIX Corps respectively.

B. THE AACHEN SITUATION.

By 13 September, the 1st Division in the VII Corps was approaching AACHEN. The XIX Corps on its left (north) was at that time not yet completely up and in line. The 3rd Armored Division on its right and the 9th Division had made some slight penetrations of the forest of ROTGEN. By 24 September the 1st Division had pressed in more closely against AACHEN so as almost to form a semicircle to the south below it; the 3rd Armored Division and the 9th Division had pushed slowly through the STOLBERG area and the wooded slopes of the ROTGEN forest. These two divisions were, however, fighting in what was readily defensible terrain. Prospects of substantial and rapid advances in this part of the area were slight. To the north, the 30th Division had moved forward almost to the line of the WURM River, and was facing east above AACHEN. Army orders issued at this time on the basis of this situation contemplated a drive to the east by the XIX Corps to cut the AACHEN - COLOGNE Road. The last few days of September had been taken up with readjustments in order to put these orders into effect.

Late in September the 29th Division returned from the campaign at BREST and assembling in the BALKENBURG - GULPEN area, took over the northern flank of the XIX Corps, freeing the 2nd Armored Division for the eastward attack.

The drive northeast by VII Corps to objectives on the corps boundary planned in September was abandoned temporarily. The 1st Division in the VII Corps was to mop up the areas it had taken to the east of AACHEN, to push in against AACHEN from the east and southeast, and to move against the VERLAUTENHEIDE - HAAREN area and the critical enemy supply route on the

AACHEN - COLOGNE Road so as to make contact with the XIX Corps effort from the north at the inter-corps boundary. AACHEN was to be encircled and not taken by direct attack.

Orders of the XIX Corps for this operation, directed a movement to the east (south of GEILENKIRCHEN) by the 30th Division. That division was to be passed through by the 2nd Armored Division moving toward the line of the ROER River between LINICH and JULICH. Then a new effort by the 30th Division directly to the south and at right angles to its original drive was to be made to secure an objective on the corps boundary to include the high ground between ALSDORF and WURSELEN.

There was minor aggressive activity on other portions of the First US Army front during the first two weeks in October, and re-adjustments of boundaries and changes in dispositions made in accordance with the shifts in boundary lines described above. Most of the activity during this early October period was, however, in the AACHEN area. Our principal problem had been whether or not we would be able to exert the pressure from the middle of September onward to drive in the enemy's scratch reinforcements before he could bring up stronger and better troops. We had not been able to do this. His prepared positions were too strong. He had been able to shift troops from other fronts to resist us. The supply services of the First US Army achieved remarkable results in bringing forward ammunition, gasoline, and supplies of all sorts, but the opposing forces and terrain were such that it was found necessary to confine our efforts to the AACHEN area largely with the troops already there.

On 1 October V Corps turned over its old zone of action to VIII Corps of the Ninth Army and relieved the 4th Cavalry Group which had been guarding the frontier south of MONSCHAU.

On 8 October the 7th Armored Division and the Belgian 1st Brigade, which had been operating generally north of SITTARD along the lines of the MEUSE, were released by XIX Corps to the Second British Army, and the Anglo-American boundary was restored to its previous direct line from HASSELT through SITTARD to the north edge of DUSSELDORF.

C. THE ATTACK ON AACHEN.

The 116th Infantry of the 29th Infantry Division was placed in XIX Corps reserve on 1 October and some of its elements took over the protection of the corps right flank through the marshy area northwest of AACHEN. On 2 October at 1055 hours the 30th Division jumped off, and crossed the branch of the WURM River to the front within the first hour, in spite of strong resistance. A battalion of the 117th Infantry was within a mile of UBACH by night, and the 119th Infantry was on the right approaching MT HERBACH. On 3 October the 117th Infantry was in the center of UBACH by noon. When darkness fell the regiment was on a northwest-southeast line on a front of 1½ miles through UBACH. The 2nd Armored Division had closed up in rear of these units and was on the northeastern edge of UBACH. The 119th Infantry had not made very substantial advances.

On 4 October the 30th Division attacked at 0700 hours without making much progress. The enemy attacked with tanks at MT HERBACH but was repulsed, and the 2nd Armored Division began to pass through the 30th Division at 1000 hours.

On 5 October the 2nd Armored Division thrust northeast to BEGGENDORF, and the next day it seized the three towns of FRELENBERG, WAURICHEN and BEGGENDORF. On the 5th the 117th had struck to the south and was west of MT HERBACH facing south the following day. To the east the 119th occupied MT HERBACH and the area to the southwest thereof. The 120th Infantry which had relieved the 116th Infantry facing HOLZ and which had advanced almost 4 kilometers on the 4th, had reached HOLZ on the 5th and was being relieved on the 6th by the 116th Infantry. This change freed the 120th Infantry to participate in an effort to the south later.

On 7 October the drive to the south gained momentum. While the 2nd Armored Division was holding the line south of GEILENKIRCHEN and occupying BEGGENDORF and BAESWEILER, the 117th Infantry advanced almost two miles south to the outskirts of ALSDORF against light resistance.

The move on AACHEN from the north was now well under way. On 8 October the 117th Infantry moved 1500 yards and was south of ALSDORF, echeloned in depth so as to protect its left flank. The 120th Infantry was in NOPPENBERG. The 119th Infantry was 600 yards south of AFDEN by noon and almost a mile further advanced by night. The 2nd Battalion of the 116th Infantry was attached to the 2nd Armored Division to move to ALSDORF for later employment. On the same day the 1st Division attacked north above VERLAUTENHEIDE and was only about a mile from the main AACHEN - COLONGNE Road, with a battalion of the 26th Infantry advancing on its left across the railroad. The strongly fortified key village of VERLAUTENHEIDE was taken after an 800 yard advance in the dark between 0400 and 0620.

On 9 October pressure was applied from both directions against the exit routes from the northeast of AACHEN. BARDENBERG fell to the 119th Infantry, and the 117th Infantry advanced 2000 yards south of SCHAUFENBERG with the 2nd Armored Division. The 18th Infantry of the 1st Division attacking from the south at 1730 hours progressed 1000 yards against stiff resistance to cut the second main road northeast out of AACHEN south of WURSELEN. On 10 October there was much consolidation and mopping up to be done. The 18th Infantry had to repulse counterattacks and fight in three directions. The 26th Infantry continued to apply pressure and street fighting in HAAREN on its left rear. The 18th Infantry was on high ground north of HAAREN and northeast of VERLAUTENHEIDE dominating the exits from AACHEN. These hills, notably Hill 231, were strongly held and their mopping up was slow and difficult. On 11 and 12 October all front line units were engaged in vigorous defensive action, cleaning up captured ground, and resisting armored counterattacks which were driven at them from the northeast. On 12 October the 26th Infantry pushed in against the north edge of AACHEN and the 119th Infantry advanced almost to WURSELEN.

On 13 October the 116th Infantry (29th Division) attacked south through the 119th Infantry on a broad front, reaching the south edge of WURSELEN with its right flank on the high ground west of the WURM River in the direction of RICHTERICH. On the same day units of the 26th Infantry drove west into the edges of the city of AACHEN itself.

Some indications of the air support received in these efforts to batter down the resistance of the defenders of AACHEN is indicated by the tonnages of bombs dropped on that city during this three day period. The following tonnages were dropped mostly by planes of the Ninth Tactical Air Command.

11 October	62.25 tons
12 October	99.00 tons
13 October	11.50 tons

On 14 October the 116th Infantry was still in position south of WURSELEN and the 26th Infantry continued pushing into AACHEN in house to house fighting. On 15 October the 116th Infantry continued its advance and the 26th continued to mop up, fighting into the city. On 16 October initial contact was made between the units of the two corps to the northeast of the city, and the ring around AACHEN was closed. The enemy counterattacked from the northeast in considerable strength, but was checked by our liberal use of air and artillery fire. The 119th Infantry had been moved down so that it formed the right flank of the attacking wedge of the 30th Division, while the 116th Infantry formed the left flank.

Initial contact between the corps at first was light, but it was strengthened on succeeding days in conjunction with moves to beat off armored thrusts made by the enemy from the east. On 17 October defensive positions were maintained as the 26th Infantry continued to close in on and clean up

AACHEN. On 18 October the 18th Infantry was required to repulse two enemy infantry and tank counterattacks and to recapture pillboxes temporarily lost to the enemy. On 19 October our heavy artillery fire checked enemy thrusts, damaged his armor, and was effective in counterbattery work.

On 20 October AACHEN was almost completely occupied by units of the 1st Division. On 21 October about noon the German Commander of the remaining units in the city formally surrendered, and a few isolated pockets of resistance were mopped up by 1615 hours.

D. REGROUPING FOR FURTHER ADVANCE.

From 16 October onwards, after initial contact had been made northeast of AACHEN by units of VII and XIX Corps and in the course of protecting that contact against enemy counterattacks, a definite front had been made to the east preparatory to further movements in that direction. Principal enemy blows against that front had been, and would continue to be, aimed at the 18th Infantry of the 1st Division.

On 22 October the first steps were taken for the regrouping and reorganization in preparation for future power drives into the lower reaches of the RHINELAND. At noon on that date Ninth Army Headquarters relinquished its control of the zone on the right (south) and took over the zone of XIX Corps on the left (north) of the First US Army. XIX Corps with attached units in their present position passed to the control of the Ninth Army. The previous boundary between the VII and XIX Corps became the new northern boundary for the First Army, between the First and Ninth Armies. At the same time the VIII Corps, which had been on the south and right of the First US Army, passed to the control of the First Army with units in their current positions consisting of the 2nd, 8th and 83rd Infantry Divisions, the 9th Armored Division, and attached units. The previous boundary between the Ninth and Third Armies became the new southern boundary of the First US Army, separating it from the Third Army, and the previous First - Ninth interboundary on the south remained as boundary between V and VIII Corps. This reallocation of the control of zones of action gave the First US Army a front of approximately 60 miles.

The front of the First US Army and the disposition of its front line elements following this rearrangement was as follows, units being designated from north to south:

VII Corps: 1st Division from the neighborhood of WURSELEN south to a point on the main highway northeast of AACHEN, thence generally east above HAAREN to STOLBERG.

3rd Armored Division east from STOLBERG through MAUSBACH generally facing north.

The 9th Division extending south through the HURTGEN and ROTGEN Forests from SCHEVENHUTTE, facing generally east.

The 4th Cavalry Group from below LAMMERSDORF to the neighborhood of MONSCHAU on the corps south boundary.

The front of this corps, a little less than 20 miles in a straight line, was bent so that its actual front was nearer 30. Most of the power of this corps was concentrated on the northern half of this front where the 1st Division had been engaged with the assistance of the 30th Division in the encirclement of AACHEN and in resisting counterattacks from the east. As distinct from the relatively open country where this action was going on, the 9th Division had been engaged in many localized actions in thick mountainous country in approximately the center of the corps zone of action. To the south from near LAMMERSDORF down to MONSCHAU, the front was covered lightly with patrols and defended roadblocks.

V Corps: From MONSCHAU inclusive through HOFEN and ALZEN to the edge of the MONSCHAU Forest the 5th Armored Division had patrols covering the front.

Patrols of the 102nd Cavalry Group covered the border through the wooded area for approximately 5 miles thereafter in a southeasterly direction.

Units of the 28th Division south from the clearings northwest of RAMSCHEID were along the frontier on the edge of the woods to a point approximately west of NEUHOF. This front was approximately 5 miles wide, ran from north to south, and faced almost directly east.

The 4th Division had a narrow front of approximately 2 miles through the BUCHHOLZ Forest, refused back however toward LOSHEIM, just across the corps boundary.

The front of the V Corps ran through high and heavily wooded country, and south of ALZEN it practically followed the frontier boundary line. The major strength of the corps was disposed in the positions on the southern half of this zone, occupied by the 28th and 4th Infantry Division.

VIII Corps: The 2nd Division held the frontier from the vicinity of LOSHEIM running slightly east of south across the valley of the OUR River and into the SCHNEE EIFEL wooded mountain line to a point west of OLZHEIM, thence southwest along the forward edge of the SCHNEE EIFEL toward HONTHIEM, thence west to below BLEIALF. The open area to the southwest was covered by patrols, except where units of the 23rd Infantry were in position between HABSCHIED and KESFELD.

The 8th Infantry Division occupied a front of approximately 20 miles following the frontier along the line of the OUR River from the neighborhood of SEVENIG to the large bend northwest of ECHTERNACH. This front was covered largely with extended patrols in position west of the river except on the south flank where the 121st Infantry was concentrated above and below the WALLENDORF crossing and backed up by the 9th Armored Division in positions southwest of DIEKIRCH.

The 83rd Division occupied defensive positions from the bend of the OUR River northwest of ECHTERNACH to the junction of that stream with the MOSELLE and along the west bank of the MOSELLE to the Third Army boundary south of REMICH. In order to cover our wide front it was necessary to assign battalion sectors approximately five miles in width. The enemy had a small bridgehead at ECHTERNACH.

This VIII Corps front was exceptionally wide. It was faced with a river line for approximately three-quarters of the distance from flank to flank. The river line being on the frontier the east bank was prepared for defense as part of the SIEGFRIED positions.

E. CLOSING SITUATION.

It should be noted, in the description of the V Corps dispositions above, that the 4th Division had been occupying a very narrow front, and that the 28th Division had not been very actively engaged.

In the VII Corps zone the 1st Division was involved deeply in the AACHEN situation. The 9th Division had been through a period of difficult fighting in the HURTGEN Forest.

It was, therefore, arranged that the 4th Division should take over the front held by the 28th Division in the zone of the V Corps, and a separated unit of the 110th Infantry (28th Division) should be relieved between MONSCHAU and ALZEN by the 5th Armored Division already in position on the right of that front. The 28th Division was to move to relieve the 9th Division in the zone of the VII Corps except for a regiment of the 9th

Division which was attached to the 3rd Armored Division. A temporary boundary would be established between V and VII Corps north of the previous and permanent boundary so as to include the major portion of the front on which the 9th Division had been engaged. The 9th Division was to be withdrawn for rehabilitation and training, and the 28th Division would participate in local advances to readjust the line projected for that neighborhood. Control was left in the hands of the V Corps at this point so that that division might continue to operate under familiar command. Boundaries between V and VII Corps were in detail to be as follows:

Permanent boundary: Effective 1200A 26 Oct: No change to K-7818 - EUPEN (incl V Corps) - LAMMERSDORF (incl VII Corps) - F-010298 (incl VII Corps) - thence along stream to F-050328 (incl V Corps) - OBERMAUBACH (incl VII Corps) - thence along RR to KREUZAU (F-1239) (incl VII Corps) - GLADBACH (F-2341) (incl V Corps) - BLIESHEIM (F-3543) (incl V Corps) - BRUHL (F-4248) - (incl VII Corps) - F-4649 (incl VII Corps).

Temporary boundary: (Effective 1200A 25 Oct.): EUPEN (incl V Corps) - ROTT (K-9233) (incl V Corps) - ZWEIFALL (K-9537) (incl VII Corps) - OBERMAUBACH (F-0936) (incl V Corps).

NOTE: Responsibility, other than tactical control, for area between new permanent boundary and temporary boundary will remain under VII Corps.

The changes noted above took place during the closing days of the month. A regiment of the 4th Division relieved two regiments of the 28th Division as planned and the 5th Armored Division took over the defense of the zone as far as MONSCHAU. The 28th Division assembled in its rear area on 23 October and prepared to move to an assembly position in the woods slightly north of the town of ROTGEN. On 25 October the 28th Division commenced the relief of the 9th Division and assumed responsibility for the front at 1530 on 26 October, taking over from and relieving the last units of the 9th Division on 27 October. In the meanwhile the 9th Division less the 47th Infantry, on 25 October came under control of V Corps and commenced movement to CAMP ELSENBORN. The 47th Infantry remained attached to the 3rd Armored Division. On 27 October the 9th Division, less the detachment mentioned above, was completely assembled and engaged in rehabilitation and training. Also the 4th Division in V Corps was made available to the VII Corps on call.

On 25 October the temporary boundary between V and VII Corps was declared effective at noon and on 28 October there were adjustments made in the boundary between the First Army and the Third Army on the south.

While the changes in disposition were going on there was little major activity. Certain areas in WURSELEN northeast of AACHEN were cleared on 22 October. Local attacks mounted by the 1st Division to a limited objective northeast of HAAREN, on 24 October, were not successful and units returned to their former positions. There were small demonstrations, active patrolling operations, and considerable air and artillery activity at various portions of the front, mostly in the neighborhood of AACHEN, but these were without substantial result.

In the V Corps zone the 28th Division was preparing its attack. In the VIII Corps zone the front was lightly held.

Allocations of major combat units at the close of the month may be summarized as indicated in the Order of Battle date 27 October 1944 as follows:

<u>VII Corps</u>	<u>V Corps</u>	<u>VIII Corps</u>
47th RCT	9th Inf Div (-47 RCT)	2nd Inf Div
1st Inf Div	4th Inf Div	8th Inf Div
3rd Armd Div	28th Inf Div	9th Armd Div
	5th Armd Div	83rd Inf Div

For future operations army boundaries were established by Twelfth Army Group near the end of the month as follows:

Between Ninth and First Armies: TAVIERS (K-0127) - GRAND AXHE (K-2234) - VIVEGNIS (K-5235) - NEUFCHATEAU (K-6237) - TEUVEN (K-6741) - K-8647 - KINZWEILER (K-9451) (all inclusive to First Army) - ALTDORF (F-0354) - HAMBACH (F-0956) - ELSDORF (F-1860) (all inclusive to Ninth Army) - QUADRATH (F-2661) - (inclusive to First Army) - PULHEIM (F-3467) - VOLKOBEN (F-4069) - MERKENICH (F-4570) (all inclusive to Ninth Army).

Between First and Third Armies: STENAY (P-1502) - LONGUYON (U-4596) - ESCH (P-7302) - SIERCK (Q-0094) - SAARBURG (L-1413) (all inclusive to Third Army) - TRIER (L-2029) - THARBACH (L-5550) - KOBLENZ (L-8995) (all inclusive to First Army).

F. COMMENTS.

1. Analysis of Operations.

It will be noted from the preceding summary, as has already been briefly indicated above, that the principal activities of the First US Army during the month of October were devoted to the neighborhood of AACHEN. Enemy defenses along the frontier, although not fully manned and although in places manned by relatively inferior troops, were sufficient to check any substantial forward movement at a rapid pace with the forces at our disposal on our extremely extended front. The early surrender of a wide portion of the front to the VIII Corps and the Third Army (later taken over temporarily by the Ninth Army) narrowed the front for a short time. However, the shift of the XIX Corps to the Ninth Army on our left and the resumption of control over the VIII Corps on our right again gave the First US Army an extremely broad front. It is true that this front covered large spaces of terrain not suitable for offensive fighting. It was terrain easily defended by an enemy and it would have been profitless to have thrown strength into the mountainous area of the ARDENNES. Similarly, the enemy realized the characteristics of that terrain and he, himself, did not accumulate substantial strength there. Not planning an offensive in that region, he had sufficiently weak strength to permit our holding large portions of our line very lightly ourselves.

Even this exercise of economy in troops on those portions of our line did not give sufficient force for decisive action against him on other portions of the line. In the first place, the enemy knew well the difficulties of the terrain west of the RHINE River from BONN to KOBLENZ. It was perfectly apparent to the German commander that the maneuver area for decisive action lay in the neighborhood of and north of the line from COLOGNE to AACHEN. He resisted tenaciously in that area from well prepared defenses. Some of his best troops held on to the last in certain positions. Early in October it was planned to pinch off AACHEN by a stroke eastwards between GEILENKIRCHEN and AACHEN. It, however, became apparent that sufficient power was not available for that stroke.

The area had many pillboxes which had to be reduced. The fighting was in the SIEGFRIED Line itself. Next, if the fact is accepted that the initial eastward thrust would have difficulty in itself reaching through to LINNICH and JULICH, it was checked in order to divert strength to drive through pillboxes and defended towns southwards against the AACHEN exits.

At the end of the month on our front there was evidence that the enemy had elements of two panzer divisions and eight infantry divisions apparently in the front line, not to include several panzer divisions capable of intervening either on the British front to our left, the Ninth Army front on our immediate left, or on our front. He appeared throughout the month to be temporarily content with a relatively stabilized front and except for local and somewhat fragmentary attacks (including armored attacks) in the neighborhood of AACHEN, to forego his established tactical practice of

organizing immediate and heavy counterattacks. The enemy had been severely shaken by the allied success in FRANCE in rapidly overrunning his forces and capturing hundreds of thousands of his troops as prisoners. Whatever delay he could impose upon us from his defensive positions along the frontier he would wish to utilize to prepare for more serious and possibly decisive fighting later.

2. Use of Artillery.

It will be recalled that the report of operations for the First US Army for the month of September made special mention of an exceptional use of artillery units. By the opening of the month of October the extreme seriousness of the supply situation had been greatly alleviated by this use of artillery vehicles for transportation purposes. It had likewise become evident that a more stabilized situation would require a greater weight of artillery fire concentration in support on the front. Artillery of the First US Army, therefore, during October returned to its proper role. Indeed in certain stages of the operations during this month its employment was a major portion of our effort. In addition to rendering normal support the artillery with the Army was regrouped in preparation for both normal and coordinated attacks.

In the attack to complete the encirclement of the town of AACHEN, part of the artillery with both the VII and XIX Corps was attached to the divisions making the main effort. During this action, the heavy artillery of the 32nd Field Artillery Brigade had the mission of supporting the fires of the XIX Corps with long range fires on communication and supply centers. The infantry - artillery - air coordination effected during this operation involved a carefully prepared counterflak program designed to silence enemy antiaircraft artillery during the air bombardment phase, a counterbattery and long range interdiction preparation prior to the attack, planned supporting fires following H Hour, and close liaison between corps and divisions in establishing successive "no fire lines."

One of the contributing factors in the final closing of the AACHEN gap on 16 October by the 1st and 30th Infantry Divisions, was the rapidity with which the field artillery neutralized enemy artillery positions and reacted to requests for close supporting fires on enemy strong points. The accurate location of enemy gun positions was attributed to the efficacy of the carefully sited sound bases of the 8th and 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalions.

Concurrent with the closing of the AACHEN gap, the 1st Infantry Division, supported by elements of the VII and XIX Corps Artillery, launched an attack to reduce the town of AACHEN. Self-propelled 155mm guns and tank destroyers were used extensively in the ensuing street fighting. Following the expiration of the ultimatum on the afternoon of 11 October, 12 battalions of light, medium and heavy artillery fired a total of 169 tons of ammunition into the city. The cessation of active enemy resistance in AACHEN on 21 October was due indeed, in no small part, to the continuous daily pounding by division and corps artillery.

Although the phrase just above about "continuous daily pounding" is correct, it must not be permitted to give a false impression. German prisoners have constantly spoken with something approaching awe as to the accuracy and volume of our artillery fire. It is possible that their impression of awe may be due more to efficiency than to volume.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

A. INTRODUCTION.

The month of October was a period of consolidation and buildup. Whereas during each of the previous two months it had been necessary to move the Army service area twice, and little dependence could be had on rail, during the month of October there was but little movement of the front lines, efforts could be concentrated on the development of the Liege-Eupen service area and the rail situation developed to the point that the majority of the supplies were brought forward by this means.

B. OUTLINE OF THE PERIOD.

1. General Buildup.

a. The general buildup during the period can be illustrated by the following figures on Class I, III and V supplies:

	<u>Class I</u> <u>Days supply on hand</u>	<u>Class III</u> <u>Days supply on hand</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Tons</u>
1 Oct	1.4	.8	20,094
10 Oct.	2.9	4.5	24,714
20 Oct	5.1	8.8	24,284
30 Oct	11.8	6.8	32,443



b. When the period opened there was still considerable tonnage of Class II and IV remaining in the Hirson-La Capelle area and other points to the rear. By 7 October what was needed of these tonnages had been brought up to Liege-Eupen area by truck and rail and the Army rear boundary was moved forward as shown in plate 5. The buildup is illustrated by the following:

	<u>1 October</u>		<u>30 October</u>	
	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Location</u>
	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>_____</u>
Quartermaster	1019	Huy and Eupen	2947	Eupen
Medical	731	Ciney, La Capelle, Eupen	588	Dolhain, Bastogne, Melmedy
Engineer	7323 *	Modave	13,662 *	Modave, Montzen
Signal	6698	Hirson & Micheroux	6,540	Micheroux & Verviers
CWS	65	Bruyers	100	Verviers & Bastogne
Ordnance	2411	Hirson, Presles, Herve	3,492	Aywaille

* Includes floating Bailey Bridge.

2. Development of Railheads.

a. The railheads at the beginning of the month were at Trooz, Herve and Pepinster. Class I was unloaded at Trooz, Class III at Pepinster and Class V and Ordnance II & IV at Herve; the remainder of II & IV was mostly unloaded at Pepinster.

b. Towards the end of the first week the loop running north from Liege to Vise, then east to Welkenvaedt and back through Herve was opened and the Class I railhead was moved to the latter place, which was adjoining the Depot area. Trooz was reserved for bulk POL shipments which began in the middle of the month. An additional railhead was set up at Herbestahl for QM class II & IV and Medical II & IV slightly to the east of Welkenvaedt.

c. During this period the rainfall was particularly heavy and very bad mud conditions developed in the depot areas. Sommerfeld track was ordered for the QM Class I depot and the Ordnance II & IV depot north of Herve was moved to hard standing in the neighborhood of Eysden, a railhead being opened for their supplies at Vise. An area with good hard standings was selected for Engineer II & IV equipment at Montzen on the northeast area of the loop and movement of supplies was begun from Modave starting 6 October.

d. About the middle of the month the bridge on the east side of Pepinster was repaired and trains could proceed east on the Trooz Pepinster line to Verviers and Welkenvaedt. Covered storage was selected for Signal II & IV and CWS II & IV in Verviers which became the railhead for these supplies. With a prospective change in the boundaries which placed Eysden in Ninth Army area the Ordnance II & IV depot was again moved to the south in the neighborhood of Aywaille. Verviers also became a railhead for these supplies. Towards the end of the month, the QM II & IV and Medical II & IV railhead was separated and one was opened for the latter supplies at Dolhain. The final development of the Army service area is shown in plate 3.

3. Move of Ninth Army to North Flank.

One of the major changes during the month was in the move of Ninth Army to the north flank of First Army. The XIX Corps was transferred to the Ninth Army and the VIII Corps to the First Army. The Ninth Army had a railhead at Bastogne with a service area in the general vicinity. This railhead was closed and all supplies destined for Ninth Army were routed north through Vise to Maastricht. The First Army railhead at Vise was surrendered to Ninth Army. The arrangements for the turnover provided in general that the Ninth Army service units supporting VIII Corps should be transferred to First Army and vice versa for the units supporting XIX Corps. On supplies, anything left in the Ninth Army dumps to the south on the date of change-over was to become First Army's and credits for like amounts were to be given to Ninth Army. The change-over date was 22 October; however, it was necessary for First Army both to take over the supply of certain items to VIII Corps prior to that date and to continue the supply of certain items to XIX Corps subsequent to the date, owing to the difficulties experienced by Com Z in building up Ninth Army's supplies.

4. Status of First Army's Special Project Equipment.

The transfer of XIX Corps brought up the question of the status of the special project equipment which had been obtained by First Army under War Department approval prior to the invasion. Orders were given that the more important items of this equipment in the hands of XIX Corps should be turned in for transfer to VIII Corps. However, the orders were suspended under instruction from Twelfth Army Group and the question arose as to whether higher headquarters would require that this equipment be considered as operational reserve with any overage to be available for redistribution. The matter was undecided at the end of the month.

C. TRANSPORTATION.

1. Quartermaster Truck Companies.

The system of assigning the Quartermaster truck companies to the services on a permanent basis for the length of time their hauling requirements demanded and the priorities justified, was continued during the period and the following table shows the maximum and minimum number of companies made available to the services:

	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
Quartermaster	26	20
Ordnance	6	6
Engineer	2	2
Medical	0	0
CWS	0	0
Signal	2	2

	Daily Average Allocation	Daily Average Receipts
Engineer Class II & IV	269	190
V	29	190
CWS Class II & IV	7	4
V	62	30
Medical Class II & IV	22	9
G-5	36	
TOTAL	5,880	4,930

c. The method in which the requisitioning system and the movement forward of supplies was being handled in the rear was of considerable concern, as not only were the total receipts in tons below the tonnages allocated but the composition of the shipments included items not required or "filler" tonnage and many items urgently required were not being received, particularly in Class II & IV. Early in the month First Army requested that a general policy be set up as follows:

(1) Every effort should be made to fill Army requisitions as submitted.

(2) If items should not be available at the time of filling the requisition, these items should be backlogged and the tonnage made up with Class I and III, corresponding adjustment being made in those classes, as soon as the short items were available for shipment.

d. The question became a matter of investigation by Twelfth Army Group and teams of officers were organized to follow First Army requisitions through the processes till the items were received in Army area. Many of the difficulties being experienced in the rear were brought to light by the investigation and the policy requested by First Army was established by direction of Twelfth Army Group.

2. Ammunition Difficulties.

a. Ammunition became a matter of especial concern during the month. Allocations were made by Twelfth Army Group based on stocks reputed to be available on the continent, which subsequently proved to be on ships on continental waters. In order to expedite the movement forward of ammunition, the classifying of ammunition in the rear areas was discontinued and all ammunition discharged was shipped forward in bulk to Advance Section, Com Z depots. Requisitioning by Army was suspended until such time as classified stocks were available in Advance Section, Com Z Depots. Allocations to Armies were then made by Twelfth Army Group against which credits were assigned by Communications Zone at various Advance Section depots. Requisitioning was then resumed against these credits.

3. Winterization Program.

a. One of the major projects during the month was the winterization of the command. In winter clothing this was successfully accomplished during the month with certain exceptions. There were shortages in overshoes size larger than 9. Only a limited issue was made of sweaters, wool knit. The program of equipping the command with either one sleeping bag and two blankets or four blankets was 50% completed within the divisions, the remainder of the command having three blankets.

b. With the very wet weather experienced during the month, an authorization was given for the issue on loan basis of heavy tentage permitting each company to have one kitchen tent and one drying tent. This was to be the precursor of the full scale program for shelter during the winter for which the Engineers completed their plans during the month. This plan was dependent on the tactical situation but in general it provided for maximum use of billets and where this was not possible, the construction of a standard type frame building of company unit size for kitchen, mess hall and drying room, installation of batten doors and frame to CP, large wall and similar tents and the provision of wood frames and wood floors for pup tents. It was estimated that over 19,000,000 bfm of lumber would be required for this and a program was embarked on for the maximum use of all local sawmills and timber stocks in order that the material might be available in time.

c. The most critical item in the winterization program was Prestone. Complete estimates of requirements were submitted 11 September and tonnage was allocated during the first part of October to cover the immediate requirements of 85,000 gallons. By the end of the month however, only 19,000 gallons had been received and the prospect of additional supply was very indefinite.

4. Shortages.

a. Shortages that developed were followed up continuously through command channels. Critical situations in a wide variety of items such as Prestone, tires, PX rations, miscellaneous Signal equipment, shoes (EE width), raincoats (medium and large size), were brought constantly to the attention of the Communications Zone and these measures succeeded in expediting delivery and in placing the emphasis on the Army's need for items rather than tons.

5. Local Procurement.

a. One of the most outstanding features of the period was the use of civilian resources and local manufacturing facilities to relieve critical situations in supply.

b. This policy had been initiated in September as the manufacturing facilities of Paris and later Liege became available to Army. In September thirteen contracts were negotiated by Ordnance, the most important of which were for overhaul of radial tank engines with the Gnome Rhone factory, Paris, for manufacture of parts for small arms with the Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre, Liege, for manufacture of tires and tubes with the Englebert Tire Company, Liege, and for rebuilding 60mm and 81mm mortars with the T. Hanrez Atelierie, Monteau Sembe.

c. During October these contracts began to bear fruit and other services began to take advantage of local facilities. The Quartermaster entered into contracts for such items as assembly of typewriters at a plant previously operated by the Germans, for manufacture of BAR belts and for coffee roasting. The mobilization of all sawmills by the Engineer has already been mentioned.

d. The most significant developments in this direction were again in Ordnance service. There was a critical maintenance situation since during the two previous months only 1.5% and 9.8% respectively of the major assemblies and spare parts requisitioned had been received. It became necessary to embark on a major rebuilding program and to keep the shops working, a large increase in the local procurement program was necessary. Contracts were negotiated for a total of 59 different items during the month. The following may be cited as examples of items which were manufactured: cylinder head gaskets for truck, trailer, 40 ton tank transporter M19; batteries, 6 and 12 volt; rammer staffs, split rings; grinding wheels and valves for the brockway bridge truck.

e. On nearly all the contracts negotiated, substantial deliveries were made during the month and these proved a saving factor in many critical situations.

4 Attachments.

- #1 - Daily tonnages bid by First Army.
- #2 - Daily receipts by First Army from Com Z.
- #3 - Daily status of railheads.
- #4 - G-4. Situation Maps.



DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10, June 29, 1964
NE by BSR date 6/20/71

• FIRST ARMY •

G-4 SITUATION MAP

SCALE 1:250,000

03 1000A OCT. 44



• FIRST ARMY •
G-4 SITUATION MAP
SCALE 1:100,000
04 1000A OCT. 44



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FIRST ARMY

G-4 SITUATION MAP

SCALE 1:250,000

07 1030A OCT. 44




FIRST ARMY

G-4 SITUATION MAP

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NETHERLANDS




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FIRST ARMY

G-4 SITUATION MAP

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14 1000A OCT. 44



FIRST ARMY

G-4 SITUATION MAP

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16 2400A OCT 44

NETHERLANDS

GERMANY

ARMY REAR BOUNDARY

BOUNDARY

FIRST NINTH

FIRST NINTH

NINTH THIRD

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7

06


FIRST ARMY

G-4 SITUATION MAP

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


FIRST ARMY

G-4 SITUATION MAP

SCALE 1:100,000

28 1000A OCT. 44



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SECTION V - CIVIL AFFAIRS

A. PERSONNEL.1. Civil Affairs Detachments.

A detachment training program, which had been instituted in late September at the Verviers Caserne, was expanded considerably in October with the training center being designated formally as the Master Military Government Center and the program for the detachments being continually improved. The experiences of actual Military Government operations in Germany were drawn upon increasingly in formulating the training program. Lecture instruction was supplemented by functional conferences, at which specialist problems were discussed. On 9 October officer personnel of the detachments at the center were given an examination on Military Government. Lack of familiarity with basic policies and other training deficiencies were disclosed by the examination, and additional emphasis was given in the training program to those subjects in which the officers had received insufficient schooling.

With the military situation remaining relatively static throughout the month, few detachments could be deployed into the areas for which they were intended. Several detachments were deployed, however, with responsibility for limited areas of Germany to give them field experience to supplement the training received at the Master Military Government Training Center. In all, 33 detachments were deployed during October. Four detachments passed from First US Army to Ninth US Army control on 4 October, and as a result of the boundary change on 22 October 7 detachments passed to Ninth Army jurisdiction and 10 detachments passed to First Army from Ninth Army.

2. Public Safety.

Unrest continued among the miners and other workers in the Liege-Charleroi industrial region with the unsettled conditions resulting in a 24-hour work stoppage on 9 October and sporadic strikes and stoppages on 31 October. Constant surveillance was maintained by Public Safety Officers of the First US Army over the demonstration strikes, caused by dissatisfaction with wages and the still existing shortages of food, and there was no violence or interference from military activity.

Resistance groups continued to threaten satisfactory maintenance of law and order in various localities. The Belgian Government's policy on the treatment of Resistance groups reflected indecision and at the end of October there was no adequate implementation of the Supreme Commander's order that Resistance groups turn in their arms. In Neufchateau, Belgium, and vicinity, where there were groups of the more militant armed elements of the Resistance, a potentially explosive situation existed which was kept under control largely through the efforts of the Civil Affairs detachment in Neufchateau.

Because of the almost complete absence of police and firemen, difficulty was experienced in recruiting satisfactory public safety forces in Germany. This problem was met in two ways. First both V Corps and VII Corps were prepared with Military Government police organizations composed of American troops; and second, a project was started to train German police officers with a view to their utilization as cadres for civilian police departments in cities to be occupied.

The V Corps Provisional Military Government Police Battalion rendered most valuable service during the month, especially in connection with the large scale evacuation of civilians in the corps area. The most important duty of the VII Corps Military Government Police, formed from the 690th Field Artillery Battalion, was in maintaining order and security in Aachen and vicinity.

On 13 October a center was established at the Caserne in Verviers for the training of German policemen in Military Government duties. Fifty-



four captured Germans, all previously screened by G-2, First US Army, were taken to the Caserne from the First Army PWE. The men were interrogated, filled out questionnaires and underwent other processing, and on 17 October a daily training schedule was introduced. By the end of October the detachment had been increased to 88 men.

3. Refugees and Displaced Persons.

The most important movement during the month was the evacuation for security reasons of more than 10,000 persons from the forward areas of V Corps. The initial processing of the evacuees took place at the Caserne at Malmedy. German nationals were segregated and billeted in the Caserne, while the other refugees were distributed among small communities immediately to the rear or were removed to a center opened on 9 October at Spa. The figures compiled by V Corps as to the actual number of evacuees were as follows: 3500 in Malmedy (town); 2000 in the Caserne, Malmedy; 2600 in the Caserne, Spa; and 2500 in other towns. The evacuation was completed by 12 October.

In the latter part of the month the barracks at Malmedy and at Spa were required for use as military hospitals. The Spa Caserne was evacuated between 18 and 21 October and the Malmedy Caserne by 27 October. These evacuations were made possible in large part by advancing the V Corps security line, permitting many of the evacuees to be returned to their homes.

On 9 October, because of the evacuation policy in the V Corps and possible similar action by other First US Army units, action was initiated to stop the practice of evacuating all civilians. On 16 October, instructions were issued by First Army which directed "that every effort be made to retain civilians as near to their places of residence as possible."

In the first days of October there was little refugee movement in the VII Corps area. Later, as Aachen and its immediate environs were occupied, all persons were evacuated. After facilities for some 1200 persons at HOMBURG and AUREL were filled, a camp was opened at the German barracks on the road between Brand and Aachen. Population at this center reached a peak of 4075 on 23 October and then began to decrease.

The XIX Corps adhered to a standstill policy and reported no refugee problems.

In the vicinity of St. Vith, in VIII Corps area, there were some 1300 refugees and displaced persons at the end of October. They were housed in 14 small shelters under the supervision of a Civil Affairs detachment.

Because the facilities of the First US Army displaced persons center at Verviers were overcrowded, on 18 October 495 Russians were evacuated to the St. Amand Assembly Center near Valenciennes, France and 114 Poles were transferred to the Charleville Assembly Center. This reduced the population at the Verviers Center to 214, with small daily increments bringing the figure to slightly over 300 by the end of the month.

At the end of October, there were an estimated 150,000 refugees and displaced persons in the First US Army area, some 15,000 of whom were being cared for in G-5 installations with the rest being absorbed in private homes.

4. Public Health.

During the month there was some increase in the incidence of acute respiratory-type diseases in Belgium, and the Public Health Department kept in close contact with civilian medical authorities to prevent the increase in endemic diseases from assuming epidemical proportions. Prompt measures were taken by the Department to prevent development of an epidemic of diphtheria in WAIMES and Faymonville, Belgium. Following the outbreak of the disease in these towns approximately 1500 children and adults were examined and over 300 contacts were given prophylactic inoculations.

Fifty-six cases of typhoid fever were reported from a suburb of Liege. Investigation disclosed that the dissemination was probably by contact due to failure to enforce isolation restrictions. Belgian authorities were requested to take steps necessary to enforce isolation measures.

Following the SOP developed during September, civilian casualties were evacuated from Army field installations to civilian hospitals in the rear areas. Due to the intense ill-feeling between the Germans and the Belgians, several fights occurred between Belgian and enemy patients who had been evacuated to Belgian hospitals. To remedy this situation a 50-bed hospital at Maastricht and a 100-bed hospital at Liege were allocated for German civilian casualties.

Shortages of medical supplies were found throughout the First US Army area. These were alleviated by the delivery of ARB medical units to Maastricht and Liege, and by distribution of panniers of medical supplies assembled from captured supplies at Liege and Reims. A stockpile of captured medical supplies, including panniers for emergency distribution, was maintained at the Civil Affairs Supply Depot at Liege.

All displaced persons and refugees infested with lice were dusted with DDT powder. The registration card or other identification papers of persons deloused were marked with a rubber stamp attesting to this fact.

B. GOVERNMENT.

1. Civil Administration.

The principal problem encountered in reconstituting governmental machinery in Aachen and the other communities of Germany in the First Army area was to obtain a sufficient number of acceptable trained personnel for administrative posts. While almost all the individuals appointed by Military Government proved cooperative, many were totally lacking experience in public administration. Increased familiarity with duties resulted in a slow but noticeable improvement in civil administration during the month. After several suitable candidates refused to accept the post for fear of reprisals upon relatives in Germany, Herr Franz Oppenhoff, a lawyer, was appointed Burgermeister of Aachen on 30 October. In cases where there were any doubts as to the reliability of Burgermeisters or other officials, Military Government officers effected replacements. New Burgermeisters were appointed at Stolberg, Roetgen and Zweifall.

In Belgium the National Government's retention of executive power and failure to issue necessary instructions prevented expeditious action by local officials, who showed a continuing tendency to depend on assistance from Civil Affairs detachments. The lack of instructions by the central authorities was particularly noticeable in Eupen and Malmedy.

2. Industry.

Specialists continued to survey factory and other industrial sites with the view to possible utilization for military and for essential civilian uses. In this work preliminary reconnaissance by Civil Affairs detachments was of considerable value.

Continuing a progressive survey of the coal mines occupied, a detailed investigation was made of the coal properties in the Alsdorf-Herzogenrath-Kohlscheid area. A report of the investigation emphasized the need to place some of the mines into production immediately to keep them unwatered. Detachment ELH2 was deployed in Alsdorf on 16 October with the mission of getting the mines back in operation. The detachment was confronted with a pressing problem in connection with the Anna Mine which had a shaft opening into enemy territory. Work was immediately started on a bulkhead to seal the tunnel connecting with the German-held shaft, and a 21-foot block was completed by 18 October.



The actual digging of coal was started on 17 October with the tonnage rising to 170 tons by 20 October. Because of the detachment's work, which prevented the flooding of the mines, it will be possible to step up the production of the mines, having a capacity of 18,000 tons of clean coal per day, as soon as the combat zone moves forward.

3. Utilities and Communications.

The highly important problems of power and rail transportation received considerable attention during the month. Available productive capacity of generating equipment was sufficient, but the problem of coal supply was critical due to the shortage of rail transportation from the coal fields. Existing plans of the Railway Operating Grand Division did not provide for moving civilian supply. Approval was secured, however, of arrangements whereby cars loaded at the coal mines along the Herve Plateau were hitched to empty military trains returning from the Army railheads. Approximately 40 cars handling 400 tons per day were being moved into Liege by this means. Similarly 10 cars of coal per day were being moved from the mines on the outskirts of Liege into the city. Investigation revealed that the Belgian authorities had complete lists of tonnages, movements and other necessary plans for civilian supplies worked out. These plans however, had not been coordinated with those of the Transportation Corps. To assist in the overall handling of rail transportation, with special emphasis on the needed dovetailing of civilian supply with use of all railway facilities by the military, a committee was formed comprising representatives of Belgian industry, railways and power, First US Army G-4 and G-5 Sections, and Civil Affairs detachments in areas where the problem was particularly acute, as in Liege and Luxembourg. The first meeting was held on 29 October.

Constant progress was made in the resumption of local postal service and other communication and informational facilities, including the resumption of operations by the Liege Radio Station and Radio Luxembourg. Telephone service and block signalling for the civilian operated railroad in the Grand Ducy of Luxembourg were restored with necessary security restrictions. It was arranged for a power line between Liege and Maastricht, needed to furnish power to the mines in the Maastricht area, to be rehabilitated by civilian labor.

4. Legal.

Courts in the liberated areas were found in general to be functioning satisfactorily. One exception to this was at Liege where several thousand civilians were confined in overcrowded and unsanitary prisons while awaiting trial by a Belgian Military Tribunal. The Belgian authorities were accomplishing little toward disposing of the cases or alleviating the unsatisfactory conditions of confinement. An investigation disclosed that the greater number of the prisoners were held without charges on suspicion of collaboration and that the Belgian Military Tribunal at Liege was unable to cope with the situation. Recommendations were immediately made which resulted in alleviation of the conditions. By 27 October the investigation of some 2600 cases had been accelerated. Charges were filed against all except some 500 individuals. These 500 cases were being studied and it was expected that some 250 would be released.

Throughout the month there were occasional meetings of Allied Military Government Courts. On 27 October the first General Military Government Court to be established in Germany tried, at Zweifall, the case of a man charged with harboring a German soldier. The accused was found guilty and sentenced to serve a term of five years. An Intermediate Military Government court of more than usual significance, appointed by the Commanding General of VII Corps, sat at Kornelimunster on 31 October. The case involved a woman charged with endeavoring to conceal from the Allied Military authorities certain important Nazi party records and with destroying others. The court found the accused guilty and sentenced her to imprisonment for a term of six years, the longest term imposed up to that time in the First Army area. The sentence was reduced on review to two years.

5. Fiscal.

As was expected, all German banks uncovered were found to have very small cash holdings. To this was added, as a further obstacle to reopening, the fact that key personnel had departed with the Germans, evacuating with them all records. By 5 October it was possible to reopen only one bank, the Kreissparkasse at Monschau. On 16 October the Deutsche Bank and the Kreissparkasse in Stolberg and the Sparkasse in Roetgen were opened; and on 30 October a fifth bank, the Volksbank in Busbach, resumed operations.

Detailed surveys of public finance conditions were made in German communities as soon as they were uncovered. Some towns were found to have adequate cash or facilities at hand for essential requirements; others were found to be very badly off. Any approach to normal conditions would be impossible for some time. No loans of Military Government funds were envisaged in spite of several approaches during the month.

The Fiscal Department maintained close surveillance of currency exchanges made during the month in the areas of Belgium and Luxembourg within the First US Army zone. The Commanding General, First US Army, issued orders prohibiting all military personnel from exchanging notes with civilians and requiring military personnel to effect their exchange of old for new notes through their commanding officers and Army Finance officers.

C. SUPPLY.

In the area of Belgium within the First US Army zone, continued progress was made in the alleviation of the food shortage by the distribution of captured German supplies located by Civil Affairs personnel and transported in captured German vehicles. One factor hindering efforts to provide adequate rations for the entire population was the lack of organized civilian transport. Moreover, local food producers lacked confidence in the currency and withheld food from normal distribution channels for better prices.

While some tonnage of imported supplies was brought forward to the Civil Affairs Supply Depot at Liege during the month, by far the greatest percentage of food supplies distributed was captured German stores. As of 31 October the stockpile of captured German food amounted to 1540 long tons.

The food situation was found to be critical in the areas of the Netherlands liberated by First US Army. Emergency transfers of local food supplies were made as rapidly as transportation permitted, and special requisitions were placed on Communications Zone for 1000 tons of food which were earmarked for Holland. After the change in the Army boundary on 22 October, food was distributed in the Netherlands by the Ninth US Army from supplies made available by the First US Army. In all 235 net long tons of foodstuffs were so issued to the Ninth Army.

In addition to the requisition for 1000 tons of foodstuff for Holland, a special requisition was placed on Communications Zone for 2500 tons of Civil Affairs supplies to be held as a reserve at the Liege Depot. Both of the tonnages were to be brought forward by Communications Zone in G-5 vehicles and were not charged against First US Army supply tonnages.

In Germany stocks of food were found to be exceedingly low in all areas occupied. Local civilian food committees, approved by Military Government, supervised the distribution of perishable locally produced foods. No food was supplied by the First US Army to civilians except to those evacuated to refugee camps. Those so evacuated were fed captured German stores and German produce transported from their own home localities. Division Military Government staffs initiated and supervised the transporting of large shipments of food from Germany to refugee centers, mainly in Malmedy, during the month. For example, under the supervision of the 4th Infantry Division Military Government staff, 1400 pounds of meat and 50 gallons of milk were transported from Hollenfeld on 21 October, 200 pounds of meat, 500 lbs of potatoes,

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150 lbs of cabbage, and 150 lbs of butter from Hunningen and Holzheim on 24 October; and 1000 lbs of meat and 5000 lbs of potatoes from Honsfeld on 26 October. On 20 October the 28th Infantry Division supervised the shipment of 1000 kilos of beef, 500 kilos of pork, 4000 kilos of potatoes, and 630 lbs of butter.